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ABSTRACT
The revolution in chip manufacturing processes spanning five decades has proliferated high per-
formance and energy-efficient nano-electronic devices across all aspects of daily life. In recent
years, CMOS technology scaling has realized billions of transistors within large-scale VLSI chips
to elevate performance. However, these advancements have also continually augmented the im-
pact of Single-Event Transient (SET) and Single-Event Upset (SEU) occurrences which precip-
itate a range of Soft-Error (SE) dependability issues. Consequently, soft-error mitigation tech-
niques have become essential to improve systems’ reliability. Herein, first, we proposed optimized
soft-error resilience designs to improve robustness of sub-micron computing systems. The pro-
posed approaches were developed to deliver energy-efficiency and tolerate double/multiple errors
simultaneously while incurring acceptable speed performance degradation compared to the prior
work. Secondly, the impact of Process Variation (PV) at the Near-Threshold Voltage (NTV) region
on redundancy-based SE-mitigation approaches for High-Performance Computing (HPC) systems
was investigated to highlight the approach that can realize favorable attributes, such as reduced
critical datapath delay variation and low speed degradation. Finally, recently, spin-based devices
have been widely used to design Non-Volatile (NV) elements such as NV latches and flip-flops,
which can be leveraged in normally-off computing architectures for Internet-of-Things (IoT) and
energy-harvesting-powered applications. Thus, in the last portion of this dissertation, we design
and evaluate for soft-error resilience NV-latching circuits that can achieve intriguing features, such
as low energy consumption, high computing performance, and superior soft errors tolerance, i.e.,
concurrently able to tolerate Multiple Node Upset (MNU), to potentially become a mainstream
solution for the aerospace and avionic nanoelectronics. Together, these objectives cooperate to
increase energy-efficiency and soft errors mitigation resiliency of larger-scale emerging NV latch-
ing circuits within iso-energy constraints. In summary, addressing these reliability concerns is
iii
paramount to successful deployment of future reliable and energy-efficient CMOS logic and spin-
tronic memory architectures with deeply-scaled devices operating at low-voltages.
iv
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
This dissertation evaluates and presents the necessity for radiation-induced soft-error mitigation
techniques of nano-electronic computing system architectures. As technology trends of Comple-
mentary Metal Oxide Semiconductor (CMOS) devices have improved the capability of contempo-
rary processors. However, it has increased the susceptibility of VLSI circuits to transient faults.
Thus, Soft Error Rate (SER) masking approaches are sought to increase reliability within area,
speed, energy consumption, and fault masking resilience constraints. In this dissertation, energy-
efficient and cost-effective redundancy-based soft error mitigation techniques to achieve resilience
in VLSI circuits and systems are proposed. In particular, resilient approaches are introduced to
deal with radiation-induced transient effects, i.e., Single-Event Transient (SET) and Single-Event
Upset (SEU), by carrying out tradeoffs between energy consumption and fault resilience. In addi-
tion, the effects of process variation at Near-Threshold Voltage (NTV) region on the redundancy-
based soft error mitigation approaches were investigated to leverage the technique that achieves
an increased performance, satisfies the user specified objective metrics, within an iso-energy con-
straints. Whereas, the later part of this dissertation seeks to cover reliability of deeply-scaled
hybrid CMOS/spintronic (MTJs) nonvolatile latching circuits, due to the radiation-induced soft
errors in the CMOS-based logic portion that is utilized for read/write access operations. A study
to completely and more efficiently address these transient effects to improve reliability will be
conducted to make this emerging technology feasible. This chapter discusses the necessity and
motivation for techniques presented in this dissertation, and concludes with a list of contributions
to the state-of-the-art as a result of this work.
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1.1 Categories of Single-Event
As Complementary Metal Oxide Semiconductor (CMOS) technology continues to scale towards
fundamental physical limits, its immunity against charged particle strikes decreases significantly.
This implies that the continued scaling of CMOS technology process reduces the quantity of criti-
cal charge, Qcrit, transistor’s threshold voltage, a node capacitance, and the supply voltage (VDD).
This gives rise to increase the susceptibility towards radiation-induced soft errors caused by numer-
ous energetic particles, such as protons and heavy ions in space and alpha particles from packaging
materials and cosmic rays neutrons at sea level [13]. Thus, soft errors at the chip level has become
a major reliability challenge for VLSI designs [14]. In order to achieve high-reliability for contem-
porary computing systems, memory protection techniques, i.e., Error Correcting Code (ECC), have
been utilized. However, such techniques are inadequate to completely and efficiently protect the
reliability of VLSI circuits and systems operating at NTV. In particular, soft error effects (SEE) in
logic circuits, i.e., latches/flip-flops and combinational logic, have become significant contributors
to increase Soft Error Rate (SER) at the system-level [15, 16]. Therefore, it has become essential
to ensure the integrity of logic paths by utilizing efficient soft-error mitigation techniques.
At the chip-level, various types of soft error effects can occur in CMOS logic circuits due to
incident energetic particles, including 1) particles that hit inside combinational logic and generate
a transient pulse, the Single-Event Transient (SET) [17], which propagates through downstream
logic, and eventually it might be captured by a storage element, i.e., latch/flip-flop, thereby causing
an upset, 2) energetic particles that strike node(s) inside a storage element to cause a Single-
Event Upset (SEU) that flips the bit state in a DRAM memory cell or a SRAM-based register,
resulting in a soft error, and 3) energetic particle strikes on global signal lines, such as control
signals or instruction lines, can result in Single-Event Functional Interrupt (SEFI) that causes a
temporary malfunction, i.e., interruption of normal operation [18], as the wrong instruction might
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be executed. The corrupted data can be rewritten with new legitimate data and can circumvent the
effect of incorrect state. When the physical device is not destructed, any such temporary glitches
are considered to constitute soft errors. Altogether, these events can cause catastrophic failures in
mission-critical applications. Thus, efficient protection schemes need to be evaluated with higher
priority as moving towards NTC for energy-efficient operation.
1.2 Soft Error Rate in Nanometer-scaled VLSI Devices
Practically speaking, soft errors occur when an energetic charged particle strikes a sensitive node
of a circuit. This induces electron-hole pairs that cause charge/discharge at the struck transistor
junction [19], which depends on the amount of charge collected at the node. The effect of such
transient pulse depends on its duration, the state of the struck device (ON/OFF), and the type of
struck node, i.e. drain side [20]. If the collected charge exceeds the critical amount of charge,
Qcrit, then it produces some momentary charge and flips the voltage state of some circuit node(s),
thereby causing a temporary glitch condition. The rate of these errors defined as Soft Error Rate
(SER), which is a measurement metric that is used to evaluate the sensitivity of a digital circuit to
transient and upset faults [17].
1.3 Why Are Soft Errors Important? Needs for Soft-Error Resilience Logic Circuits
The revolution in chip manufacturing processes spanning five decades has proliferated high per-
formance and energy-efficient nano-electronic devices across all aspects of daily life. In recent
years, CMOS technology scaling has realized billions of transistors within large-scale VLSI chips
to elevate performance. However, these advancements have also continually augmented the im-
pact of SET and SEU occurrences which precipitate a range of Soft-Error (SE) dependability
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issues [14, 21]. In the earlier technologies, soft errors were a major concern to the reliability of
Integrated Circuits (ICs) for space applications. Moving forward to advanced technology node, the
susceptibility of sub-micron electronics to radiation-induced transient effects has been of increased
interest, and this phenomenon dominates the overall SER of large-scale logic circuits [1, 22]. In
addition, the trend toward using smaller, denser, and faster CMOS devices has influenced logic cir-
cuits to experience larger leakage currents, thereby negatively impacting the reliability of deeply-
scaled circuits by degrading their performance and robustness [23]. This is because the heat that
results from large leakage currents can induce thermal noise, which can lead to bit upset in a mem-
ory element [24, 25]. Thus, as technology has advanced and transistors have become smaller, soft
errors have become a major contributor to reliability issues at sea level [20].
Taking all of these reliability-impacting factors into consideration, soft errors have been assessed to
dominate a variety of failure mechanisms, whereby the SER might exceed the Failure In Time (FIT)
metric [16,26,27]. As listed in Table 1.1, the SER of logic and memory per chip has increased 100-
fold with technology scaling, especially for recent generations. In addition, due to the increasing
integration density and growing complexity of ICs, the number of susceptible nodes to transients
faults have increased. This leads to a higher SER that has recently been considered a serious
concern for reliable memory and logic circuits [14, 28]. If such transient errors are not budgeted
or compensated for, then the circuit can fail to perform correctly. Therefore, soft-error suppression
becomes essential to improve the reliability of resilient systems operating in harsh environments
like space, marine, military, and even in commercial applications [16, 20, 26, 29].
1.4 FinFET Structure Devices
The High-κ/Metal Gate (HK-MG) devices with vertical channels, i.e., the fin-typed Field-Effect
Transistors (FinFETs) have been introduced to continue scaling and also show improved low-
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leakage and high performance over planar MOSFET devices [30,31]. The tri-gate FinFET devices
have been adopted by Intel at the 22nm technology node and beyond since they handle the problems
of Short-Channel Effect (SCE) and provide more robust gate controllability than planar MOSFET
devices, while offering improved switching characteristics for potential scalability beyond 10nm
half-pitch [30, 32, 33]. Additionally, multi-gate bulk FinFET devices improve variations and thus
the system’s overall performance has significantly improved. Moreover, FinFET devices have
exhibited higher tolerance to soft error effects, while being less prone to particle strikes compared
to planar structure CMOS devices, thereby they have assisted in increasing the robustness of large-
scale logic circuits [16,34]. In contrast, even though scaling the transistor volume helps in reducing
the susceptible area, there exists an increased SER. This is due to two major factors including: the
critical quantity of charge, Qcrit, of a node capacitance has aggressively diminished, while the
other factor is that the density of integration is doubling the number of transistors per unit area
over time, leading to an increased SER as low energy particles potentially can deposit an adequate
amount of charge, i.e., sufficient Linear Energy Transfer (LET), to cause soft errors.
Table 1.1: Trends of SER as impacted by technology scaling [7, 8]. However, vertical channel de-
vices, i.e., FinFETs, can offer alternatives that achieve increased tolerance to SER for technologies
beyond 22nm. For instance, Intel recently released its processors within 14nm technology node.
Design Rule SER Total SER Chip Count(nm) (Logic+Memory) (Data Center)
180 1 – –
130 15 – –
90 25 105 104.4
65 50 105.5 104.8
45 60 106.25 105.3
32 75 107 105.7
22 90 107.5 106.15
16 102 108.8 106.75
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1.5 Contributions of the Dissertation
The dissertation’s inspiration is partly to give an insight into the soft-error mitigation techniques
and their challenges related to the design of reliable systems, to assist in selecting the proper
technique for satisfying specific SER constraints. The main contributions of this dissertation are
highlighted below.
Energy-efficiency vs fault resilience: In this work, a reliable and cost-effective, area and en-
ergy efficient, redundancy-based approaches have been developed to mitigate soft errors at the
circuit/module-level. The proposed SE-tolerant techniques are able to tolerate both transient and
upset faults and provide complete SEU protection, detection, and masking. The presented schemes
impose comparable speed performance compared to the previously presented self-voting DMR
hybrid redundancy approach. In addition, the proposed approach incurs reduced area overhead as
compared to the conventional TMR, aside from its ability to tolerate double SEUs simultaneously.
The efficacy of these approaches is quantified using Fault Coverage Power Ratio metric. This work
is presented in Chapter 3.
Impact of PV at NTV on redundancy-based soft error mitigation techniques: The energy and
performance costs, which are crucial design considerations due to prevalent use of low-voltage
operation in current computing systems, were deeper investigated. In particular, detailed energy
and performance tradeoffs of redundancy-based approaches for soft error mitigation in 16-nm non-
planar FinFET and 45-nm planar CMOS structures are provided. For process variation, a compar-
ison between 45-nm planar CMOS and 16-nm FinFET CMOS structure was carried out regarding
energy-efficiency. Furthermore, the effects of both delay variation and technology node scaling
on redundancy-based soft error mitigation techniques at NTV for iso-energy constraints have been
revealed to depict the quantitative results. Additional important insight of this work was to identify
and quantify the increase in energy cost of spatial redundancy at contemporary and future tech-
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nology nodes such as 16 nm. Monte-Carlo simulation results demonstrate that energy-efficiency
benefits of scaled technology devices (16-nm) as compared to 45-nm node due to increase in per-
formance variations. The highlights of work presented in Chapter 4 are given below:
1. Assessing Resilience vs Area of Soft-Error Masking schemes: determining empirically the
costs of spatial and temporal redundancy under the impact of technology scaling.
2. Evaluating the Energy and Delay Cost of Redundancy at NTV: determining the delay of
redundant systems at NTV within a given energy budget.
3. Soft-Error Resilience Sensitivity to Process Variation: identifying the increased impact of
σVth on alternative SER reduction strategies for 45-nm planar and tri-gate 16-nm bulk Fin-
FET CMOS devices.
4. Fault Coverage Energy Ration: employing the FCER metric as an optimization parameter
for design of resilient circuits, and its applicability to guide circuit synthesis algorithms while
meeting performance goals.
5. Design Diversity and Spatial Redundancy: quantify the pros and cons of design diversity for
redundancy-based soft error mitigation approaches.
Soft-error resilient hybrid CMOS/spintronic STT-MTJ latching circuit: Emerging spin-based
devices are under intensive developments and investigations to improve their reliability. In this
work, we design and evaluate soft-error resilience hybrid CMOS/spin-based latching circuit for
nonvolatile high-performance applications. The proposed approach can achieve intriguing fea-
tures, such as low energy consumption, high computing performance, superior soft error effects
resilience, i.e., concurrently can tolerate MNU, to potentially become as a mainstream solution for
the aerospace and avionic nanoelectronics.
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Soft-error resilient NVFF circuits for eneregy-aware and reliability-aware architectural state
storage: In this chapter, radiation hardening Non-Volitale Flip-Flop (NVFF) circuits are developed
using spin-based devices that deliver reduced power dissipation and optimized CLK-to-Q delay,
while achieving complete soft errors masking coverage for both SEUs and DNUs. It identifies
the need for energy-aware and reliability-aware soft-error resilient latching circuits to improve soft
errors masking robustness of emerging large-scale NVFF circuits while concurrently reducing its
power dissipation to realize energy efficiency. Specifically, the contributions of chapter 6 are as
follows:
1. Develop an NV-latch using Spin Hall Effect (SHE)-based Magnetic Tunnel Junctions (MTJs)
that can tolerate multiple node upsets.
2. Design of low energy and high-performance SEU and DNU tolerant CMOS-based latches.
3. Develop four different NVFFs, which can be utilized in normally-off and NV computing
architectures.
8
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
In this chapter, a wide range of resilient SER mitigation techniques that exploit specific attributes
of different levels of a design for energy-savings to attain reliable protection capabilities are dis-
cussed. These techniques have been adopted to mitigate soft errors at different levels of abstrac-
tion. To highlight the characteristics of each technique and demonstrate the accuracy of soft error
mitigation schemes, the protection techniques are categorized based on the design level of the pro-
tection scheme. The taxonomy of SER masking techniques relies on the Single Event Transient
(SET) pulse generation at the device-level, propagation at the circuit-level, and capturing at the
circuit/module-level. Also developed is a concise taxonomy for the sources of induced soft errors
and variation. A comparison among the predominant mitigation schemes in terms of area, energy
consumption, fault coverage, and design complexity is carried out to leverage the robustness of
schemes that achieve the highest performance over the stated issues. Likewise, a review of the im-
pact of technology and voltage scaling trends on the SER and its masking techniques are discussed.
The inspiration of this survey chapter has been to provide a compendium of design insights for soft
error mitigation techniques to identify the most efficient hardening schemes, in order to serve as a
guide for researchers and designers of reliable CMOS circuits and systems.
2.1 SER-Induced System Dependability Issues
In the nanometric technologies, integrated circuits are associated with the diminishing of device
feature size, massive growth in integration density, and lower supply voltages. Thus, these desir-
able attributes have raised the vulnerability of the integrated circuits to soft errors as they impose
risks for terrestrial and space applications. Next, system reliability at different abstraction layers
and the sources of transient and permanent faults are discussed.
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2.1.1 Reliability at Multiple Abstraction Levels
A system’s reliability can be impacted by different effects. Herein, we concentrate on the effects
of soft errors as a major reliability issue in highly-scaled devices and systems. Suppression of soft
errors can be achieved at different abstraction levels. As seen in Figure 2.1, a fault, error, and fail-
ure can occur at three distinguished layers. As depicted by the cumulative arc in Figure 2.1, during
the mission each component may transition from viable status to faulty status for highly-scaled de-
vices. This transition may occur due to cumulative effects of deep submicron devices such as Time
Dependent Dielectric Breakdown (TDDB) [35], which is caused by an electric field weakening of
the gate oxide layer, the Total Ionizing Dose (TID) of cosmic radiation, Electromigration within in-
terconnections, and other progressive degradations over the mission lifetime. Meanwhile, transient
effects such as incident alpha particles, which ionize critical amounts of charge, ground bounce,
and dynamic temperature variations may cause either long lasting or intermittent reversible tran-
sitions between viable and faulty status. A fault may affect the data that is being processed and
then impact the final result and produce a failure. However, transient faults can be remedied at the
Resource Layer, allowing the next layer’s input to be error-free, or faults may lie dormant whereby
the physical resource is defective, yet currently unused. Later in the computations, dormant faults
become active when such components are utilized, affecting the result of the resource layer.
The Behavioral Layer shown in Figure 2.1 depicts the outcome of utilizing viable and faulty phys-
ical components. Viable components result in correct behavior during the interval of observation.
An error that occurs but does not incur any impact to the result of the computation is termed a
silent error. Silent errors, such as a flipped bit due to a faulty memory cell at an address that is not
referenced by the application or an error in a Triple Module Redundancy (TMR) system that occurs
in a single instance but the final output is error-free as long as the other two inputs are correct,
remain isolated at the Behavioral Layer without propagating to the application [36, 37].
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Figure 2.1: Layered model of permanent and soft error sources and impacts.
On the other hand, errors that are articulated propagate up to the Application Layer. The Applica-
tion Layer depicts that correct behaviors contribute to sustenance of Compliant operation. Systems
that are compliant throughout the mission at the application layer are deemed to be reliable. To
remain completely Compliant, all articulated errors must be Concealed from the application and
remain within the Behavioral Layer. Articulated errors that reach the application cause the sys-
tem to have Degraded performance if the impact of the error can be tolerated. On the other hand,
articulated errors that result in unacceptable conditions to the application incur a Failure condi-
tion, which might be recovered by replacing the effected cell(s) in the configurable devices, i.e.,
Field-Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs), or failures may be catastrophic in Application-Specific
Integrated Circuits (ASICs) devices [38].
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2.1.2 Radiation-Induced Soft Errors
Sources of most temporary errors that impact system reliability are listed in Table 2.1. These
sources are categorized based on radiation, SET characteristics, and variability, as each one can re-
sult either in soft error or hard error/failure. Ionizing radiation can have different effects on CMOS
chips, and this depends on the radiation environment in which the chips are utilized. Concerning
CMOS circuits, there are two broad categories of radiation effects including Single-Event Effects
(SEE), which are due to a single strike of a particle with high ionizing power (thereby causing
instantaneous failure); and Total Ionizing Dose (TID) effects, which are due to the progressive
accumulation of defects caused by the movement of many particles (causing long-term failure),
such as electrons or protons. Radiation-induced soft errors at the sea level consist of neutrons,
photons, muons (generated from the interaction of secondary cosmic effects with the atmosphere),
and pions. Additionally, alpha particles, that either originate from some metals used in integrated
circuit fabrication or emitted from some elements that are used in the doping of semiconductors
(radioactive impurities), is also an important source of error in sensitive circuits. Among them,
roughly 95% of these particles are neutrons [16, 28].
In SRAM cells, secondary particles from neutron collisions have the largest effect on Qcrit [28].
Overall, at sea level, both alpha-particles and neutrons are important sources to induce soft errors
in CMOS SRAMs [39]. On the other hand, it was projected in [39] that cosmic ray neutron-
induced soft errors demonstrates SER in latching circuits since they constitute a larger charge
capacitance. However, as Qcrit becomes smaller with process scaling, alpha-SER increases 4-fold
per generation [40]. This indicates that LET from alpha particles can generate greater than 1 MeV
(equivalent to 44.5fc) by direct ionization, which is more than adequate to charge/discharge a node
capacitance and flip the state of the struck node [28]. It is also reported that SEU susceptibility
to low-energy protons and alpha particles from radioactive impurities is able to deposit adequate
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charges by direct ionization to cause SEUs due to an intrinsic reduction in the amount of deposited
charge [16, 28].
Practically, enhancing the purity of the materials reduces the SER induced from alpha particles,
whereas the effects of cosmic rays can be reduced by shielding the die area [28]. Shielding pro-
vides partial masking of electrons and low energy protons. In addition, shielding a circuit by
packaging to prevent SEUs can increase the SER due to packaging as packaging materials them-
selves can release alpha particles that induce soft errors. Likewise, long-term TID exposure can
result in variations in threshold voltage, which might increase device leakage currents, and thereby
increase power consumption. These are in addition to increasing the degradation of materials, lead-
ing to timing changes and thus decreased functionality. Soft error effects can be mitigated using
radiation-hardened devices and shielding. However, these strategies are inadequate for robust sys-
tems with high reliability. Thus, utilizing redundancy techniques or changing the geometry of the
device are still in use to improve the reliability. For example, the experimental results in [41] pro-
jected that SER for SOI is reduced 5-folds compared to substrate bulk technology. In addition, the
contribution of neutron and alpha particle induced soft errors have found to be reduced roughly the
same difference. Hence, the difficulty is not how to achieve a high reliability. However, achieving
it with minimum area and power overheads and speed degradation is the aim. Thus, it is desired
for SER mitigation schemes to allow tradeoffs between reliability and overhead of protection tech-
niques. We identify these techniques in Section 2.3.
2.1.3 Sources of Variations
The lower portion of Table 2.1 identifies the sources of variability that impact reliability. Nano-
scale devices are susceptible to process variations created by precision limitations of the manufac-
turing process [42].
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Table 2.1: Categories of exposures facing highly-scaled CMOS logic circuit design.
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Sources of variability can be categorized into two groups: intrinsic (random) and extrinsic (sys-
tematic). Process variations on the gate oxide thickness (tox) and the gate length (Lg) are the most
dominant extrinsic variations, whereas variation that is intrinsic in nature results from stochas-
tic behaviors related to device fabrication including Random Dopant Fluctuation (RDF) (due to
random number and position of impure dopants), Linear Edge Roughness (LER), Random Work
Function fluctuation (WKF) (due to metal gate), and Interface Traps (ITs) [43, 44]. Practically, to
alleviate the intrinsic-parameter fluctuations, the high-κ/metal-gate technology was introduced as
an effective alternative.
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Considering all sources of variations, one of the most significant is RDF. Additionally, RDF is
exacerbated as the device area decreases for bulk substrate devices. It was reported in [1] that the
reduction in technology size accompanied by each technology generation decreases area roughly
by half. Therefore, the channel dopant concentration decreases exponentially over time. Conse-
quently, due to a few tens of dopant atoms in the channel for generations beyond 32nm, compared
to thousands of dopant atoms in earlier technologies, the randomness will increase causing more
variability [1]. However, in FinFET devices that have undoped channels, i.e., HK-MG Silicon-On-
Insulator (SOI) developed by IBM, RDF is considered negligible and WKF, ITs, and LER become
the major sources of fluctuation [45,46]. The increased occurrence of process variation results in a
distribution of threshold voltage (Vth). As the Vth increases, the increase in switching time affects
the delay performance of the circuit. Such variability is observed to be magnified by the continued
scaling of process technology [46]. For example, the effect of RDF is magnified as the number of
dopant atoms is fewer in scaled devices, as shown in Figure 2.2. This implies that the addition or
deletion of just a few dopant atoms significantly alters transistor properties.
Nano-scale devices in CMOS technology require eliminating the fabrication challenges (extrinsic
variation) as well as mitigating intrinsic variation effects, which are essential for the characteri-
zation of deeply-scaled CMOS planar and FinFET structures [31, 43]. In the design levels, the
Process Variation Effect (PVE) and RDF predominate at the circuit-level and device-level fluctu-
ations [47]. Although all of these factors influencing variation contribute a major role in impact-
ing system reliability, recently, soft errors have been pronounced in the literature as predominant
sources of reliability degradation, especially under the scaling impact at recent CMOS device tech-
nology nodes [16, 26, 27]. Therefore, herein we concentrate on radiation-induced transient faults
and review techniques presented in the literature to immune logic circuits and systems towards
soft errors. Since the characteristics of soft-errors impacting logic and memory elements differ, we
review them separately in Section 2.2 and Section 2.3.
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Figure 2.2: Random dopant fluctuation as a function of technology generations [1].
2.2 Soft Errors in Logic Paths
The contribution of soft errors in logic datapaths as opposed to memory elements is becoming
significant as the technology node and supply voltage are scaled down, specifically at the 65nm
process node and beyond [17, 27]. In the past, designers focused on soft-error induced by SEUs
to protect memories rather than protecting logic paths, i.e., latches/flip-flops and combinational
logic gates, where transient logic errors were considered negligible as compared to SEUs in mem-
ories [20]. However, as device shrinkage leads to a reduction in the amount of collected charge,
the SER trend has been higher because of the reduced quantity of collected charge required to
induce voltage and current swings in CMOS logic circuits. Therefore, as research studies and
circuit designers progressively advance technology processes including shrinking the size of tran-
sistors, reducing power supply voltage, growing integration capacity, and increasing the switching
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speed of charging/discharging operations, these have reduced a circuit’s reliability and increased
the complexity of submicron ICs [19, 20]. For instance, Dixit and Wood [10] examined SER in a
microprocessor, and their experimental results revealed that SER is expected to exaggerate under
technology node scaling. This causes the unprotected part of SER per microprocessor to be in-
creased even though the SEU per bit has decreased. Therefore, leaving the SER microprocessor
logic (latch-origin) unprotected as in earlier technology nodes has become reliability concern for
advancing technology generations. This is due to device feature size being decreased, leading to
SER in microprocessor logic becoming one of the major contributors that might cause system fail-
ure [10,14]. Thus, as with memory elements, it has become essential to protect logic paths against
soft errors [17], with emphasis on protecting the latching circuits.
2.2.1 Logic Path Masking Mechanisms
In logic paths, the propagation of a transient pulse through downstream logic might be masked
by three inherent masking mechanisms. These can prevent the propagation of a spurious transient
pulse along a path towards the input of a flip-flop/latch, where it may be registered to cause an
SEU [48]:
1. Logical Masking: corresponds to cases when a transient pulse does not affect the computa-
tion in other gates along the path towards the output for a given input vector,
2. Electrical Masking: caused by attenuation of the glitch while passing through subsequent
logic gates, and
3. Latching-window/temporal Masking: occurs when a generated glitch does not occur within
the setup/hold time window of a flip-flop.
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Figure 2.3: An example of logic datapath masking mechanisms.
Figure 2.3 depicts a brief example to elucidate these masking mechanisms further. As seen in the
figure, the generated SET pulse at gate G3 is masked by the logical masking since the output of
a AND gate is logic 0 whenever one of its inputs is 0. On the other hand, the SET pulse at gate
G5 is attenuated by the electrical masking due to the assumption that its width is smaller than the
transition delay time of circuit G5, however, the SET pulse maintains its amplitude while passing
through gate G4 since its width exceeds the transition delay of G4, as assumed in this example.
While the SET at DFF1 and DFF2 is not captured to flip the bit state and causes an upset because it
is either masked by the temporal masking, i.e., does not arrive during the setup/hold time of DFF1,
or it arrives at the capturing time, it was attenuated by the electrical masking, i.e., at DFF2. Thus,
its amplitude is inadequate to cause an upset. Meanwhile DFF3 undergoes an upset (bit state flip)
due to the transient pulse’s (SET2) arrival at the setup/hold time of DFF3.
These masking mechanisms have been considered to reduce SER in the logic datapaths signifi-
cantly as compared to that of a memory cell for the same technology process [48]. In addition,
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they are exploited in the SER mitigation approaches at the circuit/module-level as the means to
eliminate the propagation and/or capturing of SET pulses. However, the downscaling in the tran-
sistor’s structure and supply voltage reduction has reduced the benefits of the masking phenomenon
and made transient faults a potential source of decreased reliability in logic paths.
It is evident that logical masking is not impacted by operation at lower voltages (technology gen-
eration) since it is circuit design dependent. For example, a 0 logic on one input of a NAND gate
or a 1 logic on one input of a NOR gate prevents the illegitimate pulse from being propagated to
the next logic gate, or controlled by the state of the combinational logic. On the other hand, the
propagation and/or attenuation of such transient pulse depends on its duration. For example, if a
SET pulse duration is roughly lower than the transition delay of a logic gate, it cannot propagate
through a logic path. Whereas, if its width exceeds twice the transition delay of a logic gate, it
propagates through the logic without attenuation. However, it might undergo some attenuation
during its propagation if its duration is between 1-fold to 2-folds of the logic transition time [20].
Moreover, at low supply voltages, the electrical attenuation is lowered through logic datapaths
since smaller transistors are faster to charge/discharge, which might result in reduced attenuation
effect on the SET amplitude [10, 48]. For instance, in the earlier technologies’ gate capacitances
utilized large amounts of charge, and therefore, they were less prone to experience upsets, and
even if an upset occurs, it was most likely to be attenuated by electrical masking due that the gate
transition delay was larger than the SET pulse width [17]. Likewise, Mahatme et al. [27] projected
that electrical masking is likely to diminish as device feature size is decreased due to a reduction
in the gates’ capacitance and faster switching speed of transistors. Similarly, temporal masking
mechanism provides reduced benefits under technology scaling. A SET pulse might be registered
in a flip-flop or latch if the logic transient time becomes shorter than the duration of the pulse
width. Thus, it will no longer be masked by the temporal masking due to overlapping with the
setup/hold time.
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Figure 2.4: SET latching window of vulnerability [2].
Furthermore, increasing the clock frequency raises the probability in which the SET pulses overlap
with the clock event, a so-called window of vulnerability [20] as shown in Figure 2.4. For instance,
in [10], it is reported that the temporal masking range for latching is decreased by shrinking the
transistor geometry size and/or increasing the frequency rate. Furthermore, as operating frequen-
cies at lower supply voltage (VDD) are expected to be low, it has been suggested that pipeline stages
should consist of fewer gates to regain lost throughput. This will consequently lower the benefit of
both logical and electrical masking.
Overall, incrementing the number of stages in a pipeline processor [48], technology node scaling,
and voltage reduction can be anticipated to have detrimental impact on logic SER. Thus, it is
sought to design effective soft error mitigation techniques for reliable low power applications. For
instance, developing a method to select a hardening technique to protect a module of complex
circuitry, so that evaluating and hardening according to the SER of combinational logic-origin or
latch-origin is crucial for optimal performance [49]. In practice, designers seek the flexibility of
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achieving an optimal balance between the soft-error coverage and the system requirements, with
minimal overheads of power, area, and speed degradation as listed in Table 2.5.
2.2.2 SET Characterizing and Modeling
Recently, new methods have been developed to model, estimate, and mitigate SETs in digital
circuits at different abstraction levels, and various SER suppression strategies have been proposed.
In earlier technology generations, the largest part of soft errors causing fault in logic designs was
resulting from memory-based SEUs. However, SET pulses from logic, i.e., latches and logic gates,
have significantly increased when moving to advanced technology process or when increasing the
integration densities [19, 20]. In particular, whether logic path originated SER or unprotected
memory-originated SER will dominate the overall SER on a chip has been investigated in [10,
27]. The authors conclude that the logic SER should be emphasized for effective SER mitigation.
Similarly, Mavis and Eaton [2] emphasize that transient faults, i.e., SET pulses, in logic circuits
have become a serious reliability challenge under the shrinking of the MOSFET feature size.
Modeling SETs pulse width under technology node scaling has been investigated widely. In the lit-
erature, some predictions of the transient pulse width trends under technology process scaling have
been conflicting [9]. In fact, the impact of technology scaling on SETs is found to be complicated
by several divergent trends contributing to SET characteristics. These includes shrinking the de-
vice feature size (reduced Qcrit), reducing the supply voltage, higher clock rate, trends of datapath
masking mechanisms (electrical and temporal masking), Propagation-Induced Pulse Broadening
(PIPB) or pulse stretching, pulse quenching, n-well contact and spacing (to reduce parasitic bipo-
lar effects), voltage/oxide thickness/gate length variation, altitude (for space applications), source
of radiation/particles, and others [3, 16, 17, 26]. However, the results presented in [9] assist in
elucidating some of the discrepancies in SET pulse width measurements presented by various re-
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searchers in the last decade, especially the research work by Narasimham et al. [50]. In [9], the
variation of transient pulse widths as a function of technology scaling was investigated. A consen-
sus was reached through experimental verification whereby transient pulse widths in bulk 65nm
CMOS technology overall was found to be reduced with technology scaling under the conditions
that they evaluated, illustrated in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2: Estimated maximum SET widths based on linear energy transfer (LET) [9]; taking into




(MeV-cm2/mg) SET Width with SET Width w/o SET Width with SET Width w/o
PIPB (ps) PIPB (ps) PIPB (ps) PIPB (ps)
10 900 125 170 50
20 1200 240 175 55
30 1220 270 200 90
40 1220 360 215 125
50 1300 440 240 145
60 1400 500 250 155
The most significant outcome from Table 2.2 is that the maximum SET widths for a Linear Energy
Transfer (LET) of 60 MeV-cm2/mg are about 250 ps for 65nm, whereas they are about 1.4 ns for
both 130nm and 90nm. Another crucial conclusion is that the Propagation-Induced Pulse Broad-
ening (PIPB) also contributes a role in determining the SET pulse width. However, the broadening
length that was considered in [50] was not realistic since the authors determined the longest SET
pulse width by taking into account a linear chain of 1,000-inverters, whereas in real logic circuits
the logic chains are relatively very short [9]. Thus, the results that are listed in the third and last
column are more accurate and realistic. They demonstrate the trends of shrinking the width of SET
pulse under technology generation by measuring SET pulse widths for different technologies, 130,
90, and 65nm. Clearly, the trends of transient pulse width are found to be decreased under tech-
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nology scaling. A related work for determining the broadening SET pulse width in combinational
logic was done in [51] using 65nm technology process from TSMC. Hamad et al. [51] projected
that if the SET pulse width is sufficiently larger than the threshold combinational logic, it will
propagate through logic paths without attenuation. For instance, their experimental results show
that in a chain of six 4-input NAND gate, the width of the injected SET broadens from 100 to 178
ps when passing through combinational logic, whereas it expands to 184 ps when passing through
4-input NOR gates chain. However, this variation, i.e., PIPB, can be controlled by designing gates
with balanced rising and falling times [52]. In addition, it was reported in [53] that SER of logic
paths is not susceptible to the effect of PIPB phenomena except for long datapaths circuits. Mean-
while, a SET that hits the control lines have been specified as a considerable portion of the overall
SER per chip.
On the other hand, parasitic bipolar amplification is found to be a major contributor that causes long
widths of transient pulse in deeply-scaled CMOS technologies [3]. Amusan et al. [3] measured the
widths of transient pulses in a 90nm technology and they report that the parasitic bipolar effect and
the widths of transient pulses greatly rely on the n-well contact area and spacing. The experimental
results in [3] illustrate that the widths of SET pulses can be reduced significantly by modifying the
area of the n-well contact while maintaining the well size constant, shown in Figure 2.5. Similarly,
Gadlage et al. [9] investigated SET pulse widths based on modifying the n-well contact size of the
pMOS device, since parasitic bipolar amplification is more noticeable in a bulk pMOS device with
an n-well and p-substrate [9]. Their experimental results show the same conclusion as the results
presented in [3]. Consequently, both results in [3] and [9] confirm that layout design techniques,
i.e., n-well contact area, contribute a major role in determining SET pulse width. Thus, Gadlage et
al. [9] concluded that if the results of one work is done using a robust scheme for n-well contacts
and spacing, the SET pulse widths will be decreased with technology scaling. On the other hand,
if a less robust n-well contact and spacing layout scheme is employed to experimentally measure
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SET pulse widths, the results will lead to the conclusion that layout n-well contact and spacing
will dominate the effects of transient pulse widths.






























N−Wel l Contact Area (µm2)
Figure 2.5: Estimated maximum SET widths based on modifying the n-well contact size of the
pMOS device for 90nm technology process [3].
Overall, the variation in a SET pulse width can be either broadening its duration or attenuating
its amplitude. For instance, it was predicted in [54] that, the SET pulse width is decreased as
technology feature size is scaled down, where the critical transient pulse width is estimated to be
85, 70, and 55 pecs for 180, 100, and 45nm, respectively. This trend is found to be true for both
bulk and SOI devices. Similarly, estimating the width of the transient pulse, induced from neutron
effects, under technology node scaling was done in [55] based on changing different design factors,
including: drive strength, area of the diffusion drain, fan-out, temperature, and supply voltage.
Results indicated that the SER of SET in logic circuits deceases by roughly 50% as technology is
scaled from 90nm to 45nm for the same circuit and clock rate. Also, the authors concluded that the
main factors that should be focused on are cell type, fan-out, and supply voltage. When reducing
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the drive strength or increasing fan-out, the impact of SET will decrease for the small SET pulse
width (63 to 86 ps), but it will increase for the long pulse width (> 109 ps). Alternatively, supply
voltage reduction will increase the rate of SET since less amount of collected charge can change
the state in an output node at a logic cell.
On the other hand, since there exist several divergent trends contributing to increase or decrease
SER, modeling and measuring SER is found to be complicated with advancing technology gen-
erations. Diverse analytical techniques were recently presented to assess SER in semiconductor
logic circuits. For instance, Ashraf et al. [56] proposed a novel approach to analyze and estimate
the propagation of a transient fault through downstream computing logic. The proposed algorithm
utilizes machine learning techniques to precisely track the impact and propagation speed in dis-
tributed MPI applications and provide more accurate prediction, thereby preventing the erroneous
outcomes/conclusions that the statistical fault injection analysis might lead to, which is based on
output variation. It was stated that the introduced fault propagation framework can assist in re-
alizing high resilience by improving vulnerability of HPC applications as it not only accurately
predicts the number of corrupted memory locations into parallel MPI applications but also indi-
cates how quickly a transient error propagates into the application’s state. Furthermore, recently,
researchers have switched to using probabilistic methods for modeling SET since it provides accu-
rate and fast measuring of SET pulse width in logic circuits under the effects of process variation.
For example, Yao et al. [57] proposed a statistical SER analysis technique. Their experimental
results emphasize that PV effects have made the analysis of SET faults more complicated as the
technology process shrinks beyond 40nm. Also, it has been reported that process variations of ef-
fective channel length (Leff ), threshold voltage (Vth), and oxide thickness (Tox) have significantly
impacted SER by more than 50% of the static analysis result of SER, thus using only a static SER
analysis methodology results in inaccurate estimation of SER in logic. Therefore, utilizing a prob-
ability distribution method to characterize SER is desirable since it takes into consideration the
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effects of process variations and reduces the computational time as compared to the Monte-Carlo
analysis. Similarly, a system’s overall performance can be improved by shifting from deterministic
methods of design towards statistical and probabilistic methods due to a reduction in transistor’s
variations. Thus, accurate and efficient methods for estimating SER in current technologies are
sought.
In summary, numerous recent research studies emphasize that soft errors will increase and nega-
tively impact the reliability of CMOS circuits as technology is aggressively scaled down [16, 21,
29]. This is because Single-Event Multiple Transients (SEMT) events have increased as device
technology scales down. This implies that the probability of double or even multiple errors occur-
ring simultaneously has increased [58]. For example, a single particle strike might impact double
adjacent vulnerable nodes of a logic circuit as a result of shrinking the space between suscepti-
ble nodes and also reducing the node capacitance and supply voltage. Consequently, following
Moore’s law, it is predicted that SER per logic bit increases roughly by 8 percent per technology
generation [1, 7]. This is due to the number of transistors per unit area doubling. Thus, SER per
unit area continually increases even though SEU per bit has decreased [1, 16, 17, 26], shown in
Figure 2.6 [1]. For instance, Intel reported worsening trends that have spanned from 0.25µm to
90nm [7].
2.3 SER Mitigation Techniques
In order to achieve high-reliability in contemporary computing systems, memory protection tech-
niques have been a prominent development. However, such techniques alone have become increas-
ingly inadequate to completely and efficiently protect the reliability of VLSI circuits and systems.
Since memories are protected with Error-Correcting Code (ECC) and parity via information redun-
dancy, the residual SER originates from logic circuits. In the literature, wide ranges of strategies
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have been proposed to protect CMOS memory and logic circuits versus soft errors.




























Figure 2.6: Soft error rate of a logic and memory [1].
Figure 2.7 shows a new contemporary taxonomy of soft-error mitigation spanning multiple layers
of abstraction and the general resolution characteristics. We classified these techniques into three
levels including Radiation-Hardening By Process and material (RHBP) techniques, i.e., Silicon-
on-Insulator (SOI) at the device-level, Radiation-Hardening By Design (RHBD), i.e., spatial and
temporal redundancy at the gate-level and circuit/module-level, and resilience by coding tech-
niques, i.e., information redundancy at the system-level [16, 20, 26, 59]. Several modifications
to SER mitigation schemes at these levels have been adopted. Each approach exploits a design
property to achieve system constraints while accommodating some inherent challenges. Further-
more, SET hardening techniques can be categorized into three groups, including the point of SET
origin (SET generation), along the datapath (SET propagation), and within the latch (SET cap-
turing) [16, 26]. Schemes that tackle soft errors at the SET’s origin concentrate on limiting the
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collected charge at the sensitive node of an OFF state transistor, i.e., the drain side. Limiting the
collected charge diminishes SET pulse width and reduces SET voltage amplitude [26]. Reduc-
ing SET’s voltage amplitude boosts the electrical masking when a SET pulse propagates through
downstream logic. Additionally, device resizing [60] for current drive is an obvious SET mitigation
technique. Also, specifying the most critical logic data paths, which have nodes more susceptible
to cause an error, is considered an effective concept. In particular, one of the most effective tech-
niques for hardening SETs is inside the latch, which leverages the property that not all SET pulses
will arrive at the setup/hold time of a flip-flop. Thereby, the transient pulses, which do not overlap
with the window of vulnerability of a storage element, will not cause an upset [26]. Techniques that
are designed based on neglecting the irrelevant SET, i.e., not captured, are profitable concepts and
they have been adopted to reduce the overheads of spatial redundancy approaches. An overview to
discuss various tradeoffs of each sub-category of techniques will be presented next to highlight the
pros and cons of SE mitigation at each design level.
2.3.1 Device-Level Mitigation Techniques
At this level, designers concentrate on reducing the amount of collected charge by optimizing the
fabrication process, i.e., using more advanced and sophisticated manufacturing processes to im-
prove layout designs. Reducing the collected charge realizes a reduction in SET amplitude, which
assists in realizing better electrical masking, whereas switching to use Silicon-on-Insulator (SOI)
device structure, a semiconductor fabrication technique that IBM pioneered using silicon oxide
with pure silicon to realize CMOS circuits and microchip fabrication, improves both temporal and
electrical masking due to its buried oxide that reduces the amount of collected charge. Likewise,
CMOS SOI-based device structure is more resilient to multiple-cell upset than the bulk structure
due to its inherent resistance to the effects of SEMT [16]. Meanwhile, SOI devices are more
susceptible to PIPB phenomenon, i.e., the change of pulse characteristics during propagation, as
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precipitated by body potential fluctuations, which results from having a floating body.
Figure 2.7: Taxonomy of design levels for soft-error mitigation schemes.
Other techniques that also exploit the inherent masking mechanisms are guard-drain and guard-
ring for P-hit and N-hit mitigation, respectively [61]. Additionally, modifying the channel doping
concentration of the well itself, or adding more well contacts helps to eliminate or reduce soft error
effects. Moreover, layout topology participates in determining the pulse quenching phenomenon
that leads to reducing the width of the SET pulse and SER at the device-level. For instance, the ex-
perimental results in [62] conclude that benefits from pulse quenching are increasingly pronounced
in the common n-well design as compared to the separate n-well design of an inverter chain. This
confirms that layout design techniques, i.e., n-well contact area, contribute a major role in deter-
mining SET pulse width, and thus reducing SER in CMOS circuits [62]. Furthermore, Lee et
al. [63] introduced a new layout topology called Layout Design through Error-Aware Transistor
Positioning (LEAP) that can be used to improve soft-error resilience in terms of single event mul-
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tiple upsets for sequential elements, such as latches and flip-flops. The principle of the proposed
design is based on physically combining or placing the layout of susceptible contact nodes of any
two OFF state transistors with an ON state transistor so that reducing the collected charge, and
thus, compacts MBU malfunctions. The design principle of LEAP was tested on DICE-based and
conventional flip-flop circuits, and the results showed that the LEAP-DICE achieves 5 and 2,000
orders of magnitude soft error resilience improvement, respectively. In addition, the LEAP-DICE
flip-flop incurs negligible power and delay overheads compared to a conventional DICE flip-flop
due to the schematic structure and the operating behavior remain without any modification. How-
ever, since the principle of LEAP design utilizes more complicated intra-cell routing, it incurs
roughly a 40% area overhead.
Similarly, adding capacitance in the feedback loop, between upset and recovery, has been success-
fully used to improve the speed penalty of SEU suppression, especially for the write operation
of SRAM, and to improve the effectiveness of feedback resistance [64]. However, as we move
towards advanced technology scaling processes, utilizing more robust fabrication processes adds
more complexity and increases the production cost [14, 29].
2.3.2 Gate-Level Mitigation Techniques
Herein, soft error masking techniques rely on protecting the vulnerable nodes in logic paths. These
schemes prevent SETs from being propagated through the datapath, including Cascade Voltage
Switch Logic gate (CVSL) [65], critical node ranking, or reliable-aware logic synthesis, i.e., re-
placing cells with alternatives [66]. The drawbacks of these approaches are that they impact the
system’s speed performance more significantly than redundancy approaches at the circuit-level,
thus they might not be attractive for high speed reliable systems designers. In addition, the use
of gate resizing and gate cloning have been introduced as alternative to reduce the overheads of
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spatial redundancy, i.e., TMR, and improve SET masking of logic paths in CMOS technology.
These techniques search through a logic path to evaluate the most susceptible nodes of a logic
circuit. Once the susceptible nodes are determined, the logic gates are resized by increasing their
capacitance, so that Qcrit is increased and the prospect of SET occurrence is reduced. However,
resizing the sensitive gate nodes does not guarantee a reduced SET pulse width [52]. Furthermore,
it is costly and quite difficult to resize each sensitive individual node in designs consisting of over
1 billion transistors. Additionally, the improvement of hardening techniques at this level may be
partial at-best, thus considering some redundancy at a higher level of abstraction is required for
complete and cost-effective SEU handling [29].
2.3.3 Circuit-Level Mitigation Techniques
Circuit-level SER mitigation techniques have been introduced as intriguing alternatives to reduce
the design complexity and fabrication cost of SER suppression schemes designed at the device-
level [67]. In the literature, numerous design techniques have been introduced at the circuit-
level to mitigate soft errors in logic computing circuits and systems, such as spatial, temporal,
and hybrid redundancy approaches. The positive aspect of these SER handling techniques is the
ability to protect both sequential and combinational logic circuits, aside from mitigating both SET
and SEU errors by utilizing a single scheme. However, they involve high area overhead, power
consumption, and/or speed degradation. Thus, tradeoffs between these performance penalties and
the fault masking coverage are sought, so that hardening only the sequential logic portion, i.e.,
latches and flip-flops, which contributes the major portion of SER in logic circuits compare to
that of combinational logic [21, 68, 69]. This significantly reduces area overhead, improves circuit
and system reliability, and lowers production cost. In particular, protecting latches against SEU is
a prominent research focus, where replacing a regular flip-flop (unprotected) by a SEU-immune
flip-flop improves soft-error by roughly 10-folds [1, 70]. Next, we discuss the state of the art
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of radiation-hardening latching circuits and also the conventional redundancy-based mitigation
approaches that are introduced to address the effects of soft error.
2.3.3.1 State of the Art Redundancy-based Techniques
Over the years, various techniques have been proposed to increase the radiation-tolerance of
CMOS-based latches and FFs, of which the most recent related approaches are highlighted in
Table 2.3. Here, the mean idea of the previously presented approaches is either increasing the
feedback loop delay to introduce longer delay than a potential transient glitch that might impact
a vulnerable node of a circuit or utilizing the module redundancy by duplicating/triplicating the
circuit and employing a majority voter circuit to determine the final masked output. Notice that
the condition of a transient pulse (SET) to upset a latch or flip-flop circuit is that its duration has
to be larger than the feedback loop delay of a latching circuit [71]. The comparison among var-
ious approaches is conducted based on the design-level of protection techniques, considering the
overheads for hardening, fault-masking coverage, and design challenges as listed in Table 2.3.
Table 2.3: Comparison of selected circuit-level protection techniques.
Design SE Prediction Resilience Feature ChallengesTechnique
Mitra et al. [15] Module Redundancy SEU
- double conventional latches - high area- comparator
(BISER) - weak keeper circuit - vulnerable to DNU
Seifert et al. [72] Feedback Loops SEU
- increase Qcrit - high cost
- dynamic process for charge - impact by voltage and
(RCC) Cross-coupled Inverters collecting technology scaling
Katsarou et al. [58] Module Redundancy DNU - 2 DICE-based latches - high area
(DNUT-DICE) Feedback Loops - comparator - high power
Yan et al. [68] Module Redundancy DNU - 3 SEU-immune latches - high area
(DNURL) Feedback Loops - 9 C-element - high power
Watkins et al. [73] Module Redundancy DNU and TNU - triple conventional latches - high area-power
(HRDNUT and TNU-latch) Feedback Loops - 3 C-element - high delay (D-to-Q)
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There are several schemes that have been developed to increase the robustness of the latching
circuits, so that they become resistant to radiation-induced transient errors. For instance, Dual
Interlocked-storage Cell (DICE) [74] is one of prevalent designs for hardening against SEUs inside
latches due to its superior resilience of fault masking coverage and modest performance penalties.
The advantage of DICE is that it utilizes only 12 transistors as compared to 12-16 transistors
in a redundant memory cell (hardened cell against SEU) [22]. It utilizes feedback transistors
and advanced layout design techniques that isolate susceptible nodes. Thus, it has demonstrated
reduced area, delay, and power consumption compared to spatial redundancy-based techniques,
however it is not able to tolerate multiple node upsets. Recent investigations of radiation-based soft
errors in hardened latches have shown that even though the DICE cell can be an efficient concept
to suppress SEU inside latches, it can be very susceptible to upsets when both nodes controlled
by the feedback process get struck and change the state of the deposited charge, especially under
technology node scaling as the cell is packed very tightly [22]. For instance, at 130nm technology
node, the DICE cell is able to deliver about 10 times improvement [74] of circuit robustness over
the conventional flip-flop. However, it exhibits reduced benefits under technology scaling, i.e., 1.4
times improvement for 40nm technology [75].
Jagannathan et al. [71] presented a radiation-hardening approach to protect latches/flip-flops. The
architecture and the principle of the proposed latch is similar to that of a DICE latch where it has
four storage nodes to store a single data bit and its complementary, however, the interconnection
topology is different from that of the DICE latch. More importantly, the Quatro latch has larger
feedback loop delay, and thus, it realizes a higher immunity to SETs. Moreover, since the Quatro
latch has less sensitive nodes and higher critical charge, Qcrit, it exhibits higher robustness to
single-event induced multiple node upsets than the DICE latch [71]. For instance, the experimental
results of [71] demonstrate that the Quatro latch achieves higher SER tolerance than both the
conventional and DICE latches, more than 10 and 3 times improvement, respectively. In addition,
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it outperforms the DICE latch by consuming reduced area and power consumption, about 30% and
40%, respectively. However, it still does not realize a complete immunity to multiple node upset,
as this issue is a serious reliability concern for large-scale logic designs that are packing tightly
with enormous integration density.
Built-In Soft-Error Resilience (BISER) [15] design introduces a well-known hardening technique
that uses two latches in parallel along with a comparator to mask transient faults. In addition, a
weak keeper buffer circuit is connected to the output node in order to provide the correct output in
an event of upset when the latches’ outputs mismatch, as the output of C-element is floating (high
impedance state) during the mismatch of the internal latches’ outputs. Likewise, the other benefit
from using the weak keeper circuit is to fight the leakage current when the output of C-element
floats due to both the pull-up PMOS device and pull-down NMOS device turned OFF. Considering
soft errors in latching circuits only, the presented BISER technique improves chip-level SER by
10-folds at a power consumption penalty of 10.3%. However, the BISER design is only able to
tolerate SEUs, and therefore, can not be considered as an efficient solution to be embedded in large-
scale logic paths of high-reliability systems. A similar approach is employed in [58] to develop a
DNU-tolerant DICE-based (DNUT-DICE) latch using two SEU-tolerant DICE latch circuits. The
proposed DICE-based latch achieves an effective soft-error masking coverage for both single and
double node upsets. However, this is achieved at the cost of increased area overhead and power
consumption as listed in Table 2.3.
Furthermore, numerous modifications have been carried out to increase the immunity of DICE
latch against soft errors, so that it can concurrently tolerate DNU. The primary concept of the
previously presented approaches is either increasing the feedback loop delay to introduce longer
delay than a potential transient glitch that might hit a node of a DICE latch, or isolating the adjacent
susceptible nodes using advanced layout design techniques. D’Alessio et al. [76] presented a
Transistor DICE (TDICE) design by adding four NMOS transistors that are functioning only when
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the cell is written, whereas they are in OFF state during the hold mode, thereby enabling the
proposed latch to achieve high speed performance. It was reported that the TDICE design assists
in improving SEU resilience by three orders of magnitude of the critical charge for vulnerable
nodes. However, the drawback of the presented TDICE circuit is that it is still susceptible to DNU.
To address vulnerability of the TDICE design, Wang et al. [77] introduced a DICE-based latch
with feedback transistors. Similar to [76], the proposed latch requires four extra devices (two
PMOS and two NMOS transistors), which are turned ON during the write access operations and
turned OFF during the hold mode, to effectively tackle the impediment of DICE design and reduce
the probability of DNU simultaneously, thus its robustness is extremely improved. However, this
results in increased delay and power consumption since transistors were added in the critical path.
Another disadvantage of the presented DICE latch with feedback transistors is that it has a single
sensitive pair to cause DNU. This vulnerability can be alleviated by isolating the sensitive drain
area occupied by this node pair on the cell’s layout. The area and power consumption penalties for
the DICE latch with feedback transistors are estimated at 33% and 26% compared to conventional
DICE cell, which incurs a roughly 5% speed degradation.
A novel mitigation approach, namely Reinforcing Charge Collection (RCC) was proposed in [72].
The RCC technique is based on adding some redundancy, i.e., dummy gates, to make both the
OFF and ON devices in each inverter in the cross-coupled inverters collect the generated charge
via charge sharing mechanism, leading to increasing the critical amount of charge at a vulnerable
node. Therefore, upsetting the stored state becomes difficult since the generated charge will diffuse.
The RCC hardening technique is considered an efficient mitigation scheme that only requires less
than 20% of area overhead and 28% of power consumption, while impacting speed performance
about of 6.4%. However, it is inadequate to be implemented in space applications, aside from its
high cost and reduced fault masking resilience under technology and voltage scaling.
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Recently, a DNU-Resilient Latch (DNURL) design was introduced in [73] consisting of triple
SEU-Resilient Cells, each of which includes three 2-input Muller C-element circuits. The DNURL
achieves a significant reduction in latching delay that makes it a promising candidate for high-speed
applications. However, these advantages are achieved at the cost of high area overhead and power
consumption. Thus, as observed in Table 2.3, all previously presented circuit-level SEU-immune
techniques either impose significant area/energy overheads or cannot tolerate DNU. Therefore,
cost-efficient and double/multiple node upset tolerant approaches that incur reduced area-power
overhead and circuit performance degradation are sought.
2.3.3.2 The Conventional Redundancy-based Techniques
The soft error resilience of conventional techniques can be obtained by applying four redundant
strategies: spatial redundancy approaches such as Triple Module Redundancy (TMR), temporal re-
dundancy approaches such as clock shadow latches, self-voting redundant system strategies (com-
bining the spatial and temporal redundancy approaches), and diverse dual module redundancy,
such as spatial redundancy with diversity. Redundancy techniques are effective to mitigate soft er-
rors inside the latch and achieve a high level of protection by suppressing SEUs. They are utilized
for designing mission-critical dependable systems so that achieving high reliability and availability
while directly countering beneficial characteristics such as: low power, high speed, and minimal
layout area. Thus, the challenge is to implement them with less penalties since they incur sig-
nificant power and area overheads. Note that information redundancy schemes, such as Cyclic
Redundancy Check (CRC) codes, are also used for fault handling but at the system-level and they
will be discussed briefly in Section 2.3.4.
Most of the redundancy techniques operate based on voting mechanisms. Figure 2.8(a) depicts a
conventional 3-input majority voter circuit. The output changes state when two out of the three
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inputs change [4]. A transient glitch on any one input will be rejected by the voter, considering
the other two inputs are correct. However, a transient pulse occurring within the voter can incur
a momentary output glitch that might be corrected in the next clock cycle. Thus, no permanent
SEU occurs. Figure 2.8(b) shows a circuit implementation of the self-voter, which is a 3-input
majority voter configured to compare two inputs and the feedback of the output. The output of a
self-voter changes state to a logical 1 when both its inputs are high, and becomes a logical 0 when
the external inputs are low. In case of the two external inputs mismatch, output remains unchanged
and thus prevents a SET from being propagated to the next stage [4]. Thus, the self-voter circuit
is a state-holding element that behaves as a redundant copy of a latch or a flip-flop. Similar to the
majority voter, a transient pulse occurring inside of the self-voter circuit results in a momentary
glitch on the voter output. This is due to its input driven by a redundant copy of the same value.
The self-voting circuit is also commonly referred to in the literature as a Muller C-element circuit.
Figure 2.8: Voting Circuits; (a) Majority voter circuit, (b) Self-voter circuit [4], (c) C-element in a
temporal filter structure [5].
The major benefit of a C-element design is its simplicity. A C-element maintains its output un-
changed if the inputs differ, holds the previous state, or behaves as an inverter when the inputs
are the same [5]. The C-element might be utilized as an evaluator between two components, as
shown in Figure 2.8(c). A transient pulse that occurs at the first combinational logic, results in a
discrepancy between nodes A and B, and thus, it will be masked by the C-element as long as its
duration is less than the delay of the buffer circuit. On the other hand, if the width of the SET pulse
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is adequately large, it will pass through the C-element to the next combinational logic. This might
cause an upset if the SET pulse is captured by a storage element. The delay of the buffer circuit
depends on the width of the SET being rejected. As reported in [9], there has been some conflict
in the expected SET pulse widths for recent technology nodes as discussed in Section 2.2. The
C-element is used to mitigate any SET with a pulse width shorter than the considered delay, by
using a small area overhead. In contrast, its drawbacks are that it impacts system performance and
requires some modifications for the standard library cell or design flow, besides the circuit fails if
the filter or flip-flop is hit. Next, we discuss the four categories of redundancy-based techniques
that are employed to protect the mission-critical applications.
Spatial Redundancy Strategies: In the literature, numerous spatial redundancy techniques have
been proposed to protect CMOS circuits against soft error effects. Modular redundancy is one
of the most commonly used techniques where the design is protected by replicating the circuit N
times, N-Module Redundancy (NMR), and extra logic is included for error detection and correc-
tion. Dual Modular Redundancy (DMR) is configured by duplicating the module, i.e., N equals
two. In DMR, an error is detected if there exists a discrepancy between the outputs of identical
modules. Conventional DMR is used to detect when a transient or upset error occurs, without
error correction, since the comparator circuit is unable to identify which module is error-free [78].
Triple Module redundancy (TMR) is constructed by using three identical modules functioning in
parallel, i.e., N equals three. Both DMR and comparison or TMR and majority voter are effec-
tive techniques to mitigate SER induced by a single SET or SEU in a logic circuit. The interest
of spatial redundancy techniques are their resilience and the ability of employing them in most
designs [20]. TMR is a typical example of a spatial redundancy approach to mask soft errors in
logic paths, whereby the circuit or the logic datapath is triplicated and a majority voter decides
the final output of the circuit [26]. Figure 2.9 depicts a simple example of TMR. Triple modular
redundancy circuits are effective only in mitigating a single SET that strikes one of the modules,
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considering the other two modules are error free. This indicates that TMR circuits are unable to
tolerate multiple upsets that influence multiple redundant modules simultaneously.
Figure 2.9: Triple Module Redundancy (TMR) approach.
Spatial redundancy is typically utilized in applications that operate in harsh environments to en-
sure system operation even in unforseen circumstances, such as autonomous vehicles and satel-
lites [79–81], nuclear reactors [82], and deep space systems [83]. It has also been employed in
commercial systems such as High-Performance Computing applications [84] where significant in-
crease in computing node availability is sought. Utilization of compute-node level redundancy
at the processor, memory module, and network interface can improve reliability by a factor of
100-folds to 100,000-folds [84]. This is because TMR realizes 100% fault resilience coverage
for faults in single module simultaneously, compared to the simplex arrangement (unprotected
design). However, this is at the cost of incurring roughly two orders of magnitude for area and en-
ergy overheads [20], which limits the usage of spatial techniques in applications with tight energy
budget. Thus, TMR is suitable for high performance and mission-critical applications which can
accommodate its inherent area and energy overheads.
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Temporal Redundancy Strategies: In the earlier temporal redundancy approaches, input vectors
are repeated for the same circuit instance to compare for discrepancy. If there is a mismatch
between both execution results, then a fault occurs and the system needs to rollback and repeat
operation. This scheme is immune only to transient faults, and in the best scenario, it degrades
the system’s goodput, or correct throughput, by 50% as each circuit is checking half the time.
An evolved temporal sampling methodology, associated with minimum overheads of area, power,
and performance degradation, was proposed by Mavis and Eaton [2]. They describe how the new
circuit design methodology can totally eliminate all soft errors, i.e., foreseeable SETs and SEUs,
in any synchronous microcircuit. Adaptions and modifications on the basic temporal sampling
approach had been done to construct practical circuit embodiments that can be utilized for space
and terrestrial sub-micrometer electronics. The key contribution is the ability of implementing the
proposed approach in combinational logic preceding a latch or utilizing it to protect the latch itself.
In this approach, data for the same combinational logic can be sampled at three distinct instances
to construct a voting arrangement while using a simplex instance of the datapath. As shown in
the design of Figure 2.10 [2], the data is captured at three different time instances (T1, T2, and
T3) by using three identical registers (flip-flops) triggered by three different clock signals (CLK1,
CLK2, and CLK3). The relative latency between the clock signals is employed such that they are
delayed by a phase shift (Φ1 and Φ2), which can be selected depending on the SET pulse width
coverage and the propagation delay time of the circuit, so that the same data from the previous
stage is latched in the registers. A majority voter is employed to determine the final output, so that
when a soft error occurs in the datapath logic it will be stored in one of the flip-flops, and it should
be rejected by the voter. The signal Datain represents the coming data from the previous datapath
logic, whereas the final output signal represents the data sent to the next stage. To ensure that
the same data is stored in all the registers, temporal redundancy should be constrained by timing
constraints, where there is a phase shift Φ1 between CLK1 and CLK2 and Φ2 between CLK1 and
CLK3. The timing constraints are presented in [85], so that the legitimate data is captured in the
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registers. Similar to the TMR arrangement, the temporal redundancy approach achieves complete
SEU masking in a single module, whereas it fails in the rare case when two out of three registers
are impacted concurrently. This is due to the result of majority voting.
Figure 2.10: Temporal redundancy approach [2].
Avirneni and Somani [85] employed the temporal redundancy approach for mitigating soft error in
a two stage pipeline processor. The authors proposed two approaches, called Soft Error Mitigation
(SEM) and Soft and Timing Error Mitigation (STEM). The latter could be used to detect and cor-
rect the timing errors that occur when operating at very high frequencies, overclocking, in addition
to detecting and correcting soft errors. Both approaches provide 100% fault coverage and since the
proposed schemes are designed such that they do not cost any reduction in the system’s overall per-
formance during the correct operations, i.e., error-free operations, they offer better performance.
In terms of performance improvement, SEM approach attains 26.58% on average compared to a
conventional TMR approach, while STEM outperforms SEM by 27.42%. In [86], a heterogeneous
spatial and temporal redundant FPGA-based system is designed and implemented by exploiting
the linear transform of pipelineable applications. The proposed schemes are based on Concurrent
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Error Detection (CED). In the heterogeneous CED (hCED) based spatial redundancy, the redun-
dant module is used as a checker for the original module and since it only operates as an error
detection circuit, its size can be reduced, which is a major concept of the hCED scheme. Alterna-
tively, hCED based temporal redundancy utilizes the original module as the genuine module and
also as the checker module by switching between them alternately. The major drawback of hCED
is that it is considered an application dependent scheme since it needs a condition to identify a
block as fault-free. Additionally, it can be used for error detection only (unable for correction).
Self-Voting Dual Module Redundancy Strategies: As shown in Figure 2.11, combining the
DMR with the self-voting provides less area overhead compared to conventional TMR and less
speed degradation (by the width of SET being mitigated) compared to temporal redundancy. The
performance degradation is half that of temporal redundancy [4]. Self-voting DMR cannot toler-
ate multiple SETs similar to TMR. While achieving soft error masking equal to TMR, self-voting
DMR must mask the effect of SET on data inputs, clock signals, and storage elements, i.e., flip-
flops. In resilient systems for space or nuclear applications, the voter circuit should be protected
against soft errors. Figure 2.11 shows an example of protecting an edge-triggered flip-flop besides
the protection of the voter circuit, where two majority voters are used at the register output to filter
out any SEU. At the temporal sampling phase (see Figure 2.11), register R1 and R2 (DFF1 and
DFF2) receive their inputs directly from the datapath logic, while register R3 receives its input
from a self-voter that votes on two redundant combinational logic circuits to produce its output.
Legitimate data is captured by the third flip-flop as long as the two external inputs match, in the
absence of SET. On the other hand, if there exists a present mismatch between the external inputs,
this might result in upsetting the third flip-flop. For instance, in case the previous state of the self-
voter circuit is a 1 logic and a new data, which needs to be stored in the flip-flops, is a 0 logic, and
if one of the redundant modules is hit, and a SET generates and reaches the self-voter circuit, this
results in a mismatch, and thus the output of the self-voter circuit will be unchanged during the
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transient pulse duration. If the SET pulse overlaps with the setup/hold time of the third flip-flop, it
will cause an upset/disrupt the third flip-flop’s state since a 1 logic is captured by the third flip-flop
instead of a 0 logic. To address this problem, the third flip-flop should be triggered by a clock cycle
delayed by the width of the SET pulse. On the other hand, if energetic particles hit the self-voter
circuit’s output during the latching cycle of the third flop-flop, this will result in an SEU in the third
flop-flop. However, the data capturing phase will not fail as long as the other flip-flops registered
the correct data. The main advantage for utilizing the self-voting DMR approach is that it requires
the duplication of the datapath logic instead of being triplicated as in conventional TMR, while the
sequential part remains triplicated.
Figure 2.11: Self-voting DMR logic circuit [4].
Based on the experimental results in [4], self-voting DMR provides a performance compromise
between the temporal and spatial (TMR) redundancy approaches, where it consumes less area
(by one redundant combinational logic) than TMR and provides half the speed degradation of the
temporal redundancy scheme. However, for designs that operate with low speed, i.e., the critical
delay is large (> 20ns) and the speed performance of self-voting DMR becomes comparable to
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δTMR = δcritical + δvoter (2.2)
δTemp = δdatapath + δvoter + 2 ∗ δSET (2.3)
δSV DMR = δcritical + 2 ∗ δvoter + δSET (2.4)
Where δcritical, δvoter, and δSET represent the critical path delay of the datapath logic, delay of
the voting logic, and delay of transient pulse width, respectively. 2 ∗ δvoter is required due to one
majority voter and one self-voter are located in the longest critical datapath, whereas 2 ∗ δSET is
required to ensure that the legitimate data is captured at the registers. On the other hand, if Alogic
represents the required logic area of a design and Acomb, Aseq, Avoter, and ASV DMR represents
combinational logic, sequential logic, voter area, and self-voting DMR design area, respectively
then the area overhead for the redundant systems are given by:
Alogic = Acobm + Aseq (2.5)
ATMR = 2 ∗ Alogic + Avoter (2.6)
ATemp = 2 ∗ Aseq + Avoter (2.7)
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ASV DMR = Acomb + 2 ∗ Aseq + 2 ∗ Avoter (2.8)
Furthermore, area overhead depends on the combinational and register logic ratio in a design.
Overall, self-voting DMR provides 10 − 24% area improvement over the TMR implementation,
based on different combinational logic ratios in the design, low, medium, and high [4]. Gener-
ally, the higher the combinational ratio, the higher area improvement achieved. Practically, it is
possible to combine self-voting DMR with TMR for optimizing large chip designs against SETs,
where TMR is advantageous for critical datapath pipeline stages, whereas DMR is convenient for
reducing area and energy overheads on pipeline stages with non-critical datapaths [4].
Diverse Dual Module Redundancy: The conventional DMR scheme is used to detect the occur-
rence of a soft error, without correction, since the comparator circuit is unable to identify which
module is error-free [87]. Recently, the DMR concept has been extended to provide low cost soft
error rejection by monitoring the mismatch of the output, called Diverse DMR (DDMR). Design
diversity helps to prevent so-called Common Mode Failures (CMFs) [88]. By leveraging design
diversity among the modules in spacial redundancy, different outputs are produced under CMF
such that an error is detectable [89,90]. Also, design diversity is employed in temporal redundancy
to detect permanent faults by performing the same operation redundantly by alternating physi-
cal circuits [91]. The main concept of DDMR is to use diversity with pattern mismatch, where
two different structures with equivalent functionality utilized in parallel with an error location and
masking circuit.
DDMR requires a discrimination circuit to be designed for each module type. When an error oc-
curs, either structure produces a mismatch for one sample or pattern of samples and the error loca-
tion and masking circuit monitors the output to determine which module structure is error-free [6].
Thus, the error pattern produced by module1 and module2 must be mutually exclusive. By rec-
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ognizing the module that has a pattern of error when soft error hits, the output of the error-free
module is used. The design drawback of this approach is to identify a pair of module implementa-
tions that can produce error patterns when a soft error occurs. Besides, a simple logic circuit must
be used for error location and masking that only inspects the module outputs. Likewise, the re-
dundant module should not be exceedingly larger than the unprotected module. However, Digital
Signal Processing (DSP) is a promising field for DDMR due to the fact that DSP modules have
alternative implementations in addition to consuming significant area and energy [87]. Arithmetic
circuits are another identified field for utilizing DDMR.
Figure 2.12: Structural DMR design for FIR filter [6].
Figure 2.12 depicts a novel technique, namely structural DMR, of utilizing DDMR to protect the
Finite Impulse Response (FIR) filter by using two different module structures, transpose of direct
and mixed transpose-cascade structures [6]. Herein, the design diversity is used to identify and
mask a soft error and thus FIR filters are constructed such that they provide different error patterns
at the output. A single error in the transpose filter’s output, i.e., ý, occurs in an upset event, whereas
an SEU in any stage (except the final one) of the cascade filter produces consecutive multiple errors
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in output, i.e., ´́y. A duplicated element is used to duplicate the cascade filter’s final stage, while
an error correction (detecting and filtering out) circuit is used to check for consecutive mismatches
between the filters outputs. When double or multiple consecutive mismatches are observed, the
cascade filter must become upset, and thus, output of the transpose filter is selected as the final
output. When a single mismatch is observed, either the error occurs in the transpose filter or in the
cascade filter’s final stage. Therefore, the final output is determined by comparing the duplicated
element and the cascade filter’s output. When a discrepancy is detected, this indicates that the error
must have occurred in the cascade filter. Otherwise, the transpose filter suffers a hit and an upset
occurs. On the other hand, if the correction circuit becomes upset, this only changes which filter
is selected as the final output. Since the design can only tolerate a single error at one time, and
it cannot occur simultaneously in both cascade and transpose filters and in the error location and
correction circuit. Thus, the output of both filters must be correct. Therefore, any one of them can
be used as the final output. Experimental results show that the structural DMR FIR filter consumes
2.25x area compared to the non-protected filter while TMR FIR filter requires 3.003x [6].
2.3.4 System-Level Mitigation Techniques
At the higher levels of the system stack, information-based approaches such as Error-Correcting
Codes (ECCs) for memory protection can be attractive schemes to impart immunity to single-bit
errors. These typically incur low area, speed, and power overheads. Multi-Cell Upset (MCU)
can be suppressed by utilizing advanced coding approaches that are immune to multi-bit errors
such as Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) codes, Reed-Solomon (RS) codes, Hamming code,
etc. [16, 28, 92]. These approaches require a small number of redundant parity bits to recover
in the event of an upset. However, at the chip level, memory protection techniques, or Error Cor-
recting Code (ECC), have become insufficient for designs fabricated with advancing technology
generations due to the logic soft-error, i.e., errors in latches/flip-flops and combinational logic, has
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become significant contributors to increase SER at the system-level [92, 93]. This is because the
spacing between the sensitive nodes is reduced with technology size scaling, which gives rise to
increase the vulnerability of latches/flip-flops. Similarly, soft errors in flip-flops have become a
concern due to particle strikes induced Double Node Upset (DNU) [94, 95]. Therefore, the scope
of this survey is to concentrate on techniques for Radiation Hardening By Design (RHBD), thus we
focus on reviewing approaches that protect the storage elements, i.e., latches/flip-flops, for reliable
computing systems, while the memory cells will be reviewed briefly late on.
At the architecture-level, the effect of soft errors can be identified into two categories including:
Silent Data Corruption (SDC) and Detected Unrecoverable Error (DUE). SDC errors occur when a
transient fault propagates and corrupts the data, and then becomes a visible error. DUE, on the other
hand, is detected by the system; however, it causes the system to freeze or crash without corrupting
the user’s data thereby rebooting the system is required [96]. Unlike DUE that makes the system
unavailable, SDC errors result in unnoticed corrupted data. Thus, they are considered more signif-
icant in terms of reliability challenges as they might harm the system’s functionality and/or user’s
data. This is because SDC can corrupt several components, such as registers, cache, Arithmetic
Logic Unit (ALU), multiplexer (MUX), memory, etc. [97]. Error detection for arithmetic units, i.e.,
ALU, is achieved via information-based approaches such as Error-Correcting Codes (ECCs) [98].
Thus, the other important susceptible components are the pipeline registers. One solution to en-
sure data integrity of the registered states is by separating the bits of the same word. However,
this scheme becomes a complicated process and might not be feasible for deeply-scaled register
sets, as it impacts area and power consumption [77]. Moving forward to the architecture-level,
the rate of particle induced soft errors in a processor core has become proportionally increased
as the number of bits increases, which leads to impacting robustness of deeply-scaled computing
systems [99]. In other words, soft errors can limit nanoscale multi-core processors used in data
centers, High-Performance Computing (HPC), and mission-critical applications, such as online
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banking systems [69,99]. These systems can have severe repercussions if they fail [100,101]. This
is because a glitch at the circuit-level can propagate to the system-level and eventually may become
a user-visible error. Therefore, efficient and practical soft-error masking techniques become highly
sought after to prevent these transient faults from silently corrupting computation and logic states
in registers. Achieving soft-error resilience for these resources at the circuit-level is the starting
point to design reliable computing architectures. Consequently, SER of any component has to be
adequately low to satisfy the system-level reliability requirement.
Similar to the circuit-level designs, the architectural state storage components are mostly hard-
ened against soft errors using redundancy-based methods, which duplicate or triplicate the vul-
nerable components/circuits in the targeted system [102]. They can be protected by employing
DMR to fully duplicate the pipelines, a partial redundancy using Reduced Precision Redundancy
(RPR) [103], or checkpoint recovery. Both fully and partial duplication can detect and recover
soft errors, whereas the latter can only be incorporated to perform recovery operations. Thus,
protection of the registers at the system-level would be selectively applied to only a subset of the
flip-flops, thereby maximizing the soft fault masking coverage while minimizing the performance
penalties for the protection logic. Additionally, in [15], it was reported that roughly 50% of the
SDC errors result from the sequential circuits, i.e., latches and flip-flops, in Intel processors. Sim-
ilarly, in [104], the authors projected that the majority of the system failures were found due to
the vulnerability of some important registers in the targeted LEON3 processor core. It turned out
that deploying TMR approach partially to protect the CPU’s most susceptible registers can achieve
99.25% of SEU masking with marginal area overhead. Furthermore, in [105], it was concluded
that an important reliability improvement (masking more than 70% of soft errors) can be achieved
when hardening only 10% of the sequential logic, i.e., the most susceptible registers, in an ARM
Cortex-R5 CPU core. Thus, even though numerous papers in the literature discuss recent innova-
tions for SE-mitigation in memory devices, the focus herein is on protecting the registered states
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in datapaths due to its increasing importance.
On the other hand, recently, the research work in [106] showed that, even though compiler opti-
mization has played a major contributor to realize high performance and efficiency for multi-core
computing applications, their vulnerability towards transient errors has also increased, and gen-
erally the impact of vulnerability was found to be comparable to the level of code optimization.
This indicates that highly-optimized code for HPC applications is more susceptible to soft errors
than the unoptimized code [106]. Thus, soft error effects should be considered and required fur-
ther investigation for the compiler optimization to improve soft errors masking at the system-level.
Finally, at this level, an efficient soft-error suppression is achieved by concentrating on protecting
storage elements, such as latches/flip-flops and memory cells. Below, how memory cells are made
immune to soft errors are briefly reviewed.
2.3.4.1 Soft Error Masking for Other Components
SER has been aggravated under technology process scaling not only in logic circuits but also
in memory cells. In the literature, numerous studies [10, 48, 107] have reported that SER has
increased in SRAM for a fixed-sized array area whereas the device feature size has shrunk, thus
the proportion of sensitive area has increased.
In modern SRAMs, the density of devices has followed Moore’s law whereby recent experimental
results showed that SEU susceptibility occurring from low-energy protons and alpha particles from
radioactive impurities have become able to deposit sufficient charge by direct ionization to cause
transient and upset glitches [16, 28, 108]. Physically, mitigating SER in memory cells involves
interleaving techniques such as placing the memory layout of a one bit of many different words
adjacent on a chip. Likewise, Single Error Correct-Double Error Detect (SEC-DED) codes can be
effective even with Multi-Cell Upsets (MCUs) by interleaving the SRAM cells, therefore, MCUs
50
lead to a number of separate Single-Bit Upsets (SBUs) in multiple correction words, rather than
Multi-Bit Upsets (MBUs) in a single word [109].
Unlike SRAM, DRAM-based soft errors tend to decrease with subsequent technology generations.
In fact, this is due to the Qcrit amount being roughly constant in a DRAM cell, and thus it becomes
more difficult to deposit the same amount of charge into a shrunk sensitive volume [109]. However,
there exists a general agreement that MBUs should be addressed in SRAM and latching circuits
since it is more susceptible as density is increased [10,16]. At the system-level, the design process
of memory cells protection is easier since it is achieved by coding. However, under the highest
level, the system synchronization becomes a major problem, thereby ceasing the running task or
system clock is required for synchronization [110].
2.3.4.2 Multi-Bit Upsets
Recently, as CMOS devices continue to shrink, advanced memory devices become impacted from
multi-cell soft errors and thus MBU becomes a key reliability concern. An MBU occurs if two or
more bits in the same word are upset by a single event at one time. For instance, spatial MBUs
occur when a single particle upsets multiple bit that resides within the same physical neighborhood.
Whereas temporal MBUs occur when two or more particle strikes independently upset distinct
NMR instances. In contrast to SBU, MBU in memory cells cannot be resolved by single-bit ECC,
thus more powerful techniques are required to suppress SER. Notice that the term Multi-Cell Upset
(MCU) refers to errors that occur in different rows of an array corresponding to multiple words,
thus MBUs present a serious concern as it occurs in a single word.
As the technology generations move forward, MCU exhibits a negative trend as listed in Ta-
ble 2.4 [10]. Clearly, the experimental results in [10] show that SRAM-MCU has increased from
2% to 38% as the technology node is scaled from 180nm to 40nm. Single particles induced MCUs
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is considered one of the crucial mechanisms that increases SER. Another source, the parasitic bipo-
lar effects resulting from the well structure strongly affects MCUs. However, Fuketa et al. [111]
investigated alpha-particle-induced soft error in 10T subthreshold SRAM for 65nm and they con-
clude that the main cause of increasing MCU in the subthreshold region is the mechanism of
Single-Event Double Node Upset (SEDNU) or MBU within a device. Additionally, the variation
of supply voltage and temperature also impact the rate of MBU [112, 113]. Numerous fabrication
concepts are proposed to reduce/eliminate MBU, such as adding more well contacts, increasing the
distance between cell to the next well contact, guard ring, etc. Similarly, SOI technology exhibits
less susceptibility, and thus, it is more robust in MCU tolerance than CMOS bulk structures [16].
Furthermore, the combination of interleaving and ECC schemes are more efficient in reducing
MBU rates. For example, it was stated in [114] that, MBU is reduced when the separations of data
bits within each word are designed to be adequately large, whereas reducing spacing between bits
in SRAMs increases the likelihood of MBU [115]. Clearly, with technology generation scaling,
separating the bits of the same word becomes a complicated process and might not be feasible for
deeply-scaled register sets, as it impacts area and power consumption.
Table 2.4: SBU and MCU ratio trends under technology scaling [10].






Considering the MBUs in current technology generations, recent studies showed that circuit-level
mitigation techniques introduce reduced benefits under technology scaling [21, 58, 67]. Thus, the
vulnerability of SEU-immune flip-flops increases with technology generations [58, 67, 115]. This
implies that, a single particle strike that hits a sensitive node can affect more than a single storage
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element at a given instance of time [58], which results in MBU in the same device. Consequently,
the probability that double, or even multiple, errors occur simultaneously has become high. There-
fore, soft errors in flip-flops have become a concern due to the effect of Single-Event Double Node
Upset (SEDNU) or MBU within a device [21, 95]. Thus, alternative energy-efficient techniques
that effectively address both SEU and MBU within a device and cross devices are sought.
Table 2.5 summarizes and provides a qualitative analysis for most of the discussed soft-error tech-
niques. It can be seen that each approach has its inherent drawback(s). There is no optimal solution
that can provide efficient performance in terms of power consumption, area overhead, speed degra-
dation, fault coverage, and design complexity. For instance, the C-element approach is a simple
design that achieves an effective reduction for area overhead, but it incurs a speed degradation,
limited by the width of the SET pulse, and also needs some modification for the standard library
since it is implemented at the device-level. On the other hand, the self-voting DMR approach pro-
vides a comparable area overhead to DMR, making it advantageous for the applications that can
tolerate some speed degradation while achieving energy saving and handling soft errors. Mean-
while, DDMR occupies a small area compared to the conventional TMR arrangement and incurs
less speed degradation than temporal redundancy approaches. These are powerful advantages, es-
pecially for DSP applications and arithmetic circuits, but it requires one to identify a pair of module
implementations that can produce a pattern mismatch. Developing a new concept that can be used
for a better optimization of the self-voting DMR approach or finding other promising fields that
can be implemented using DDMR to protect a design against soft error effects are still challenges
for voting approaches based on DMR. On the other hand, systems within iso-energy constraints
can be protected by hardening only the sequential logic portion, i.e., vulnerable registers, thereby
tolerating some unmasked soft errors while significantly reducing the protection cost. Thus, it
is inconclusive to determine which approach can be utilized to achieve the design requirements
without considering the application and properties that the design is used for.
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Table 2.5: Summary of SER mitigation techniques proposed at different abstraction design-level.
Approach Level Scope Beneficial Attributes Performance Penaltiesand Costs
SOI structures [41] Device Optimizing the fabrication pro-cess, material and/or structure
change.
SER is 5-fold lower than for
bulk technology.
More susceptible to thermal
effects and pulse broadening
phenomenon.
Guard ring and guard
drain [61] Device
Limit the quantity of collected
charge at the sensitive node of
the transistor.
Diminishes SET pulse width
(improves the temporal mask-
ing) and reduces SET voltage
amplitude (boosts the electrical
masking).
Increase fabrication cost under
technology node scaling.
LEAP-DICE [63] Device
Physically placing the layout
of an invulnerable contact node
between the susceptible ones.
Reduce the quantity of col-
lected charge and thus reduce









Increase the size of the critical
nodes of a gate.
Reduce SER. Increase fabrication cost, be-
sides they do not guarantee re-
duce SET pulse width.
Reliable-aware logic
synthesis [66] Gate
Creating an improved cell li-
brary to replace cells with alter-
natives.
Reduce the SET width and the
diffusion drain area of a circuit
by 30% and 40%, respectively.
Impact system’s speed perfor-
mance higher than redundancy
approaches.
DICE [74] Circuit
Adding more transistors to pro-
tect the sensitive nodes in a
latch or flip-flop.
Reduce the fabrication cost and
design complexity, improves
soft error roughly by 10-fold.




latches operating in parallel,
C-element and weak keeper
to mask soft errors and fight
against leakage currents.
Improve fault masking re-
silience by 10-fold at 10.3%
of power consumption penalty.
Consume high area overhead
and still susceptible to MBUs.
SEM and STEM [85] Circuit
Reduce the size of voting cir-
cuit by utilizing EDC circuit
to detect errors and recover the
system by rollbacking the cor-
rect data.
Average performance improve-
ment of 26.58% compared to a
conventional TMR and STEM
outperforms SEM by 27.42%.
Incur area and power consump-
tion overhead and increase the
complexity of the design.
Temporal redun-
dancy [2, 20, 117] Circuit
Triple the sequential paths with
simplex combinational logic
path or repeat the operation and
check for discrepancy.
Reduce the inherent overheads
of spatial redundancy.
Incur the system’s perfor-
mance, depends on Eq. (2.3).
Spatial redun-
dancy [110, 118, 119] Module
Double or triple the logic paths
in a system.
Masking both SEU and STE. Incur more than 100% / 200%
of area and power overheads.
Self-voting DMR [4] Module
Double the logic datapaths and
triple the sequential logic.
10 − 24% area improvement
over the TMR.
Compromised speed perfor-
mance and area/power over-





tural DMR [6, 87] Module
Design diversity with pattern
mismatch, utilizes two distin-
guished structures with equiv-
alent functionality.
Consume 2.25x area compared
to 3.003x of TMR implemen-
tation.
Require a discrimination cir-




Use CED scheme and exploit
the linear transform of the
pipelineable applications.
Reduce power consumption by
reducing the size of the checker
circuit.
Cannot correct errors and
needs condition to identify a
block as fault-free.
EEC and parity [10,
48, 107] System
Require extra bits of informa-
tion be stored with the data in
memory cells.
Incur less area, speed, and
power overheads.
Vulnerable to MBUs, and ceas-





System Separate data bits within eachword adequately large.
Reduce the likelihood of MBU
in SRAMs.
Complicated process and im-
pacts area and power consump-
tion.
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From Table 2.5, it can be inferred that a system’s performance is a tradeoff between the discussed
issues, and selecting one of the discussed approaches to protect a design against soft errors depends
on the application and the design constraints. In summary, as seen in Table 2.6, circuit-level
mitigation approaches are the most dominant techniques to protect logic paths against soft errors
since device-level techniques appear to become more difficult to implement and cost higher as
device feature sizes are more shrunk. Meanwhile, effective alternative solutions that potentially
offer intriguing features, such as being directly implementable on commercial technologies, able
to tolerate SEU and MBU, while incurring acceptable area-energy and performance overheads
under moderate cost are still sought to increase robustness of latching circuits at the circuit-level.
Table 2.6: Comparison between design-level abstraction of SE-mitigation approaches, where by
each (X, –) indicates relative (strength, limitation/weakness).
Approach Performance Fault Masking Complexity / Leverages InherentDegradation Coverage Cost Masking Mechanisms
– X – – – – –
System-level low / medium high for both moderate not exploited
SEU and SET
– X – – X
Circuit/Module medium / high for both moderate utilized considerably
-level acceptable SEU and SET
– – – – – – – – –
Device-level medium / high 100% for SEU not high not exploited
guaranteed for SET
2.4 SER Recent Trends and Technology Challenges
Recent advancements in technology process, use of low-power technologies such as low-voltage
operation, and the massive growth of device integration density have increased the susceptibility
of integrated circuits to SER [16, 21, 26, 29]. Herein, some trends and challenges of recent CMOS
device/circuit design constraints on SER are reviewed.
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2.4.1 Trends of Technology Scaling on SER
In the literature, several research efforts [26, 27, 120, 121] have been carried out to investigate the
trend of transient faults on the SER in CMOS logic designs under technology size scaling. Due
to many divergent trends contributing to SET occurrences, the effect of technology scaling on the
SET width is complicated [26]. Overall, an increase in SER is expected in current computing de-
vices, despite decreasing the SEU rate per bit [10]. There exists several possible explanations to
elucidate this issue. However, the most distinctly possible explanations are that under CMOS scal-
ing, VLSI chips have become denser and smaller, therefore, its immunity towards particle strikes
decreases significantly. With the massive growth in integration capacity in advanced CMOS tech-
nology, the susceptible nodes of the drain area have been increased, thereby leading to higher
SER [10]. Additionally, in the earlier technologies, the main contributor of soft errors was indirect
ionization of neutrons. Even though the neutrons by themselves are unable to cause direct ioniza-
tion, however, the high energy neutron collision that interacts with semiconductor materials induce
sufficient ionizing energy depositions, which can cause SEUs. Therefore, the secondary particles
of high energy neutrons have the largest effect on Qcrit at sea level. However, as the device feature
size is shrunk, Qcrit becomes smaller, alpha particles contribute increased SER in CMOS SRAMs,
while secondary particles of neutrons still dominate SER in latching circuits [39].
Overall, the most distinctly possible explanations that elucidate why the current trend of soft-
error towards higher rates is that under technology scaling, the number of transistors per unit
area doubles, thus SER per unit area continually increases even though SEU per bit has de-
creased [10, 17, 26]. Thus, soft errors have been pronounced in the literature as predominant
sources of reliability degradation due to VLSI chips’ immunity towards particle strikes decreases
significantly. Nevertheless, the soft-error historical studies in [26] and [16] report that the only
fact is that SET rate has not yet exceeded the SEUs failure rate of a storage element. However,
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single-event induced multiple node upset have become more pronounced due to reducing device
dimensions. Therefore, the designers of microprocessors and memory structures should take into
account MCUs/MBUs in the SER protection techniques.
2.4.2 Trends of Voltage Scaling on SER
Supply voltage (VDD) scaling is widely recognized as the most effective strategy to reduce power
dissipation/consumption for VLSI logic devices. In fact, Near Threshold Voltage (NTV) operation
slightly reduces supply voltage to 100-200mV above the threshold voltage of the transistors, allow-
ing for significant improvement in energy-efficiency [122], significant energy savings as compared
to operating at nominal voltage [123]. However, the critical charge needed to cause a transient
fault decreases linearly as VDD is scaled, and the SER exhibits an exponential effect based on crit-
ical charge [10, 50]. Such trends are consistent with decreasing feature sizes due to technology
scaling [124].
For instance, [48] predicts that the SER of logic circuits per die will become comparable to the
SER for unprotected memory elements, which was later verified through experimental data mea-
sured from a microprocessor [10]. Operation at NTV is predicted to aggravate these trends. For
example, [10] reports that SER increases by roughly 30% per each 0.1V decrease as VDD is de-
creased from 1.25V to 0.5V. Moreover, both simulation results and experimental results at the
40nm and 28nm technology nodes concur that SER increases by two orders of magnitude when
VDD is reduced from 0.7V to 0.5V [10]. Thus, microprocessor energy reduction techniques, such
as Dynamic Voltage Frequency Scaling (DVFS), might suffer higher SER, i.e., an increased rate
of both SET and SEU, due to reducing VDD to minimize energy consumption, and therefore, neg-
atively impact the microprocessor’s reliability [10].
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2.4.3 Trends of Multi-Gate FinFET Devices on SER
The non-planar structure devices, i.e., fin-typed Field-Effect-Transistors (FinFETs), have been in-
troduced to continue scaling and also show improved low-leakage and high performance over
planar MOSFET devices [30, 31]. However, they also can offer alternatives that achieve increased
tolerance to transient faults, i.e., SET and SEU [16]. The benefits of non-planar multi-gate devices
on reducing SER in CMOS circuits have been emphasized in numerous studies [30–34,43–45,125,
126]. In [44], it was reported that FinFET devices have been introduced as alternatives with a 50%
reduction of threshold voltage fluctuation of 16nm-gate HK-MG bulk FinFETs compared with
the results of planar MOSFETs. Additionally, even though spatial MBU feasibility has increased
due to technology scaling, the experimental results in [34] showed that non-planar devices offer
a means to reduce SER in logic paths and MCU in memory arrays. For example, 22nm tri-gate
technology is shown to reduce neutron-induced SER at nominal voltage from 1.5-folds to 4-folds
and alpha particle SER in excess of 10-folds compared to a 32nm planar process. Moreover, Fang
and Oates [125] projected that the neutron-induced SER of bulk FinFET SRAM cells is roughly
6% compared to the SRAM that is configured with non-planar devices. In contrast, even though
scaling the transistor volume helps in reducing the susceptible area, there exists an overall agree-
ment that SER per chip increases with nanoscale device technology generations [10, 14, 16, 21].
This is due to lower Qcrit and higher device density per unit area, i.e., roughly doubling, which
leverages a higher strike probability. Consequently, low energy particles can deposit an adequate
amount of charge, i.e., sufficient Linear Energy Transfer (LET), to cause soft errors.
2.5 Summary
The revolution in chip manufacturing has placed multicore and many core microprocessors at the
forefront of delivering high-performance and energy-efficient nano-electronic devices to servers
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used in cloud and High-Performance Computing (HPC). These systems employ billions of tran-
sistors within large-scale VLSI chips to elevate performance. However, these advancements have
also continually augmented the impact of Single-Event Transient (SET) and Single-Event Upset
(SEU) occurrences which precipitate a range of Soft-Error (SE) dependability issues. In this chap-
ter, a wide range of soft error resilience mitigation techniques that exploit specific attributes of
different design levels for energy-saving under a reliable protection levels are discussed. These
techniques have been adopted to mitigate soft errors across different levels of design abstrac-
tion. Determining which radiation-hardening scheme achieves better performance is a tradeoff
between the design requirements and their challenges. However, SER mitigation techniques at
the circuit/module-level can be convenient since not all SETs will cause an upset in logic paths.
Overall, all the reviewed SE-mitigation techniques involve high area-power overhead and/or cir-
cuit performance degradation. Furthermore, as technology trends for increased transistor density
continue, SEU-immune schemes have become inadequate for robust designs. Thus, more power-
ful SER mitigation schemes, and means for cost-efficient and MBU/DNU-tolerance, that consider
layout modifications and/or circuit design topology with reduced area-power overhead and circuit
performance degradation are sought. Considering the complexity of large-scale mission-critical
systems, robustness and energy-efficiency are the major challenges that need careful investigation
for tradeoff. Developing SE-resilient latches to budget or compensate for these transient faults is
essential for resilient systems. Addressing these reliability concerns is paramount to successful
deployment of future reliable circuits and systems with deeply-scaled devices operating at low-
voltages.
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CHAPTER 3: TEMPORAL SELF-VOTING CHECKERS: ENERGY VS.
RESILIENCE TRADEOFFS
In this chapter, we developed two circuit-level techniques, namely Temporal Self-Voting Logic
(TSVL) and Hybrid Spatial and Temporal Redundancy Double-Error Correction (HSTR-DEC),
to prevent the effects of soft errors in logic circuits, occurring due to Single-Event Upset (SEU)
or Single-Event Transient (SET). TSVL and HSTR-DEC circuits can be utilized to improve the
reliability of a logic path with minimal impact on circuit delay while achieving a high coverage
and cost-effective SEU handling as compared to the previously presented redundancy-based soft-
error masking approaches.1
3.1 Energy-Efficiency vs Fault Resilience
SE-mitigation techniques are utilized for designing dependable systems so that high reliability
and availability are realized while directly countering desirable attributes such as, high speed,
low power, and minimal area overhead. However, adding extra logic to harden a design against
soft error effects increases the number of susceptible nodes, leading towards the reduction of the
system’s overall performance. Hence, the challenge is not how to realize a high reliability, however,
achieving it with minimal area and energy overheads and speed degradation is the aim. Considering
all these factors, tradeoffs between fault resilience and energy consumption were carried out in
designing the proposed soft error handling approaches, so that slightly sacrificing fault making
coverage reduces the energy consumption of proposed schemes. The primary contribution of these
SEU-tolerant approaches is that they eliminate error masking from the combinational datapath
logic, thus, area and energy overheads are significantly reduced. It is worth noticing that the
1 c© 2016 IEEE. Reprinted, with permission, from [67].
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presented approaches achieve resilient fault masking coverage, higher than 96% for the worst case.
3.2 The Proposed Approaches
Achieving high reliability against transient faults poses significant challenges due to the trends
of technology and voltage scaling. Thus, numerous soft error mitigation techniques [2, 4, 85, 86]
have been proposed for masking Soft Error Rate (SER) in logic circuits. However, most soft er-
ror suppression approaches have significant overheads in terms of area, power consumption, and
speed performance degradation. Herein, we introduce two novel efficient and cost-effective tech-
niques to harden the logic paths against soft error effects. The proposed approaches concentrate on
protecting the sequential logic elements, i.e., flip-flops or latches, from an upset while achieving
significant area and power saving.
3.2.1 Temporal Self-Voting Logic (TSVL) Approach
In conventional Dual Module Redundancy (DMR) approach, the outputs of two identical modules
are compared, and an error is detected where there is a discrepancy between them. Conventional
DMR scheme is used to detect when a soft error occurs, without error correction, since voting
cannot determine which of the two modules is error-free [78]. However, the proposed scheme,
TSVL, can be utilized to detect and correct any upset in a flip-flop while incurring acceptable
area, power, and performance penalties. As seen in Figure 3.1, the design is able to detect and
correct any SEU that hits one of the flip-flops or an SET that generates, propagates, and eventually
is captured by one of the flip-flops. Herein, there are three possible scenarios in which an upset
will occur. The first scenario is when an SET hits the combinational logic preceding the flip-flops
and then propagates and arrives at the setup/hold time of the first/original flip-flop, overlapping
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with window of vulnerability. This will upset the original flip-flop, while the redundant flip-flop is
error-free as long as it is triggered by a clock delayed by a phase shift greater than the width of the
transient pulse. Thus, the comparator (XOR-gate) will assert the ErrorSEU signal to indicate the
occurrence of an upset, making the self-voter circuit determine the final output.
Figure 3.1: Temporal Self-Voting Logic (TSVL) approach.
Hence, the third input of the self-voter is fed from a MUX that receives its first input directly
from the datapath and the second input from the feedback of self-voter circuit; an SEU will be
masked by the self-voter circuit regardless of whether it occurs in the original or in the redundant
flip-flop. This is because the third input of the self-voter determines the output when the external
two inputs mismatch. Since the third input of self-voter circuit relies on the output of the first
MUX that drives its output based on the delayed clock rate (CLK2), the self-voter’s third input
will be switched alternately between the direct combinaltionl datapath, with the rising edge, and
the feedback of self-voter circuit, with the falling edge. Thus, when an SET hits the combinational
logic and is then captured by one of the flip-flops, its duration is significant. If it will have passed
by the time that the first input’s rising edge arrives to the first MUX, then it will be ignored as
long as the delay of CLK2 is larger than the generated SET. Therefore, the correct data will pass
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as the self-voter’s third input with the rising edge. The purpose for using a MUX circuit at the
input of self-voter is to update the previous state of the self-voter circuit with the rising edge of the
delayed clock (CLK2). Figure 3.2 depicts the validity of the proposed scheme, as two individual
upsets occur in the original and redundant flip-flop, get corrected, and legitimate data is passed to
the final output.
Figure 3.2: Timing diagram of TSVL approach with SEU recovery occurred in the original, Q1,
and redundant, Q2, flip-flop consecutively, masked_out is an inverse of data_in.
As a result, irrespective of whether the upset occurs in the original or redundant flip-flop, the final
output is always correct as long as the third input of self-voter circuit alters based on CLK2. The
second scenario is when an SET hits inside a flip-flop, an error (SEU) will be observed, and it
will be masked in the same way as stated above. The last scenario is when the first MUX or the
XOR-gate is hit by a transient pulse and in this case, the final output is not effected as long as the
output of both flip-flops are correct; therefore, any one of them can be selected as the final output.
However, an SET that hits the second MUX circuit, that determines the final output, will cause a
momentary glitch in the final output, as in the majority voter of a TMR. Note that signal CLK2 is
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generated by buffering the main clock to add phase delay greater than the SET pulse width, which
is a popular practice in the design of reliable circuits. The main difference between the proposed
approach and the Self-Voting DMR approach presented in [4] is that TSVL functions are based
on a simplex combinational datapath and double flip-flops, whereas Self-Voting DMR uses DMR
for the combinational logic portion and TMR for the sequential logic portion, thus TSVL achieves
significant reduction in area and power penalties as compared to the Self-Voting DMR approach;
this will be discussed in Section 3.3.
As compared to spatial and temporal redundancy approach flip-flop based designs, TSVL provides
a performance compromise between TMR and temporal redundancy approaches. The proposed
scheme (TSVL) consumes less area (by two redundant logic modules) than TMR and provides
higher performance in term of speed than temporal redundancy (roughly half the speed degradation
of the temporal redundancy scheme). Overall, the delay of TSVL approach is given by:
δTSV L = δcritical + δvoter + 2 ∗ δMux + δSET (3.1)
δcritical, δvoter, and δSET were discussed in chapter 2.
Based on Eq. 2.5, in chapter 2, the area overhead for TSVL approach is given by:
ATSV L = Aseq + Avoter + 2 ∗ AMux (3.2)
Equation 3.1 considers the longest datapath delay. Thus, to meet the timing constraints of a radia-
tion hardening technique, its main clock period must be greater than, or equal to, the longest logic
datapath delay.
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3.2.2 Hybrid Spatial and Temporal Redundancy Double-Error Correction Approach
Recently, CMOS technologies have been deeply-scaled, thereby a single particle strike that hits a
sensitive node can affect more than a single storage element at a given instance of time [95]. This
implies that the probability of double or even multiple errors occurring simultaneously has become
high. Thus, soft error in flip-flops has become a concern due to the effect of charge sharing between
the adjacent nodes [95]. Additionally, circuit-level mitigation techniques introduce reduced ben-
efits under technology scaling. For instance, in [115], it is predicted that, as the spacing between
the sensitive nodes is reduced, the vulnerability of hardened flip-flops increases. Therefore, opti-
mized solutions which offer multiple error correction while minimizing performance degradation
and energy overhead, imposed by the extra logic for protection, are sought.
Figure 3.3: Hybrid Spatial and Temporal Redundancy Double-Error Correction approach.
Based on the issue stated above, we develop a new technique, namely Hybrid Spatial and Tempo-
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ral Redundancy Double-Error Correction (HSTR-DEC), for soft error tolerance. As illustrated in
Figure 3.3, the proposed approach utilizes DMR circuit for the combinational datapath with TMR
for the sequential portion, i.e., flip-flops. The final output is determined by voting based on two
masked outputs, nodes N1 and N2, and the masked output from the original and redundant data-
paths. The proposed scheme significantly improves the error resilience as compared to previous
traditional redundancy approaches due to its ability to tolerate double SEUs simultaneously, i.e.,
Multi-bit Upsets (MBUs) are tolerated. Moreover, HSTR-DEC approach can surpass not only the
SEUs, but also can mask SETs that generate through datapath logic and are eventually captured by
one of the flip-flops. Our approach has been motivated by the original technique proposed in [4],
and the proposed changes have been designed by evaluating the limitations of error resilience, i.e.,
Multi-Bit Upsets (MBUs), regarding area and delay overheads. Table 3.1 shows the possible sce-
narios of soft error (SEU) that HSTR-DEC approach can tolerate. In case a single SEU occurs, the
proposed approach is able to mask an upset regardless of which register the error occurs.
Table 3.1: Possible error scenarios of HSTR-DEC approach; (NE = No Error; UE = Upset Error).
] of SEUs Case R1 R2 R3 N1 N2 Masked Output
Single
I UE NE NE X X X
II NE UE NE X X X
III NE NE UE X X X
Double
I UE UE NE UE X X
II UE NE UE X X X
III NE UE UE X UE X
On the other hand, in case there are two SETs generated and propagated through the datapath at
the same time, they might be captured by R1 and R3 only, whereas R2 will capture the legitimate
data since it is triggered by a clock which is delayed by a phase shift greater than the generated
transient pulse. There exist three possible scenarios for two SEUs to occur simultaneously. In case
I, both register R1 and R2 are upset, therefore, the output of the first self-voter circuit, node N1,
is incorrect while node N2 is correct due to the second self-voter votes based on R2, R3, and the
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redundant direct datapath during the rising edge of the clock. Thus, N2 is error-free as long as both
R3 and the redundant datapath are correct. The same scenario, i.e., case III, occurs when both R2
and R3 get upset. In case II, register R1 and R3 get upset, meanwhile nodes N1 and N2 are correct.
This is because both self-voter circuits vote based on R2, which is error-free, and the original and
redundant datapaths which are also error-free as long as the width of SET is less than 200 psec.
However, the proposed scheme is unable to recover when all the flip-flops, i.e., R1, R2, and R3,
become upset at the same time. This indicates that the proposed scheme fails to recover only when
the energetic particles strike inside the flip-flops and are adequately large to flip the bit state at all
registers during the same clock period.
3.3 Experimental Results and Analysis
To assess alternatives that can mask Soft Error Effects (SEE) under the impact of transistor scaling,
Synopsys Design Compiler was used to synthesize the proposed approach using 15nm technology
process based on NanGate open source library. Since TSVL does not require any modifications or
adoptions at the device-level, the standard cell libraries were used to implement the circuits. Thus,
no complexity or additional fabrication cost will be associated with the proposed scheme under
technology generations. Additionally, area and energy costs are minimized in the generation of
the delayed clock signal (CLK2) by using buffers that introduce maximum delay with minimum
power consumption and area usage.
3.3.1 Quantifying Fault Resilience for Proposed Techniques
The ability of the proposed hardening approaches to suppress soft errors, was tested by randomly
injecting transient and upset faults at the gate-level design. As a case study, a set of ISCAS89
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benchmark circuits, with a different combinational and sequential logic ratio, have been synthe-
sized using Synopsys Design Compiler and validated with fault injection technique, presented
in [127], where 7000 faults, both SET and SEU, were injected into the gate-level Verilog code de-
scribing the benchmark circuit constructed with the proposed approach. SEUs were injected into
the input node of a flip-flop with the rising edge, whereas SETs were injected into a node of a logic
gate, and they were injected at arbitrarily chosen locations and times. The fault coverage of the
proposed approach is listed in Table 3.2 for a set of ISCAS89 benchmark circuits constructed with
TSVL using 15nm technology process.
Table 3.2: Fault coverage analysis of TSVL approach.
Benckmark ] of ] of Injected ] of Masked ] of Unmasked Fault SV-DMR TSVL
Circuit Cells Faults Faults Faults Coverage % [4] FCPR FCPR
S27 13 500 487 13 97.4 20.40 23.75
S349 127 4000 3883 117 97.075 3.51 4.35
S444 163 7000 6814 186 97.34 2.13 2.5
S838 418 7000 6798 202 97.11 1.73 2.21
S1423 683 7000 6779 221 96.84 0.68 0.804
S9234 1369 7000 6737 263 96.24 0.365 0.455
The analysis of simulation results indicates that TSVL is able to recover from soft errors by 100%
of SEUs and 97% of SETs, thus, on average, it can roughly suppress 99% of soft errors. In addition,
since SER mitigation techniques offer a tradeoff between the error resilience and overheads of
protection techniques, we calculate a new metric called Fault Coverage Power Ratio (FCPR) by
dividing the fault coverage by the power consumption, as the goal is to maximize the fault coverage
and minimize the power consumption. Thus, the higher the value of FCPR, the better the design.
As seen in the last two columns of Table 3.2, TSVL realizes higher FCPR for all the selected
benchmark circuits, regardless whether the combinational or the sequential logic ratio is higher.
Also, TSVL achieves higher FCPR for the small circuits. Notice that the unmasked faults in the
S1423 and S9234 are large because these benchmark circuits utilize large number of flip-flops, 74
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and 228 respectively, thus the probability of an SET hitting the second Mux circuit is increased.
Thus, the proposed approach can be advantageous for soft error tolerant designs constrained with
a tight energy consumption budget with a minimal impact on the reliability by 1% for the soft error
effects.
3.3.2 Performance Evaluation for Proposed Techniques
In this section, area overhead, power consumption, and speed degradation are quantified for the
proposed techniques. The area overhead for the TSVL is estimated by measuring the implemen-
tation area in um2, and it turned out that the proposed scheme requires 54.53 um2, whereas 66.5,
64.9, and 43.4 um2 is needed to configure S27 benckmark circuit with TMR, Self-Voting DMR,
and temporal redundancy approach, respectively. Figure 3.4 shows the area overhead for a set
of ISCAS89 benchmark circuits with a distinct combinational and sequential logic ratio. It can be
seen that the proposed approach imposes an area overhead comparable to the temporal redundancy,
while achieving significant reduction as compared to Self-Voting DMR or TMR approach. In ad-
dition, Self-Voting DMR approach realizes an area reduction when the sequential logic portion is
high, while the proposed approach saves significant area either if the sequential logic portion is
high or if the combinational logic portion is high. On average, TSVL approach imposes less area
overhead by 22.02% and 36.84% as compared to Self-Voting DMR approach, presented in [4],
and TMR, respectively. In terms of power consumption, TSVL realizes power consumption im-
provement of 20.1% and 35.55% over the Self-Voting DMR and conventional TMR approach,
respectively, as depicted in Figure 3.5. Therefore, for applications which seek to protect a design
against soft errors with constant energy budget, it is advantageous to utilize TSVL approach as it
imposes high level of protection, besides achieving significant reduction in area-energy overhead
as compared to other hardening redundancy-based techniques.
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Figure 3.4: Area overhead evaluation of redundancy-based soft error masking techniques.
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Figure 3.5: Power consumption analysis of redundancy-based soft error masking techniques.
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In terms of performance, TSVL provides a comparable speed performance to that of Self-Voting
DMR approach, shown in Figure 3.6, as both incur a phase delay within a period that depends on
the SET pulse width. Overall, TSVL outperforms Self-Voting DMR by 2.15%. A transient pulse
of 200 psec was considered in order to generate CLK2 that triggers the second and third flip-flop
of TSVL and Self-Voting DMR approach, respectively. Thus, an SET pulse within a width larger
than the considered phase delay might be captured by a flip-flop if it arrives at the setup/hold time
thereby causing an upset in that storage element, unless it is masked via the electrical or logical
masking mechanism.
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Figure 3.6: Performance evaluation of redundancy-based soft error masking techniques.
Interestingly, HSTR-DEC approach is able to tolerate an SET within a width wider than 200 psec.
However, in this case the transient pulse should occur in the original datapath only, Datain1, and
the redundant datapath should be error-free at the same time, and vice versa. This indicates that
HSTR-DEC is able to tolerate a single SET with a width larger than the considered phase delay
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as long as the other datapath is correct. On the other hand, HSTR-DEC scheme is able to tolerate
two simultaneous SETs within a width of up to 200 psec. While TMR, temporal redundancy, and
self-voting DMR approaches achieve complete fault masking coverage for SEU in single module
simultaneously, HSTR-DEC approach realizes complete fault masking coverage for SEU in single
or double module concurrently. In addition to its increased level of reliability, the proposed scheme
consumes acceptable extra logic for error masking. The evaluation results indicate that HSTR-
DRC approach reduces area and power overheads roughly by 18.2% and 16.83%, respectively, and
imposes the performance by 20.17% as compared to conventional TMR using 15nm technology.
Table 3.3: Mean area-power consumption and delay of redundancy-based approaches w.r.t. sim-
plex design.
Design Normalized Normalized Normalized
Implementation Area Power Delay
Spatial Redundancy 3.14x 3.11x 1.19x
Temporal Redundancy [2] 1.88x 1.83x 1.69x
Self-Voting DMR [4] 2.48x 2.46x 1.4x
Proposed Approach (TSVL) 1.96x 1.91x 1.37x
Proposed Approach (HSTR-DEC) 2.6x 2.54x 1.43x
On the other hand, it improves speed performance by 15.38% while incurring 19.23% of area
overhead as compared to temporal redundancy approach. Likewise, it achieves comparable over-
heads in terms of power, area, and delay as compared to previous works of hybrid redundancy
approach, presented in [4], as both utilize duplicated datpaths and triplicated flip-flops. However,
our approach is able to tolerate double upsets that occur at the same time, whereas conventional
TMR, temporal redundancy, and SV-DMR are unable to detect and correct double upsets simul-
taneously. Table 4.2 lists the area, power consumption, and speed degradation penalties of the
redundancy-based soft error mitigation techniques, normalized to the simplex (non-redundant) de-
sign. In addition to increased levels of fault coverage, the proposed approaches are considered a
compromise solution ranging between the spatial and temporal redundancy approaches, as they
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realize a high protection against soft error effects, MBUs tolerance for HSTR-DEC, and impose
acceptable overheads in terms of area, power, and performance degradation.
3.4 Summary
As technology continues to scale, CMOS logic becomes denser, thus its immunity towards parti-
cle strikes decreases significantly. In this work, efficient and cost-effective redundancy-based Soft
Error (SE) handling approaches are proposed, namely TSVL and HSTR-DEC. They are utilized
to prevent the effects of soft errors in logic paths, occurring due to SEU or SET. The proposed
approaches are validated by injecting transient and upset glitches. Experimental results indicate
that TSVL approach can cover soft errors, on average, by roughly 99% while realizing an improve-
ment of 22.02% and 2.15% for area and speed degradation compared to the previous Self-Voting
DMR approach. Meanwhile, HSTR-DEC approach realizes complete masking coverage for single
and double SEUs while incurring comparable area and delay overheads as compared to the prior
hybrid redundancy approach, aside from its energy-efficiency as compared to conventional TMR
approach.
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CHAPTER 4: IMPACT OF PROCESS VARIATION IN THE NVT
REGION ON SOFT ERROR RATE
In this chapter, we investigate the effect of both technology size scaling and delay variation at
Near-Threshold Voltage (NTV) region on redundant systems, regarding energy versus performance
tradeoffs within an iso-energy constraints. We develop new results for the evaluation of alternatives
to mask Single Event Transients (SET) in combinational logic and Single Event Upsets (SEU) in
storage elements for three commonly utilized redundancy approaches, namely, spatial, temporal
and hybrid of both spatial and temporal. The performance, and energy impact of each approach
is quantified at NTV operation. Additionally, the impact of increased effect of threshold voltage
variation at NTV is assessed for all redundant systems. We also investigate the effect of technology
scaling by comparing the energy and performance variation of 45-nm MOSFET planar and 16-nm
High-κ/Metal Gate (HK-MG) bulk FinFETs structures as modeled by PTM NanGate open source
library via simulations in HSPICE. Monte-Carlo simulations reveal the influence of the threshold
voltage (Vth) variation in redundant systems at NTV to mask a transient pulse in combinational
logic and/or an upset glitch in a storage element. The primary insight from this work is identifica-
tion of redundancy-based hardening techniques that can deliver increased benefits in terms of the
Fault Coverage Energy Ratio (FCER) for the leveraged tradeoffs within iso-energy constraints at
Near-Threshold Voltage (NTV). We demonstrate how the FCER metric can be used as an optimiza-
tion parameter to guide circuit synthesis to meet performance and robustness goals. Finally, the
impact of design diversity on spatial and hybrid redundancy at NTV is assessed in terms of FCER
and delay variation to form overall recommendations regarding soft-error mitigation at NTV.12
1 c© 2017 IEEE. Part of this chapter is reprinted, with permission, from [29].
2 c© 2018 IEEE. Part of this chapter is reprinted, with permission, from [69].
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4.1 Energy-Efficiency Through Near-Threshold Computing
Supply voltage (VDD) scaling is widely recognized as an effective lever to reduce the power dis-
sipation and energy consumption for VLSI logic devices. Total energy consumption of CMOS
logic circuits is determined by dynamic and static energy components, which are both depen-
dent on supply voltage. The dynamic energy component has a quadratic relationship with VDD,
whereas the static components have a linear dependence. This property can be exploited in a
harsh environment, where some remote accessed systems might operate with serious constraints
or power consumption budgets. For instance, low power designs can be protected more adequately
by employing the redundancy approaches at lower VDD and lower performance. Operating at low-
voltage such as below the transistor’s threshold voltage Vth, which is an order of magnitude larger
than thermal voltage, can result in highly undesirable exponential increase in delay. The leak-
age energy also begins to dominate at a certain point, such that designs within this sub-threshold
region have limited applicability. Hence, operation in the near-threshold region is sought, as it
provides an energy-efficient operating tradeoff against delay. In Near-Threshold Voltage (NTV)
region, the VDD is set to be slightly above the Vth (100-200mV) [122] of the transistors to pro-
vide a 10X delay improvement compared to operation in the sub-threshold region with only a 50%
reduction in energy savings [123]. Taking all of these factors into consideration, NTV can be pre-
ferred to provide up to 6X energy savings with reasonable performance overheads as compared to
operating at nominal voltage [123], [128]. Even though NTV computing offers an attractive ap-
proach to balance power consumption versus delay for applications within iso-energy constraints,
such as for high-performance computing [123], it can result in reliability implications as the fault
masking coverage is reduced. In the literature, several studies have reported the impact of voltage
scaling of integrated circuits to soft errors where millions of transistors are used to construct the
ICs. Herein, we assess the relative performance of temporal and spatial alternatives from 800mV
to 500mV using a 16-nm Predictive Technology Model for Multi-Gate transistor (PTM-MG) li-
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brary.As near-threshold computing becomes mainstream, more mission-critical applications will
seek to embrace this mode of operation for the energy benefits with maximum reliability. The
potentials and pitfalls of near-threshold computing for mission-critical applications, such as on-
line banking systems, avionics operation and control systems that can have a severe impact if they
fail [101], are end-product impacts of this work.
4.2 Trends of SER in NTV Region
Operation with VDD in the NTV region is sought for highly-scaled CMOS logic circuits due to
its balancing of minor performance degradation relative to its significant power savings [129].
While NTV offers an attractive approach to balance energy consumption versus delay for power-
constrained applications such as high-performance computing, there is a need to evaluate its reli-
ability implications through increase in soft errors [122] and performance variation due to higher
impact of threshold voltage variation [130]. The SER is exacerbated by two complex interacting
factors: technology scaling and reduced VDD. In particular, radiation-induced SEUs which cause
soft errors can increase significantly in this operating region [10]. These soft errors are expected
to increase at NTV and will be exaggerated with manufacturing-induced Process Variations (PV)
due to technology scaling [10, 129]. Additionally, reducing VDD will increase the impact of SETs
since the amount of critical charge (Qcrit), which needs to be collected in order to change the state
of an output node at a logic cell, is reduced. Primarily, the critical charge needed to cause a failure
decreases as VDD is scaled and SER has an exponential dependence on Qcrit [10]. As a result,
soft errors during NTV operation can affect memory elements and cause arbitrary bit flip(s) in the
stored data (SEU), or transient errors can propagate through a logic path and eventually become
latched by a latch/flip-flop circuit (SET) to cause erroneous computations. Thus, the trend of SER
is expected to increase at NTV operation of deeply-scaled VLSI systems.
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4.3 Technology Scaling and PV Trends for SET
In the literature, some predictions of the transient pulse width trends under technology process
scaling have been conflicting [9]. In fact, the impact of technology scaling on SETs is found to be
complicated by several divergent trends contributing to SET characteristics, such as reducingQcrit,
Propagation-Induced Pulse Broadening (PIPB), pulse quenching, n-well contact area and spacing
(to reduce parasitic bipolar effect), trends of datapath masking mechanisms, charge sharing, and
source of radiation/particles [9, 26, 27]. However, the results presented in [9] assist in elucidating
some of the discrepancies in SET pulse widths measurements presented by various researchers
for the last decade. Gadlage et al. [9] experimentally measured the transient pulse widths in a
bulk 130, 90, and 65-nm CMOS technology, and they reported that SET pulse width overall was
found to be reduced under technology scaling for the conditions which they evaluated. However,
an overall increase in SER is expected in recent computing devices, even though the SEU per bit
has decreased due to lower Qcrit and higher device density per unit area, i.e., roughly doubling,
which results in a higher strike probability, even in deeply-scaled non-planar devices that exhibit
increased tolerance to particle strikes. Moreover, the analyses of the previous soft error studies have
predicted that soft error in combinational logic and latches/flip-flops would dominate the overall
CMOS chip errors, and it will exacerbate under technology process scaling [16]. Particularly,
in [15], it is predicted that SER contribution of logic circuits to total chip SER, roughly estimated
at 60%, exceeds SRAM which contributes 40% of SER during execution. Therefore, SER logic-
based should be emphasized for effective SER mitigation [27].
On the other hand, to alleviate the Process Variation (PV) associated with technology scaling,
FinFET devices have been introduced as an alternative with 50% reduction of threshold voltage
fluctuation for 16-nm-gate HK-MG bulk FinFETs compared with the results of the planar MOS-
FETs [44]. In particular, performance improvement of nano scale CMOS devices requires not only
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eliminating a variety of fabrication challenges (systematic or extrinsic variation) but also mitigat-
ing random or intrinsic variation effects including Random Dopant Fluctuation (RDF), Line-Edge
Roughness (LER), Interface Traps (ITs), and Work-Function (WK) variations, which are crucial
for device characterization of nanometer scale CMOS planar and FinFET structures [31, 43]. The
non-planar devices offer a means to reduce SER. For example, 22-nm tri-gate technology is shown
to reduce neutron induced SER at nominal voltage from 1.5-folds to 4-folds and alpha-particle
SER in excess of 10-folds compared to a 32-nm planar process [34].
In this work, intra-die variations for both CMOS 45-nm planar and tri-gate 16-nm bulk FinFET
technology nodes are simulated using the Monte-Carlo method in HSPICE. For 45-nm, the random
effects are modeled through the variation in Vth caused by RDF and LER effects [46]. Similarly,
for 16-nm, the variation is due to RDF, WKF, and ITs effects [31, 44]. The standard deviation
σVth values of 25.9mV for 45-nm process and 28.7mV for 16-nm process are adopted from [46]
and [44], respectively. Finally, we restrict our discussion to show how these PV effects combine in
redundant systems of logic datapaths to exhibit a higher mean delay than a simplex system. While
numerous studies in the literature discuss recent innovations for SE-mitigation in memory devices,
we focus herein on logic critical datapaths due to its increasing importance. The redundant system
performance is determined by the worst-case delay out of any of the constituent modules. For
instance, the delay of a TMR arrangement can be predicted to exceed that of any single module
since the module instance with maximum delay determines its final delay. Generally, if the worst-
case delay of module instance i of a redundant system is τi, then the overall delay of the TMR
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(τi) + 2 ∗ δvoter + δSET (4.3)
Where δvoter and δSET represent the delay of the voting logic and the delay of transient pulse
width, respectively, which contribute directly to the critical delay. 2 ∗ δSET is required as a phase
shift between CLK1 and CLK3, Figure 2.10, to ensure that the legitimate data is captured at the
registers, whereas 2∗ δvoter is required in SV-DMR because one majority voter and one self-voter
are located in the longest critical datapath [4].
4.4 Experimental Setup
4.4.1 Simulation Objectives, Tools and Workflow
Experiments are carried out to analyze the overheads for the above-mentioned soft error mitigation
techniques in terms of energy consumption and the σVth impact on the propagation delay. For
this case study, an inverter chain composed of 26 Fanout-of-4 inverters with registered outputs
was synthesized and simulated using 45-nm MOSFET planar and 16nm-gate High-κ/Metal Gate
(HK-MG) bulk FinFETs structure based on PTM-based NanGate open source library [131], using
an HSPICE simulation. Monte-Carlo simulations were carried out to implement the threshold
variation in spatial, temporal, and hybrid (SV-DMR) redundancy schemes. These simulations vary
the Vth of the transistor in the netlist based on a Gaussian distribution having a mean equal to
the nominal model card for PTM and Vth as provided in [44, 46]. The σVth can be adapted to
accommodate local and global variations, or their combined effects as considered in this work.
First, operation at NTV increases the effect of threshold variation on the datapath delay of the
soft error mitigation techniques redundancy-based. Therefore, using Eq. 4.1 through Eq. 4.3, we
quantify the delay performance impact of threshold voltage variation for each mitigation technique.
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Figure 4.1: Local Clock Manager (LCM) to generate CLK2 and CLK3.
For example, Eq. 4.1 is used to determine the delay of a TMR system. The overall delay in this
case is determined by the slowest critical datapath among the three modules and the delay of the
voter circuit. On the other hand, there exists only a single datapath in the temporal redundancy
approach while intricate details about the working of the voter circuit determine the overall delay
as quantified in Eq. 4.2. The design of the temporal redundancy scheme is depicted in Figure 2.10,
in chapter 2. It can be observed that the data is captured at three different time instances (T1,
T2, and T3) by using three identical registers (flip-flops) triggered by three different clock signals
(CLK1, CLK2, and CLK3). The relative latency between the clock signals is employed such that
they are delayed by a phase shift (Φ1 and Φ2), where there is a phase delay Φ1 between CLK1
and CLK2 and Φ2 between CLK1 and CLK3. To further clarify, Figure 4.1 illustrates the internal
working of Local Clock Manager (LCM) which is used to generate the required clock signals.
Finally, the delay of ∆T can be selected depending on the SET pulse width coverage, thereby
the total datapath delay is determined by summing the datapath and voter circuit’s delay, while
considering the slowest clock rate (CLK3) as delay of 2 ∗ δSET should be added.
In addition, the tradeoff analysis for the hybrid redundancy approach, Self-Voting DMR [4] (Fig-
ure 2.11), was also carried to for delay variation estimation. We calculate slowest datapath delay
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among two modules, the original and the redundant module. However, it uses two voting circuits,
one majority voter and one self-voter, therefore, 2∗δvoter is required for the longest delay datapath.
In addition, it also incurs a phase delay within a period that depends on the SET pulse width to
delay the clock rate of the third flip-flop, more details can be found in [4]. Thus, the total datapath
delay is determined by summing the critical datapath and the delay of two voter circuits, while
considering the slowest clock rate (CLK2) as quantified in Eq. 4.3.
The considered equations are leveraged in HSPICE circuit simulation tool to calculate the critical
path delay for each scheme, and investigate the effect of threshold variation on each SER mitigation
technique. The simulation framework is illustrated in 4.2. The Monte-Carlo simulations were
conducted to utilize at least 1,000 experimental runs for every design implementation, therefore,
the datapath delay of TMR system is obtained by calculating the mean value of the datapath delay
of each module for 1,000 runs. Then the module instance with maximum datapath delay determines
the delay of the TMR system as indicated in Eq. 4.1. Mean values are reported for each case. This
scenario is repeated 1,000 times to establish mean value for every supply voltage value, as the
supply voltage was altered from the nominal VDD (1.1V) to 0.5V by a discernment of 0.5V for the
45-nm CMOS planar structure, whereas it is altered from the nominal VDD (0.8V) to 0.5V for the
16-nm bulk FinFET structure. Furthermore, the energy consumption is computed by accumulating
the energy requirement of the mean value operating at a frequency of 1/τTMR. The same setup is
altered for other redundancy-based SE mitigation techniques presented in this work.
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Figure 4.2: Simulation framework developed to estimate the delay and energy for TMR. At least
1,000 samples are synthesized for each redundant system to conduct the statistical analysis.
4.5 Experimental Results and Analysis
4.5.1 Quantifying Area Overhead for SE-Mitigation Techniques
It is known that the area overhead for the TMR is more than 200% including voting logic, whereas
for temporal redundancy only the latches in the design grow in number while all the combinational
logic elements remain unchanged. Thus, area overhead incurred can be expected to be roughly
twice the area of the latches in the overall design. Indeed, a design which consists of a large se-
quential ratio and/or a large word-width occupies larger area as more flip-flops are required. On the
other hand, area overhead of SV-DMR scheme presents a compromise between spatial and tempo-
ral redundancy approaches. For the fault coverage, the spatial, temporal, and hybrid redundancy
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approaches achieve complete fault masking coverage for SEU in single module simultaneously.
However, temporal and hybrid redundancy are capable of detecting and correcting all upsets oc-
curring on registers, but they are unable to detect any transient pulse width exceeding 160 psec,
as explained later on. Therefore, to maintain high coverage for all redundant systems in order to
enable a fair comparison, a higher value of SET pulse width is considered herein than estimated in
prior works [9].





























Figure 4.3: Mean energy consumption for redundant systems using 45-nm and 16-nm technologies.
4.5.2 Comparison of Delay and Energy Consumption
Results Figure 4.3 depict energy consumption for the simplex (non-redundant) and redundant ar-
rangements. It is observed that temporal approach consumes a comparable amount of energy
compared to the unprotected circuit. However, it incurs an average speed degradation of 28.19%
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compared to TMR. In addition, as listed in Table 4.1, the experimental results depict an increment
in the speed degradation for both temporal and hybrid redundancy approaches with scaled supply
voltage. This is because buffering the clock signals causes more delay with scaling VDD, buffering
the clock signals will be discussed late in Section 4.5.5. Similarly, the speed degradation of both
TMR and SV-DMR is seen to be produced from both considering the slowest critical delay path
due the Vth variation and the delay of voter(s) circuit, besides considering the slowest clock rate
for SV-DMR as quantified in Eq. 4.3. Figure 4.4 shows speed degradation analysis for redundant
systems at NTV region using 45-nm technology process.
To further analyze the impact of increased variability on energy overhead of soft error resilient
designs, experiments were conducted using the 16-nm PTM-MG HP model. As shown in Ta-
ble 4.1, which illustrates the energy reduction and speed degradation for different supply voltages,
the temporal redundancy realizes higher average energy saving as compared to TMR implemen-
tation, 54.14% and 56.21% for 45-nm and 16-nm, respectively. This is partly due to the fact that
the multi-gate FinFET devices have less leakage than the planar MOSFET devices [30, 31]. In
term of speed performance, the speed degradation, Figure 4.5, of both temporal and hybrid re-
dundancy is reduced while utilizing multi-gate bulk FinFET devices because the latter achieves
more robust gate controllability and thus improves the system performance. Thus, both temporal
or hybrid redundancy approaches are able to exploit the benefits of scaled technology devices. The
overall comparison of energy and delay for all redundant system is presented in Table 4.2. On
average, temporal scheme consumes 34.51% more energy than the simplex circuit, whereas the
energy overhead is 207.19% and 123.25% for TMR and SV-DMR, respectively. However, tempo-
ral redundancy degrades system performance by 37.79% within a δSET = 150 psec for transient
pulse width using 16-nm technology.
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SVDMR (45nm)
TEMP Redundancy (45nm)
Figure 4.4: Speed degradation analysis at NTV for the 45-nm technology.



















Spatial Redundancy / TMR (16nm)
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TEMP Redundancy (16nm)
Figure 4.5: Speed degradation analysis at NTV for the 16-nm technology.
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Table 4.1: Mean energy reduction and speed degradation of temporal redundancy and SV-DMR
approach versus TMR.
45nm 16nm
VDD Temporal SV-DMR Temporal SV-DMR
Energy Speed Energy Speed Energy Speed Energy Speed
Reduct. Degrad. Reduct. Degrad. Reduct. Degrad. Reduct. Degrad.
1.1V 55.6% 21.22% 24.22% 12.92% - - - -
0.8V 54.41% 26.73% 23.67% 15.78% 55.15% 21.78% 27.31% 8.79%
0.65V 53.9% 31.9% 23.25% 18.49% 55.86% 26.24% 26.85% 12.87%
0.55V 53.6% 33.16% 22.18% 21.53% 55.17% 30.27% 26.53% 15.34%
0.5V 52.45% 35.76% 21.54% 23.17% 54.57% 33.45% 25.84% 17.74%
Ave. 54.14% 28.19% 22.31% 16.6% 56.21% 27.67% 26.93% 15.86%
Table 4.2: Mean energy consumption and speed degradation of spatial, temporal, and hybrid re-
dundancy approaches.
45nm 16nm vs. Simplex
Design Energy Speed Energy Speed 16nm
Implementation (pJ) (ns) (pJ) (ns) Energy Delay
TMR 0.391 2.26 0.0932 0.294 307.19% 7.92%
Temporal 0.191 2.93 0.0464 0.374 134.51% 37.79%
SV-DMR 0.296 2.595 0.0701 0.334 223.25% 24.94%
4.5.3 Impact of Process Variation in NTV Region
Table 4.3 depicts the speed degradation in the NTV region of redundant systems normalized to
the simplex design implementation. It can be seen that the speed degradation exacerbates with
lowering VDD for redundant implementations. This implies that the variation in the output delay
was found to be increased under scaling down VDD from the nominal level to 0.5V for both the 16-
nm bulk FinFET and 45-nm planar MOSFET. The critical path and SET pulse width for spatial and
temporal redundancy respectively incur more speed degradation with down scaling of the supply
voltage. As illustrated in Figure 4.6, the delay variation of temporal redundancy is lower than
the variation of both TMR and SV-DMR, even the variation of 16-nm is beneath that of 45-nm
86
technology node for spatial and hybrid redundancy approach. This implies that delay variation
increases for either higher redundancy or increased sophistication of the fault resolution circuit.
However, the latter impacts the delay variation higher as can be seen in the curves of SV-DMR
approach in Figure 4.6 for both 45-nm and 16-nm technology node. Thus, temporal redundancy
can be utilized to alleviate the effect of delay variation at NTV. In addition, the 16-nm node-
based temporal system improves the normalized speed degradation by 12.4% compared to the
implementation of a temporal system based on 45-nm planar, and it also enhances the average
normalized energy saving by 5.74% compared to the 45-nm planar structure. Consequently, soft
error resilient low power designs can be protected more adequately by employing the temporal
approach at lower VDD.
Table 4.3: Normalized speed degradation of spatial, temporal, and hybrid redundancy (SV-DMR)
w.r.t. simplex design.
45nm 16nm
VDD Spatial Temporal Hybrid Spatial Temporal Hybrid
Redund. Redund. (SV-DMR) Redund. Redund. (SV-DMR)
0.8V 1.105x 1.33x 1.25x 1.05x 1.29x 1.11x
0.75V 1.107x 1.34x 1.27x 1.05x 1.3x 1.13x
0.7V 1.109x 1.36x 1.28x 1.06x 1.32x 1.13x
0.65V 1.11x 1.37x 1.3x 1.07x 1.34x 1.14x
0.6V 1.11x 1.39x 1.31x 1.07x 1.35x 1.15x
0.55V 1.12x 1.42x 1.33x 1.09x 1.36x 1.17x
0.5V 1.13x 1.44x 1.35x 1.09x 1.38x 1.17x
4.5.4 Impact of Supply Voltage in NTV Region
NTV operation reduces supply voltage to 100-200mV above the threshold voltage of the transis-
tors, allowing for significant improvement in energy-efficiency with a reasonable performance im-
pact [122]. The energy savings can be utilized for either reduced power consumption or to increase
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resilience via redundant implementation. Thus, the near-threshold region allows for consideration
of interesting tradeoffs. For example, a design with spatial or temporal redundancy can be utilized
as a means to increase reliability within the same energy budget as a simplex (unprotected) system
operating at nominal voltage. This is valid provided that the increase in delay, and thus correspond-
ing drop in performance and area costs are acceptable. Note that pursuit of increased reliability is
predicated upon the assumption that the source of variability in the near-threshold region is due to
variation in Vth for which this work is restricted.































Figure 4.6: Delay variation for redundant systems using 45-nm and 16-nm technologies.
Based on these assumptions, the tradeoffs in Figure 4.7 and 4.8 are highlighted. For instance, it
shows the feasibility of the temporal approach at around 0.97V on average given an identical energy
budget of a simplex system operating at nominal voltage of 1.1V (for 45-nm technology). TMR
and hybrid redundancy can be employed to protect the design at lower supply voltage, ∼ 0.67V
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and ∼ 0.8V, respectively. On the other hand, for 16-nm technology process, results emphasize
that utilizing temporal redundancy approach at NTV provides better energy reduction with scal-
ing, as shown in Figure 4.8. The temporal scheme can be employed to mitigate soft errors with the
nominal energy budget at a supply voltage between 0.7V to 0.75V. Meanwhile, spatial and hybrid
redundancy should operate between 0.5V to 0.55V, or 0.6V to 0.65V, respectively, to maintain the
energy consumption at the same level as the simplex design implementation. In this case, using
either TMR or SV-DMR in NTV region will degrade the performance more than utilizing tem-
poral redundancy as shown in Table 4.4, where it depicts performance degradation with constant
energy budget for redundant systems compared to simplex design implementation. Thus, while
maintaining energy-efficiency temporal redundancy scheme provides better performance in terms
of energy saving, speed degradation, and variation in output delay with technology scaling at NTV.
Therefore, for applications which seek to protect a design against soft errors with constant energy
dissipation budget as compared to nominal operation, it is advantageous to utilize temporal redun-
dancy approach to achieve that at lower VDD since scaling down the supply voltage is the most
effective method to reduce energy consumption.
Table 4.4: Effect of reducing supply voltage under iso-energy constraints.
45nm 16nm
Design VDD Norm. Norm. VDD Norm. Norm.
Implementation (volts) Energy Delay (volts) Energy Delay
Simplex 1.1 1x 1x 0.8 1x 1x
TMR ∼ 0.67 1.059x 2.7x 0.5 ∼ 0.55 1.057x 1.615x
Temporal ∼ 0.97 1.087x 1.68x 0.7 ∼ 0.75 1.072x 1.37x
SV-DMR ∼ 0.8 1.037x 2.35x 0.6 ∼ 0.65 1.014x 1.48x
89


























Figure 4.7: Maintaining energy consumption at NTV using 45-nm technology process.


























Figure 4.8: Maintaining energy consumption at NTV using 16-nm technology process.
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4.5.5 Constraints of Temporal Redundancy Approach
Herein, experiments are conducted to explore the tradeoffs of performance vs SET pulse width for
the temporal approach. To generate the clock signals for temporal redundancy approach, shown in
Figure 2.10, a Local Clock Manager (LCM) is employed, presented in [85], offering advantages
in terms of complexity and energy consumption. CLK1 is the same as CLK (main clock), while
CLK2 and CLK3 are produced by utilizing clock buffers. The number of buffers depends on the
phase shift between the clocks. The latter depends on SET pulse width. The transient pulse width
is estimated in [9, 132] with nominal voltage operation and 65-nm technology node between 25
psec to 125 psec at the sea level. In this work, a relatively higher pulse width value of 160 psec and
150 psec was chosen to accommodate the worst case and incorporate the effect of using reduced
technology node size of 45-nm and 16-nm, respectively.
As illustrated in Figure 4.9, the considered delay, δSET , increases as the supply voltage is lowered.
Thus, operation at NTV increases the delay for the clock buffers, where the number of buffers
were determined based on nominal value of VDD, and thus, this makes the temporal redundancy
scheme more robust to reject larger SET pulse width than operation at nominal voltage. Overall,
the temporal redundancy approach is able to reject SET pulse widths ranging between 380 psec
to 850 psec and 170 psec to 230 psec when the supply voltage is scaled between 0.7V to 0.55V,
for 45-nm and 16-nm technology process, respectively. This demonstrates the benefit of temporal
approach for these parameters. However, this is at the expense of performance degradation as
stated in Section 4.5.2.
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Figure 4.9: SETs pulse width rejection at NTV for 45-nm planar MOSFET and tri-gate 16-nm bulk
FinFET.
4.6 Energy Efficency versus Fault Resiliency
To realize tradeoffs between the fault-masking coverage achieved versus its cost in terms of power
and delay, an appropriate metric is proposed. The metric is then used to optimize the design of
several low-power circuits. We evaluate the redundant arrangements by calculating a new metric
called Fault Coverage Energy Ratio (FCER), which divides the soft or transient fault masking
coverage over the worst case energy consumption. The aim is to maximize the resilience of fault
coverage and minimize the consumed energy. Thus, the higher the value of FCER metric, the
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better the protection arrangement. FCER is expressed as:
FCER =
fault coverage
MAX (delay × power consumption)
(4.4)
The worst case energy consumption considers the power consumed by the logic circuit as well as
the protection circuit. To consider worst case conditions, the circuit needs to be evaluated through
the application of worst case input vectors. FCER is used to evaluate the overheads of providing
soft error resilience using multiple mitigation techniques. We identify the following applications
of FCER metric: 1) FCER serves to compare multiple mitigation techniques; 2) Use of FCER as a
parameter for synthesis of resilient circuits. In an iterative design process, the metric can be used
as an optimization parameter to guide selection of the protection approach and meet performance
and energy goals.
4.6.1 FCER Evaluation of Redundancy-based Approaches
The summary of the FCER analysis for the redundancy-based soft error mitigation techniques is
listed in Table 4.5. Note that, only the fault masking coverage for TSVL approach is listed in
Table 4.5, while the masking coverage for other redundancy-based techniques is assumed to be
100%. Additionally, Figure 4.10 shows FCER under scaling down VDD from the nominal level
(1.1V) to 0.5V for 45nm technology. As observed in Table 4.5, at the nominal supply voltage, the
hybrid redundancy scheme (TSVL) achieves the preferred tradeoffs in terms of FCER among the
redundancy-based soft error mitigation approaches for most of the selected benchmark circuits,
irrespective of whether the combinational or the sequential logic ratio is higher. While the tem-
poral redundancy realizes high or acceptable FCER when the combinational logic ratio is high,
TMR achieves desirable/acceptable FCER either when the sequential logic ratio is high or when
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the benchmark circuit occupies a small area. On the other hand, in the NTV region, the tempo-
ral redundancy approach realizes an increased benefit in terms of FCER, meanwhile TSVL still
achieves competitive FCER compared to the temporal approach at NTV operations. Consequently,
the TSVL approach can be utilized to harden logic paths against radiation-induced soft errors that
are constrained with an iso-energy consumption budget with a minimal impact on the masking
coverage roughly by 1.5% of transient errors. Likewise, the temporal approach offers promis-
ing attributes at NTV operation while encountering an acceptable/reasonable performance delay
variation and degradation.


































Temporal Self−Voting Logic (TSVL)
Figure 4.10: Mean fault coverage energy ratio analysis for benchmark circuits realizing different
redundancy-based approaches. Each point is obtained by average of FCERs obtained by scaling
VDD from nominal level (1.1V) to the NTV region (0.5V) with decrements of 0.1V.
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Table 4.5: Fault coverage energy ratio analysis of redundancy-based soft-error mitigation ap-
proaches.{FC=Fault Coverage}
Benchmark ] of FC of Redundancy FCER FCER FCER
Circuit Cells TSVL (%) Approach (VDD=1.1V) (VDD=0.75V) (VDD=0.55V)
S27 13 97.4
TMR 12.82 12.25 10.28
Temporal [2] 7.11 6.88 7.47
SV-DMR [4] 7.034 6.97 5.45
TSVL [67] 9.90 9.99 7.99
S349 127 97.075
TMR 3.60 3.4467 2.8929
Temporal 3.77 3.6617 3.9745
SV-DMR 3.73 3.7022 2.8993
TSVL 4.26 4.3210 3.4546
S444 163 97.34
TMR 2.25 2.1523 1.8065
Temporal 2.19 2.1330 2.3153
SV-DMR 2.13 2.1165 1.6574
TSVL 2.71 2.7488 2.1976
S838 418 97.11
TMR 1.55 1.4937 1.2537
Temporal 1.82 1.7662 1.9172
SV-DMR 1.66 1.6468 1.2896
TSVL 2.027 2.0595 1.6466
S1423 683 96.84
TMR 0.798 0.7630 0.6404
Temporal 0.748 0.7247 0.7866
SV-DMR 0.724 0.7179 0.5622
TSVL 0.924 0.9392 0.7509
S9234 1369 96.24
TMR 0.223 0.2140 0.1797
Temporal 0.278 0.2690 0.2920
SV-DMR 0.224 0.2219 0.1738
TSVL 0.282 0.2888 0.2309
Simulation Results of Complete Systems Utilization
22360 94.34
TMR 0.0686 0.0812 0.0524
32-bit Pipeline Temporal 0.0759 0.1003 0.0654
Processor SV-DMR 0.0587 0.0843 0.0546
TSVL 0.0760 0.0.975 0.0843
12828 95.61
TMR 0.0159 0.0189 0.0122
128-bit AES Temporal 0.0311 0.0410 0.0268
Encryption SV-DMR 0.0185 0.0267 0.0173
TSVL 0.0267 0.0.342 0.0296
1095 93.15
TMR 0.0427 0.0507 0.0327
I2C Memory Bus Temporal 0.0771 0.1018 0.0664
Controller SV-DMR 0.0539 0.0775 0.0502
TSVL 0.0653 0.0.838 0.0725
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4.6.2 Design and Analysis using FCER
To further investigate the energy-efficiency and resilience of fault masking coverage for highlighted
approaches, we synthesized and optimized via FCER maximization the following applications in
addition to the benchmark circuits: 1) a 5-stage pipeline processor, 2) a cryptographic processing
core, and 3) a memory controller. Using the results, realistic estimations are obtained of perfor-
mance penalties versus robustness for mission-critical systems. These circuits were synthesized
and simulated using Synopsys Design Compiler with the 45nm technology node of NanGate open
source library. We show how energy savings obtained from NTV operation can be utilized to
fortify both the computational logic and the pipeline registers against soft errors via the afore-
mentioned mitigation approaches. Then, we investigate the effects of soft errors on the protected
computational logic while evaluating area overheads. For example, a TMR arrangement is utilized
with majority voting which has the ability to mask corrupted outputs. On the other hand, a low
overhead approach as compared to TMR, the Self-Voting DMR [4] approach is also evaluated. Al-
ternatively, the temporal and hybrid (TSVL) redundancy approach replaces the pipeline registers
so that soft fault detection and correction storing circuitry is deployed only in the pipeline registers
while utilizing a simplex instance of the datapath.
The simulation results of a 5-stage pipeline 32-bit MIPS processor show that the hybrid redundancy
(TSVL) scheme incurs only an increased energy of 5.7% at nominal supply voltage compared to
the temporal redundancy approach, which incurs the lowest power consumption and area overhead.
This is due to a major contribution of TSVL hardening scheme as it utilizes a single computational
logic for error detection and duplicated registers, instead of triplicated registers in the temporal
redundancy arrangement. Therefore, performance penalties of TSVL are reduced compared to the
conventional TMR or SV-DMR pipeline stages. However, for the Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) encryption circuitry, temporal redundancy realizes the best energy results among all uti-
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lized techniques. This is because the AES encryption module has large fraction of computational
logic that remains unprotected in the temporal redundancy while only the state holding logic, i.e.,
registers/flip-flops, are triplicated. Therefore, a minimum area overhead is required to immune the
registers. Figure 4.11 and 4.12 demonstrate that the temporal redundancy delivers an optimized En-
ergy Delay Product (EDP) at 0.8V, whereas TSVL needs to operate at 0.75V to realize the optimal
EDP. Even though temporal redundancy provides reduced energy savings, it has higher propaga-
tion delay at the NTV region due to the buffer circuits which are used to delay the main CLK
signal and generate the phase shifted signals to capture the input data at different time instances.
Meanwhile, considering low supply voltage (VDD=0.75 or 0.55V) for energy-efficiency, the TSVL
approach delivers intriguing energy savings. This competes well with the temporal redundancy
approach by achieving roughly 2.96% and 26.76% improvement, respectively. Therefore, it can be
utilized to fortify low-power circuits and systems against transient and upset faults. On the other
hand, both the conventional TMR and SV-DMR redundancy approaches incur high energy and
EDP compared to either the temporal or TSVL approaches at NTV. Consequently, variation-aware
fault-tolerant designs can be hardened via temporal redundancy. This is because it exhibits strong
capability to incur less delay variation [29] in the critical output datapath and preserves the best
tradeoff between energy saving and fault masking coverage for operations at the nominal supply
voltage, as listed in Table 4.5 and discussed later on.
4.6.3 Evaluation of Fault Coverage
In this work, we utilize an in-house fault-injection module developed at the RTL-level to simu-
late and evaluate the transient fault masking capability of circuits implemented in Verilog HDL.
Large-sized circuits such as a 32-bit pipeline processor, a 128-bit AES encryption core, and an I2C
controller have been evaluated. This aids us to accelerate the determination of FCER for practical
systems.
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Figure 4.11: Energy Delay Product (EDP) analysis with varying supply voltage for multiple re-
dundant arrangements using a 32-bit 5-stage pipelined MIPS processor.






























Figure 4.12: Energy Delay Product (EDP) analysis with varying supply voltage for multiple re-
dundant arrangements using a 128-bit Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm.
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For experimental results herein, 1,000 faults of each SET and SEU were injected into the gate-level
Verilog code describing the benchmark circuitry configured with the redundancy-based mitigation
techniques. SETs were injected into a node impacting a logic gate, while SEUs were injected
into the input of a register/flip-flop with the rising edge of the main CLK signal. All errors were
injected at randomly selected locations. The evaluation results showed that the spatial (TMR) and
hybrid (SV-DMR) redundancy can prevent the injected transient fault from propagating through
the computational logic of the pipeline stages in all cases. On the other hand, for the hybrid
redundancy (TSVL), 5.66% of the injected errors were occasionally observed to corrupt a pipeline
register causing transient error in the register’s output.
Further investigation into the fault coverage results of the TSVL approach listed in Table 4.5 reveals
interesting trends. Specifically, TSVL approach achieves high fault resilience for systems that
include higher proportion of combinatorial logic than sequential logic. For instance, the majority
of the logic (roughly 85%) of the AES encryption circuitry is combinational logic for computation
while only about 15% is used for registers. Therefore, in this case, the possibility of having a SEU
at the intermediate registered output hardened with the hybrid redundancy is reduced. On the other
hand, for the I2C controller benchmark circuit, the TSVL approach provides inadequate robustness
(93.15%) since the I2C controller circuitry includes high sequential logic portion for holding its
state, and thus there is a higher probability for an intermediate register to capture a SET and cause
an upset. Even with these unpreventable transient faults, the TSVL approach still achieves a high
soft fault masking with roughly 7% margin of error.
4.6.4 Summary of Fault-tolerant Design using FCER
The peak tradeoffs between energy efficiency and resilience of fault masking for the hybrid (TSVL)
compared to temporal redundancy approach can be obtained at NTV (VDD=0.75V), as an energy
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saving of 2.96% is achieved. Furthermore, the hybrid redundancy approach realizes a higher FCER
than the temporal redundancy as shown in Table 4.5 and Figure 4.13. However, our results demon-
strate that this is worthwhile for an application/system with the following traits: balanced sequen-
tial and combinational resources or an application constrained with iso-energy objective that allows
sacrificing fault resilience while meeting the constrained budget of energy consumption. For in-
stance, image processing applications are a promising field to employ the hybrid redundancy at
NTV region. This demonstrates the benefit of utilizing either the TSVL or temporal redundancy
approach at NTV to protect low power designs against transient faults.
In summary, the energy usage is minimal while using the hybrid redundancy (TSVL) for protec-
tion, with the expense of delivering a reduced performance due to the speed degradation. There-
fore, to improve reliability of low power computing systems in NTV region, the temporal redun-
dancy approach can be selected to harden designs that consist of higher sequential logic resources,
whereas the hybrid redundancy can be chosen to protect a design configured with a balanced usage
between the computational and sequential logic resources. Tradeoffs between energy-efficiency
and resilience of fault masking coverage can be obtained by utilizing the hybrid redundancy ap-
proach to protect a low-power system that requires maintaining high performance and tolerates
few unmasked soft errors. Finally, the temporal redundancy approach can be selected to ef-
fectively immune mission-critical systems to radiation-induced transient faults while delivering
energy-efficiency and preserving high soft fault masking with an acceptable performance degrada-
tion. In this case, FCER metric is validated as an optimization parameter to guide circuit synthesis
algorithms to meet performance goals after the selection of a mitigation technique. It is notewor-
thy that the electrical and logical masking mechanisms that inherently mask transient faults are not
considered during the fault injection process, thus, fault masking coverage can be expected to be
higher in the field than the values estimated.
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Temporal Self−Voting Logic (TSVL)
VDD  (volts) 1.1V 0.75V 0.55V
Figure 4.13: Fault coverage energy ratio analysis of multiple application circuits protected us-
ing multiple redundancy-based approaches, VDD is scaled from nominal level (1.1V) to the NTV
region (0.55V).
4.7 Relationship of Area and FCER
Herein, we explore the relationship between the SER and area overhead of redundant systems by
using a set of ISCAS89 benchmark circuits with various number of cells. It turns out that the ratio
for all circuits is the same except that the power is positively correlated with area and the probability
of soft error is positively correlated with area. Thus, there is an overall impact of FCER =
O(Area2) relationship as observed in Figure 4.14. Meanwhile, since the TSVL approach offers
a reduced SER while incurring modest performance penalties in terms of occupied area, power
consumption, and speed degradation, it is considered an intriguing approach that addresses or
alleviates the drawbacks of spatial and temporal redundancy approaches.
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Temporal Self−Voting Logic (TSVL)
Figure 4.14: Relationship between area (number of cells) and FCER for each benchmark circuit realized
using multiple redundancy approaches, at nominal supply voltage (VDD = 1.1V ).
4.8 Design Diversity and Spatial Reduandancy
Here, the use of Design Diversity, which is a circuit synthesis technique, is investigated to mitigate
soft errors. Design diversity with spatial redundancy as a use-case is employed to test the efficacy
of fault-tolerant circuit synthesis using FCER. For instance, a TMR arrangement is constructed
with three different structures while a voter circuit determines the majority condition in order to
determine the final masked output. To quantify the advantages/disadvantages of diverse TMR ar-
rangements, the FCER metric defined earlier in Section 4.6 is utilized. Table 4.6 lists the summary
for some design arrangements of TMR systems. Results indicate that the inverter-based chain
achieves the highest FCER, but it incurs the highest delay variation to impact the performance as
compared to diverse implementations. Additionally, these results are based on a single error in-
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jection scenario considered for each diversity enabled-TMR inverter chain, since the conventional
TMR approach is only able to tolerate a single error at a time. Thus, the diversity enabled-TMR
arrangements might be used to alleviate/address the issue of MBU, aside from its benefit to tolerate
the CMFs. Meanwhile, the delay variation results in time-dependent bit error, when the delay vari-
ation exceeds the clock period. Therefore, considering the transient error (SET/SEU) and timing
error when calculating the fault masking coverage will provide a more accurate evaluation for the
FCER metric. It provides a means to further highlight the pros and cons of design diversity when
used with spatial redundancy.
Table 4.6: Fault coverage energy ratio analysis of diverse-TMR arrangements.
Diverse-TMR Delay Delay Variation FCER(Inverter Chain) (ns) 3σ (%)
INV,INV,INV 0.61 2.46 3.94
INV,INV,NAND2 0.62 2.01 3.84
INV,NAND2,NAND2 0.745 1.56 3.158
NAND2,NAND2,NAND2 0.75 1.44 3.1
4.9 Summary
Mitigating soft errors at NTV can provide a range of alternatives across metrics of area, speed,
and power. Thus, it would be advantageous to consider NTV operation within contemporary con-
straints of the design, such as minimum energy within a soft error mitigated design, maximum
speed given an energy budget, or a tradeoff between these issues. In terms of delay variation,
temporal redundancy incurs less variation (22%) at NTV (VDD = 550mV) under technology node
scaling as compared to both TMR and SV-DMR (31.6% and 35.2%, respectively), even the vari-
ation of 16-nm is beneath that of 45-nm technology node for both. Thus, the drawback of TMR
and SV-DMR is the need to accommodate the slowest module delay. On the other hand, temporal
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redundancy provides higher energy saving, but it requires consideration of the SET pulse dura-
tion. Thus, for soft error resilient low power designs, designers can select temporal redundancy
at lower supply voltage thereby allowing for significant improvement in energy-efficiency at NTV
under technology generation, while facing an acceptable delay variation and a reasonable speed
degradation.
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CHAPTER 5: HIGH-PERFORMANCE DOUBLE NODE
UPSET-TOLERANT NON-VOLATILE FLIP-FLOP DESIGN
This chapter discusses implications for future emerging spin-based latching circuits. Recently,
emerging spin-based devices are introduced as an intriguing candidate to alleviate leakage currents
and continue the scalability of CMOS technology. However, their immunity to radiation-induced
transient faults needs to be adequately addressed. In this work, a radiation-immune hybrid Spin
Transfer Torque Magnetic Tunnel Junction (STT-MTJ)/CMOS flip-flop is designed and evaluated
for nonvolatile applications. The proposed nonvolatile flip-flop circuit achieves attractive features,
such as low standby power dissipation (21% less than CMOS-based design), high computing per-
formance, and superior soft-error resilience (concurrently can tolerate DNU) to potentially become
as a mainstream solution for the aerospace and avionic nanoelectronics.1
5.1 Hybrid CMOS/Spintronics: Alleviating CMOS Challenges
Currently, CMOS logic designs are moving toward their physical limits, and therefore, their contin-
ued scalability to sustain Moore’s law becomes challenging in near future [134]. In addition, static
power in CMOS logic and memory circuits of technologies beyond 45nm has increased due to
increasing leakage currents [135]. To address this issue, a hybrid STT-MTJ/CMOS circuit design
is developed as a potential alternative and an intriguing candidate to address scalability challenges.
Moreover, the property of Non-Volatility (NV) facilitates the capability of instantly turning on
devices that are normally OFF. Thus, the energy consumption demand can be reduced. Due its
efficient recall operation and compatibility with CMOS processing, the STT-MTJ NV flip-flop has
been targeted for nonvolatile processors. In particular, it is an intriguing concept to address power
1 c© 2018 IEEE. Reprinted, with permission, from [133].
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failures from energy harvesting [136, 137].
An MTJ cell is inherently resistant to the radiation-induced transient faults [134, 138] because the
magnetization direction of the ferromagnetic (FM) layers is physically immune to energetic par-
ticles, i.e., cannot switch as a result of particle strikes. This is because the data bit is stored in
the MTJs based on the spin direction, such as spin-up and spin-down (spin property of electrons),
instead of electrical positive and negative charges as in the conventional CMOS circuits [13]. On
the other hand, the issue of radiation-induced transient effects, i.e., Single-Event Transient (SET)
and Single-Event Upset (SEU), in the CMOS-based circuits for read/write access operations re-
mains unaddressed [139]. In addition, as the spacing between the sensitive nodes is reduced with
technology size scaling, the vulnerability of SEU-immune flip-flops increases [69]. Thus, soft
errors in flip-flops have become a concern due to the effect of SET induced Double Node Up-
set (DNU) simultaneously between the adjacent vulnerable nodes [94,95]. Consequently, efficient
solutions to completely and efficiently address this issue are sought to improve the reliability of hy-
brid STT-MTJs/CMOS nonvolatile sub-micron electronics [134], thereby making this technology
feasible. In response to these aforementioned challenges, a power-efficient with superior soft-error
resilience Non-Volatile Flip-Flop (NVFF) design is developed. It can significantly reduce the po-
tential Single-Event Double Node Upset (SEDNU) rate due to the space reducing between the
susceptible nodes. The experimental results validate its resilience, in terms of DNU-tolerance, and
its efficiency, in terms of occupied area, speed performance, and power dissipation, compared to
the prior work in [140] and [141]. The proposed design is the first NVFF circuit that has been
demonstrated to tolerate DNU simultaneously.
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5.2 Fundamentals of Magnetic Tunnel Junctions
An MTJ consists of two ferromagnetic (FM) layers, called fixed layer and free layer, which are
separated by a thin oxide barrier, i.e., MgO [142]. There are two different magnetization con-
figurations for FM layers, parallel (P) and antiparallel (AP), according to which MTJ resistance
changes between RP and RAP , respectively. MTJ resistance is determined by the angle (θ) be-
tween the magnetization orientations of fixed layer and free layer due to the tunnel magnetoresis-
tance (TMR) effect [143]. The MTJ resistance in P (θ=0◦), and AP (θ=180◦) states is expressed by
the following equations [135]:
R(θ) = 2RMTJ ×
1 + TMR












Where Vb is the bias voltage, and Vh = 0.5V is the bias voltage when TMR is half of the TMR0,
tox is the oxide thickness of MTJ, Factor is obtained from the resistance-area product value of the
MTJ that relies on the material composition of its layers, Area is the surface area of the MTJ, and
ϕ is the oxide layer energy barrier height.
A promising approach, which is known as spin transfer torque (STT), was proposed in [144] to
switch the MTJ states. In the STT approach, a bidirectional spin-polarized current (IMTJ ) is re-
quired for switching the free layer nanomagnet configuration of the MTJ, as shown in Figure 5.1.
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Figure 5.1: Spin transfer torque switching mechanism.
The P or AP configuration of the MTJ is determined by the direction of the current that flows
through it. The required bidirectional current could be produced by means of simple MOS-based
circuits. According to the relative amplitude of the IMTJ and the switching critical current (IC),
STT switching behavior can be categorized into precessional region (IMTJ > IC), and thermal acti-
vation region (IMTJ < IC). To have high switching speed, MTJ is required to work in precessional










em(1 + P 2)
(IMTJ − IC) (5.4)
Where τ
STT
is the mean duration for precessional switching region, C = 0.577 is the Euler’s
constant, ∆ is the thermal stability factor, and m is the free layer magnetic moment. In this paper,
Verilog-A is utilized to model the behavior of STT-MTJs based on the aforementioned physical
equations. Then, the model is leveraged in SPICE circuit simulator to validate the functionality of
the designed circuits using experimental parameters listed in Table 5.1.
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Table 5.1: Parameters of STT-MTJ devices.
Parameter Description Value
MTJArea MTJLength ×MTJWidth × π4 40nm × 40nm ×
π
4
tox Thickness of oxide barrier 0.85nm
P Spin Polarization 0.52
RP , RAP MTJ Resistances 3.22 KΩ, 6.44 KΩ
TMR0 TMR ratio 100%
5.3 Technology Scaling Trends on Data Bit Upset
In recent sub-micron CMOS electronics, the latching circuits have become more susceptible to
Multiple Node Upset (MNU) due to the effect of SET induced DNU simultaneously. This is be-
cause the charge/discharge node capacitance of a circuit and the spacing between the vulnerable
nodes are reduced to ten(s) of nanometers under the aggressive scaling of technology genera-
tions [95]. As a result, a higher Soft Error Rate (SER) is anticipated due to single particle strikes
upsetting double nodes concurrently. Moreover, separating the bits of the same word becomes a
complicated process, and it might not be feasible for deeply-scaled register sets, as it impacts area
and power consumption [77]. Therefore, optimized solutions which offer multiple error correc-
tion capability while minimizing performance degradation, area overhead, and power dissipation,
imposed by the extra logic for protection, are sought.
5.4 Radiation-Induced Transient Faults Emulation
At previous technology nodes having reduced device scaling, a primary contributor of radiation-
induced soft errors was indirect ionization due to incident neutrons. However, as the amount
of critical charge, Qcrit, becomes smaller with the process scaling, alpha particles contribute as
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much as neutrons to the overall SER [28, 39]. In particular, Linear Energy Transfer (LET) from
alpha particles can generate greater than 1 MeV (equivalent to 44.5fc) by direct ionization, which
is more than adequate for recent technologies to charge/discharge a vulnerable node capacitance
and flip its logic state [28]. It has also been reported that SEU susceptibility to low-energy alpha
particles from radioactive impurities can deposit adequate charge by direct ionization. Therein, the
impurities induce SEUs via their intrinsic reduction of the deposited charge threshold [16, 28]. As
discussed in in Section 5.1, the MTJs are inherently immune to radiation-induced transient faults.
However, the CMOS-based portion for read/write access operations needs to be hardened. To cover
these cases, an accepted approach is to model the radiation-induced transient faults using a double
exponential current source, which injects current to the nodes that are vulnerable to soft errors.
This current source was injected/connected into vulnerable nodes during the sense mode for the




(e−t/τ1 − e−t/τ2) (5.5)
Where the parameter Qinj represents the amount of injected charge which depends on the technol-
ogy node size (150 fC was considered for 45nm), whereas τ1 and τ2 represent the time constant
with typical values of 150 and 50 ps, respectively [147]. Thus, herein, α-particles effect is con-
sidered the major source of radiation-induced transient faults. As stated in [147], a transient fault
strikes at an input node of a latch circuit is not a major concern since it has a marginal impact.
Thus, herein, the resilience of soft fault coverage masking for the proposed DNU-immune NVFF
circuit has been evaluated by considering transient faults hitting the internal (feedback loop nodes)
and output nodes when the CLK single is active. Therefore, a transient pulse overlapping with the
window of vulnerability can be latched and eventually cause an upset. The window of vulnerability
of node i refers to the time interval during which an energetic particle striking a susceptible node i
might result in a soft error [25]. Next, the developed SE-resilient NVFF design is discussed.
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Figure 5.2: The proposed DNU-tolerant soft-error resilient nonvolatile flip-flop circuit.
5.5 Proposed DNU-Tolerant NV Flip-Flop Circuit
Herein, a power-efficient with superior soft-error resilience NVFF design is introduced. The de-
veloped design has been motivated by the techniques presented in [134] and [77], based on the
combination of reliable Pre-Charge Sense Amplifier (PCSA) circuit [134] and a double upset
tolerant DICE latch with feedback transistors [77]. The proposed modifications have been de-
signed by evaluating the limitations of power consumption, soft error resilience, and volatility of
CMOS-based large-scale logic circuits, regarding area overhead and speed performance degrada-
tion. Figure 5.2 depicts the design architecture of the developed NVFF circuit. The structure of
the presented NVFF circuit is composed of three components including: logic control for write
access operations, nonvolatile master latch, and volatile slave latch. The write circuit employs
STT switching mechanism to switch the configurations of the MTJs since the STT technique is
considered the most mature and advanced writing mechanism due to its low current usage, e.i.,
50µAmps@40nm [148], and high-speed performance. In addition, the transmission gates (TG1
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and TG2) were added to isolate the write circuit from the sensing path during the sensing mode,
synchronize the read and write access operations. The magnetic master latch utilizes 17 transistors
in sense amplifier circuit configuration that is highly robust against particle strike induced DNU,
whereas the slave latch uses 18 transistors in DICE latch with feedback transistors configuration
that is substantially immune to single-event induced double upset.
5.5.1 Functionality Analysis of the Proposed NV Flip-Flop
Default operation mode: Considering the SEU-free case, when the clock signal (CLK) is low and
the complement clock signal (CLḰ) is high, i.e., falling edge of the clock, the coming data bit at
the input is written into the NV master latch by reconfiguring the state of the MTJs based on the
bit value. This is achieved by the STT switching mechanism that generates bidirectional current
to switch the free layer of the storage MTJ cell to represent a 0 or 1 logic value as compared
to the reference MTJ. During the rising edge of the CLK signal, when CLK is high and CLḰ
is low, the magnetic master latch is functioning in the transparent mode of operation, and the
sensed data bit from the NV MTJ cells is sent to the output through TG3. Whereas when the CLK
signal is low and CLḰ is high, the slave latch is functioning in the latching mode of operation,
and the output is taken from n2 of DICE latch through TG4 with the falling edge of the CLK.
Meanwhile, since the feedback path delay of the proposed NVFF is isolated from the input-to-
output delay path during the rising edge of the clock signal, the proposed DNU-tolerant NVFF
achieves excellent sensing and CLK-to-Q delay times as the performance degradation is roughly
25% compared to conventional CMOS DICE-based flip-flop, presented in [77]. The proposed
NVFF was evaluated by simulations using HSPICE. Figure 5.3 shows the timing waveforms of
the developed NV latching circuit. As can be seen, both nodes S0 and S1 are precharged to VDD
during the falling edge of the CLK, while the data bit and its complementary are sensed at these
nodes during the rising edge of the CLK. The output, Q, is updated from node S1 with the rising
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edge of the CLK, while the logic value of node n2 is sent to Q during the falling edge.
Figure 5.3: Timing waveforms of the proposed DNU-tolerant NVFF.
5.6 Experiments and Results
Experiments are carried out to analyze the overheads for the proposed soft-error tolerant NVFF de-
sign. The developed DNU-tolerant NV flip-flop design is synthesized and simulated using HSPICE
simulation based on 45nm HK-MG bulk CMOS PTM-based NanGate open source library. The
conducted simulations for the proposed NVFF circuit is performed with supply voltage of 1.1 V
at room temperature. In order to make the design work using a single clock rate for both the TGs
and the MTJs’ sensing circuit, a relatively higher switching current of roughly 100 µA was used
to quickly switch the configuration of the MTJs at a delay of ∼2 ns during the falling edge of the
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clock. Thus, the frequency is set at 250 MHz for the entire circuit. However, this is at the expense
of high write energy as will be discussed in Section 6. For a fair comparison purpose, all designs
in [140,141], and [77] have been re-simulated using the same CAD tools, i.e., the same technology
node (45nm) and the same STT-MTJ model based on Verilog-A.
5.6.1 Evaluation of Area, Power, and Delay Overheads
Performance penalties of the proposed radiation-hardening NVFF design is analyzed and evalu-
ated in terms of area overhead, efficiency of power consumption, and propagation delay to validate
the superiority of the presented NVFF over the selected prior work in [141] and [140]. Table 5.2
summarizes the performance penalties and soft error robustness of the presented NV latching cir-
cuit, normalized to the CMOS-based flip-flop design presented in [77]. The occupied area of
the proposed NVFF is estimated in equivalent device count required to construct the NVFF design,
adopted from [149]. Simulation results reveal that the proposed NVFF incurs 17% and 13% of area
overhead and power consumption, respectively, while the design recently presented in [140] incurs
37% of area overhead and 24% of power consumption penalty. Additionally, the proposed NVFF
realizes an acceptable performance degradation (25%) in term of overall time delay (max {TCLK−Q
+ Tsetup, Tsense}) and relatively associated with low leakage power (21% less than CMOS-based
design). The design presented in [141] incurs the lowest area and power overheads, however, it
does not provide protection for both SEU and DNU.
On the other hand, the drawback for the developed NVFF is that it consumes high energy for write
access operations since a high switching current (IMTJ = 100µA) with a shot duration (∼2 ns)
is utilized to change the states of the MTJs, but it is less than those in [140] and [141]. Thus,
improved developments to lower the write energy and improve the reliability, scholastic behaviors,
of STT switching mechanism is sought so that hybrid STT-MTJ/CMOS circuits can be directly
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implemented on commercial technologies. The presented NVFF incurs moderate area overhead,
low leakage power, and high computing performance. Thus, it can be utilized as a base component
to design more complicated hybrid Spintronics/CMOS non-volatile logic and memory circuits.
Table 5.2: Performance penalties of the proposed NVFF circuit w.r.t. conventional CMOS-based
flip-flop.
Metrics CMOS-Based NVFF NVFF ProposedFF [77] [141] [140] NVFF
Area
1 0.57x 1.37x 1.17x
(Device Count)
Power Consump.
1 0.48x 1.24x 1.13x
(µW )
Overall Delay
1 1.72x 1.78x 1.25x
(ns)
Leakage Power
1 0.43x 0.91x 0.79x
(µW )
Write Energy
1 10 ∼ 11x 9x 5 ∼ 6x
(fJ)
Nonvolatility x X X X
SEU / DNU
X/X x/x X/x X/X
Tolerant
5.6.2 Evaluation of SEU and DNU Immunity
Table 5.3 lists the total number of vulnerable nodes that cause soft errors. In addition, the most
vulnerable nodes of each latch (master/slave) are identified based on their susceptibility. These
nodes, i.e., (S0, S1, S2, and S3) for master-latch and (n0, n1, n2, n3, v0, and v1) for slave-latch,
result in a latch upset when hitting by an energetic particle with adequate LET to flip the latch state.
These nodes are considered susceptible area because they are connected to the reverse-biased junc-
tion of transistors in OFF state. In order to quantify the robustness of the presented design against
radiation-induced soft errors, a transient current source was connected to each susceptible node,
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identified in Table 5.3, with a maximum pulse amplitude of 0.192 mA and 800 ps of duration.
These HSPICE simulations were carried out to determine the vulnerable node pairs, i.e., most sus-
ceptible to particle hits, so that if they suffered a hit and flipped the logic state, then the selected
pair is considered unprotected. This current source was injected into a single node to emulate a
SEU, whereas double current sources were connected to double adjacent susceptible nodes, node
pair, concurrently to imitate the effect of DNUs. The results of the transient simulation demon-
strate that the presented NVFF is robust to achieve 100% of SEU masking, while the probability of
unmasked DNU is found to be roughly 3.3%, as listed in the last column of Table 5.3. The vulner-
ability of DNU results from the fact that the hardened PCSA circuit has two vulnerable node pairs
(S0 and S3; S1 and S3), and the DICE latch has a single susceptible node pair (n0 and v0), shown
in Figure 5.2. However, this vulnerability can be alleviated by isolating the device sensitive drain
area occupied by these node pairs on the cell’s layout, which is beyond the scope of this work.
Meanwhile, among the designs listed in Table 5.2, the presented NVFF is the only non-volatile
latching circuit that can highly tolerate SET induced DNU simultaneously. It is worth noticing
that each latch circuit of the proposed NVFF is able to tolerate DNU concurrently, which makes
the developed NVFF circuit an attractive soft-error resilience storage element for nanoscale device
technology.
Table 5.3: Soft-error tolerance analysis of the proposed NVFF design.
Latching Total ] ] of Vulnerable Possible ] of Unprotected Fault Masking
Circuit of Nodes Nodes Node Pairs Node Pairs Coverage (%)
Master-Latch 6 4: (S0, S1, S2, S3) 15 (S0,S3) and 100 for SEU(S1,S3) 86.67 for DNU
Slave-Latch 8 6: (n0, n1, n2, n3, v0, v1) 28 (n0,v0) 100 for SEU
96.43 for DNU




In this chapter, a soft error resilient NVFF circuit that can achieve intriguing attributes is presented.
The developed NVFF achieves reduced area and power penalties (14.6% and 10.3%, respectively),
while offering speed performance improvement of 29.5% as compared to the prior work in [140].
In addition, it significantly reduces leakage power by 21% compared to the CMOS-based design.
Thus, the proposed soft-error resilient NVFF can be utilized to harden the critical or vulnerable
registers against radiation-induced transient faults, including both SEU and DNU. Meanwhile,
since the STT writing mechanism incurs high energy for switching the MTJs states, thus energy-
efficient NV-FF circuits are still sought. In the next chapter, energy-efficient Spin Hall Effect
(SHE)-MTJ NVFF designs will be introduced as promising candidates to realize energy-aware and
reliability-aware soft-error resilient latching circuits.
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CHAPTER 6: ENERGY-AWARE AND RELIABILITY-AWARE
NON-VOLATILE SPINTRONIC REGISTERS FOR RESILIENT
ARCHITECTURAL STATE STORAGE
This chapter covers the designs for energy-aware and reliability-aware soft-error resilient latch-
ing circuits to improve soft-error masking robustness of emerging large-scale NVFF circuits while
concurrently reducing its power dissipation to realize energy efficiency. In particular, low-energy
radiation-hardening approaches are proposed to develop Non-Volatile (NV) Flip-Flop (FF) cir-
cuits using spintronic devices. Also, Spin Hall-Effect Magnetic Tunnel Junctions (SHE-MTJs) are
used to design a radiation-hardened NV-latch that is proposed to be utilized as a shadow latch to
maintain the data during the standby mode when the circuit is power-gated. Moreover, soft error
resilient CMOS-based latching circuits are designed to be leveraged as master and slave latches in
the NV-FF structure. The proposed hardening techniques are based on using feedback loops and
clock-gating Muller C-elements, as well as increasing the charge capacity of vulnerable nodes.
The circuit simulations indicate that the proposed Single-Event Upset (SEU) and Double Node
Upset (DNU) resilient latching circuits can achieve at least 81% and 24% power-delay-product
improvement, respectively, while incurring comparable area overhead compared to the previous
energy-efficient radiation-hardened latch designs. Finally, the proposed latching circuits are com-
bined to develop four radiation-hardened NV-FF designs. The results obtained show that, using
the proposed NV latching circuit as a shadow latch can result in two orders of magnitude reduc-
tion in energy consumption compared to the FF circuits with an NV master latch. In addition, the
proposed latches achieve favorable tradeoffs in terms of minimized performance overheads and
maximized robustness (100%) of Soft Fault Coverage to single and double upset.1
1 c© 2019 IEEE. Reprinted, with permission, from [150].
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6.1 Writing Mechanisoms for Switching the MTJs States
Spin transfer torque (STT) switching mechanism is one of the most commonly-used methods for
changing the MTJ states [144]. However, the STT approach incurs high switching energy, and
suffers from oxide barrier reliability issues due to the shared read and write path. Therefore, Spin
Hall Effect (SHE)-assisted STT approach has been introduced in recent years, which consumes






Figure 6.1: (a) SHE-MTJ vertical structure, (b) SHE-MTJ top view.
Figure 6.1 shows a three terminal SHE-MTJ device, in which the free layer is directly connected
to a Heavy Metal (HM). The MTJ state can be changed via a charge current applied to the HM,
which can generate a spin-polarized current that flows through the MTJ free layer. In particular,
a positive current along +x induces a spin injection current in +z direction. The injected spin
current produces the required spin torque for aligning the magnetic direction of the free layer in
+y directions, and vice versa. The ratio of the injected spin current to the applied charge current
is normally greater than one in SHE-MTJ devices, and is called Spin Hall Injection Efficiency













The relation between the switching delay (τSHE) and the applied charge current (IWRITE) is shown













τ0 = qMSVHM/IcPµB is the characteristic time, θ0 =
√
kB/2Eb is the effect of stochastic varia-
tion, and Eb is the thermal barrier of the magnet. In this paper, the SHE-MTJ devices are modeled
based on the modeling approach proposed in [143] and [152] using the aforementioned equations.
In particular, a Verilog-AMS model is developed and utilized in SPICE circuit simulation to val-
idate the functionality of the designed circuits. Table 6.1 lists the experimental parameters for an
in-plane CoFeB/MgO/CoFeB MTJ with β-tungsten (β-W) HM that are obtained from [11, 12].
6.2 Soft Fault Coverage Analysis of Latching Circuits
Here, to evaluate the radiation tolerance of the proposed circuits, the Soft Fault Coverage (SFC)
metric is introduced, which is determined by the ratio of unprotected node pairs over the total
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) ) ∗ 100% (6.4)
where n is the total number of sensitive nodes, and m represents the total number of unprotected
nodes in a circuit.
Table 6.1: Parameters of SHE-MTJ devices [11, 12].
Parameter Description Value
HMV olume lHM× wHM× tHM 100nm ×60nm ×3nm
MTJArea lMTJ× wMTJ × π4 60nm ×30nm ×
π
4
MTJArea Reference MTJ Surface 50nm ×25nm ×π4
α Gilbert Damping factor 0.007
MS Saturation magnetization 7.8e5 A.m−1
P Spin Polarization 0.52
RP , RAP MTJ Resistances 2.8 KΩ, 5.6 KΩ
RP Reference MTJ Resistance 4.1 KΩ
TMR TMR ratio 100%
θSHE Spin Hall Angle 0.3
ρHM HM Resistivity 200 µΩ.cm
λsf Spin Flip Length 1.5 nm
IC−SHE SHE-MTJ Critical Current 108 µA
Transient faults are known to have negligible impacts on the inputs nodes of a latch circuit [147].
Thus, herein, focus is on faults affecting internal nodes of feedback loops and output nodes of the
circuits to evaluate the radiation-tolerance of the proposed designs when the data is latched with the
rising/falling edge of the clock signal. Therefore, a transient pulse overlapping with the window of
vulnerability can be latched and cause an upset. The window of vulnerability refers to the period
during which a particle striking a sensitive node might induce a soft error [25]. Vulnerable nodes of
a circuit are identified based on their susceptibility, whereby nodes connected to the reverse-biased
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junction of transistors in the OFF state are considered sensitive nodes [153].
6.3 Proposed Soft-Error Resilient NV-FF Designs
Herein, resilient spintronic NV flip-flop designs are developed to significantly reduce the impact of
transient and upset glitches, thus elevating the robustness of latching circuits. This is a vital focus
whereas the feedback and output nodes of a latching circuit are the most vulnerable nodes capable
of contributing to an SEU [147]. The NV-FF circuits are designed by considering hardening for
these susceptible nodes. This can maximize the soft error immunity while minimizing the area and
energy costs of the proposed latching circuits. First, the design of the proposed spintronic latching
circuit is discussed.
6.3.1 DNU-Resilient Non-Volatile Latch Circuit
The proposed radiation-hardened non-volatile latch circuit is shown in Figure 6.2, in which the
write circuit has not been depicted for simplicity. Transmission Gates (TGs) are used in the SHE-
MTJ write circuit, which are characterized by their near-optimal full-swing switching behavior.
TGs can provide an energy-efficient and process variation resilient write circuit as established
in [154]. Figure 6.3 (a) and (b) show the structure of the TG-based write circuit required for switch-
ing the logic states of NV-latch’s SHE-MTJ and reference SHE-MTJ cells, respectively. As shown,
if Q=VDD and WE=VDD, the TGs will generate a charge current (IC) in –x direction, which induces
a spin current (IS) in +z direction aligning the magnetic direction of the free layer (FL) in –y direc-
tion. Thus, the magnetization orientation of the free layer and fixed layer will be in the AP state,
leading to a high resistance for the SHE-MTJ device (RMTJ=RHIGH=RAP ). Similarly, Q=GND
aligns FL in +y magnetic direction, leading to a SHE-MTJ with P state, thus RMTJ=RLOW=RP .
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The write circuit for the reference SHE-MTJ is only utilized after the device power-on, in which
the magnetic direction of reference SHE-MTJ is tuned to the P state by applying QREF=0 and
WEREF=1 signals. The TG-based write circuit can generate a current amplitude of ∼160 µA,
which is sufficient to switch the logic state of MTJ in less than 2ns. The maximum write current
density for the SHE-MTJ device utilized in this paper is approximately 9×1011 A.m−2, which is
greater than the minimum write current density required for switching the conventional 2-terminal
MTJs. However, the reliability of tunneling oxide barrier, which is a major reliability issue in
2-terminal MTJs, is improved in the SHE-MTJ, since the current does not flow through it during
the write operation [155]. Moreover, the authors have investigated the effect of radiation particles
on the SHE-MTJ write circuitry in [156], where it was shown that the SHE-MTJ magnetic state
does not change due to the short duration of the radiation-induced current pulses. Thus, herein,
concentration is on protecting the read operation of the latch in the presence of radiation particles.
The read circuitry is designed based on the well-known Pre-Charge Sense Amplifier (PCSA) cir-
cuit [134]. The PCSA compares the stored resistive value of the SHE-MTJ cells with a reference
MTJ cell. As expressed by Eq. 5.1 and Eq. 5.2, the resistance of the SHE-MTJ is determined by the
angle (θ) between the magnetization orientations of its fixed layer and free layer. In particular, if
the magnetization orientation of the layers is in parallel (P) state (θ = 0), the SHE-MTJ resistance
is low (RLOW=RP ), and if the magnetization orientation of the layers is in anti-parallel (AP) state
(θ = π), the SHE-MTJ resistance is high (RHIGH=RAP ). Thus, the resistance of the reference
SHE-MTJ should be designed such that its resistance value in P configuration (RP−ref−MTJ ) is
between the resistances of the NV-latch’s SHE-MTJ cell (RLatch−MTJ ) in P and AP states as ex-
pressed by Eq. 6.5. Specifically, the resistance of the SHE-MTJ cell can be tuned by adjusting the








 1 if RLatch−MTJ > RP−ref−MTJ ;0 if RLatch−MTJ < RP−ref−MTJ .
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Non-Volatile DNU-Resilient Latch Circuit
Figure 6.2: Circuit diagram for the NV DNU-resilient latch, in which the write circuits have not


























Figure 6.3: Write circuit for (a) NV-latch’s MTJ cell, (b) Reference MTJ cell.
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Therefore, if the resistive value of a SHE-MTJ cell in the NV-FF circuit is greater than the resis-
tance of the reference cell, the output of the PCSA will be logic ’1’ and vice versa. Read operation
using PCSA involves two operating phases: (1) pre-charge, in which S0 and S1 nodes are charged
to the nominal voltage (VDD), and (2) discharge, where SE signal equals VDD and the MP0 and
MP1 transistors are OFF. Therefore, the pre-charged S0 and S1 nodes are disconnected from the
voltage source, and start discharging with different speeds due to the difference between resis-
tances of the discharge paths. For instance, if the voltage of node S0 discharges faster, the MP2
transistor will be ON earlier than MP1 due to the voltage difference between its gate and source
terminals. This recharges node S1 to VDD, which results in MP1 transistor remaining OFF and
node S0 completely discharging to the ground. In the proposed circuit, node S0 is connected to the
storage element and shows the output of the latch, while node S1 is connected to a reference SHE-
MTJ cell. The dimensions of reference MTJ is designed such that its resistance in P configuration
is between the resistance of the storage cells in P and AP states.
The internal node S0 and S1 are the radiation-sensitive nodes of the proposed NV latch circuit. The
hardening circuitry includes four NMOS (MN0-MN4) and two PMOS (MP6-MP7) transistors that
are used to discharge the radiation-induced electric charges injected to these vulnerable nodes (S0
and S1). However, the utilization of these feedback transistors creates two sensitive nodes within
the hardening circuitry, S2 and S3, which are the surroundings of the reverse-biased drain junction
of MP6 and MP7 transistors during the discharge phase. The sensitivity of these nodes depends
on the state of the SHE-MTJ. In particular, when the SHE-MTJ is in P configuration, then S3 is
the sensitive node. While node S2 is the vulnerable node when SHE-MTJ cell is in AP state. To
increase the radiation tolerance of S2 and S3 nodes, the MP6 and MP7 transistors connected to
these vulnerable nodes are enlarged to increase their equivalent charge capacitance.
Soft-error resiliency of the proposed NV-latch is evaluated via SPICE circuit simulations, in which
the latch storage cell is considered in P state, thus S0, S1, and S3 are the sensitive nodes. Figure 6.4
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shows the behavior of the proposed radiation-hardened NV-latch circuit in presence of SEUs. An
SEU on node S1 increases its voltage, however since the voltage of S0 is still near zero, MP2
remains ON and S1 will be re-charged to VDD through MP2. An SEU on node S0 increases its
voltage level to more than VDD, however since the voltage of S3 is near VDD, the MN4 transistor
remains ON and the injected charge will be discharged through MN4 and the output will be recov-
ered after ∼ 0.9 ns. Radiation particles striking at node S3 have a negligible effect on its voltage,
thereby the voltages of the nodes S0 and S1 remain unchanged. The transient behavior of the pro-
posed NV-latch in presence of DNUs is shown in Figure 6.5. Particles striking S0 and S1 nodes do
not impact the voltage level of node S3, therefore MN4 will remain ON and the injected charge at
node S0 will be discharged through MN4 leading to the S1 being recharged to VDD through MP2.
DNUs on nodes S3 and S0 have a minor impact on the voltage of S3 due to its increased charge
capacitance, thus MN4 remains ON and the injected charge will be discharged through MN4 and
the output will be recovered. Similarly, DNUs on node S3 and S1 result in an insignificant effect
on S3 since the voltage of S0 remains near zero, and S1 will be charged to VDD through MP2.



























































































Particles Striking Node S0
Particles Striking Node S1
Particles Striking Node S3
Figure 6.5: Transient response of the proposed NV-latch to DNUs.
Herein, the proposed SEU and DNU resilient CMOS-based latch circuits can be used as master and
slave latches in the NV-FF designs, as shown in Fig. 6.6 and 6.8, respectively. The proposed DNU-
resilient NV-latch is utilized to backup data only during standby mode. Hence, the logic state of
the CMOS-based flip-flop is stored into the MTJs before entering standby mode via power gating
circuits. In the wake-up mode, the data stored in MTJ is sensed and transferred to the CMOS-based
logic. In this case, the MTJ cells are only written in the standby mode, while CMOS-based latches
are used during the normal operation.
6.3.2 SEU-Resilient Non-Volatile Flip-Flop Circuit
Herein, the MTJs serve to backup data only during standby mode, whereas the proposed SEU-
resilient NV-FF operates in four modes including: (1) latch mode: this is the normal operation of
the circuit which is similar to the conventional FF circuits, (2) back-up mode: the data in slave latch
is stored into the NV-latch, (3) standby mode: the circuit is power-gated and the data is maintained
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in non-volatile elements, i.e. MTJs, with near-zero leakage power, (4) wake-up mode: the stored
data is sensed using proposed radiation-hardened PCSA and recovered for normal latch operation.
The proposed SEU-resilient CMOS-based latching circuit shown in Fig. 6.6 includes an inter-
locked loop, a regular latch, and a clock-gating output comparator (C-element) circuit. Transmis-
sion gates are used to separate master and slave latches, and to isolate the CMOS-based datapath
from the NV-latch circuit. During the restore mode, the data from NV-latch is sensed and inter-
locked into the feedback loop of slave latch. During the latching phase, the proposed circuit can
completely mask transient faults impacting a single vulnerable node that is located either in the
datapath logic or in the feedback loops. To reduce the area overhead and power consumption of
the hardening circuitry, the inverters required for each redundant interlocked loop are replaced with
a single C-element circuit that performs both comparison and inversion operations on the data bit,
therefore a masked output is generated at the internal nodes. The functionality of the proposed
SEU-resilient latch circuit used as a master latch is described below. Similar circuitry is utilized as
the slave latch. When the clock signal (CLK) is low, the input data bit is propagated to the output
of the master-latch through TG1, and simultaneously stored into the regular latch configured by
INV1 and INV2 through TG2. The datapath delay (CLK-to-Q) equals the propagation delay of
a single TG realizing high speed operation. In the latch mode, when the CLK signal is high and
its complementary (CLKB) is low, first the feedback from output node and regular latch (n1) are
compared through the C-element circuit (configured by MP0-MP1 and MN0-MN1), which forms
an interlocked loop and produces the masked internal output, i.e. node n4. Then, the logic value of
node n4 is compared with the output of the regular latch (n2) via a clock-gating C-element circuit
(constructed by MP2-MP4 and MN2-MN4) to produce the masked output of the latch. Thus, a
radiation-induced transient pulse striking node n1 or n3 is filtered out by the internal interlocked
comparator, while the output comparator masks the transient faults striking at node n2 or n4. In
addition, during the normal operation the SE signal in the feedback loops set to logic ’0’, thus the
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latched data bit in the feedback loops will be updated from the coming data at the input. During
the wake-up mode, the stored logic bit in the NV logic is sensed and will be transferred to and
latched in the feedback loops of the slave-latch via TG8 and TG9. In this case, TG8 and TG9
become ON, thus the feedback loops will be updated from the NV-latch circuit before resuming
normal operation. Therefore, the SE signal is essential to control and synchronize the feedback
loops write operation of the slave-latch.

















































































Figure 6.6: Circuit diagram of the proposed high-performance shadow-based SEU-resilient NV
flip-flop.
The radiation-tolerance of the proposed SEU-resilient NV-FF was evaluated by SPICE circuit sim-
ulation. Radiation-induced current pulses were injected to sensitive nodes n1, n2, n3, and n4 at
different instances of time, as shown in Fig. 6.7. The logic states are recovered in n1, n2 and n4
nodes after∼ 200 ps, while node n3 temporarily holds an incorrect logic value until the next rising
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edge of the CLK. Meanwhile, the output (Q) remains unchanged, and the proposed SEU-resilient
latch maintains correct operation. It is worth noting that transient faults striking the output of TG1
do not impact the latch output since it is in transfer mode and its data is invalid during this period
of time [147]. Although the proposed SEU-resilient NV-FF achieves complete SEU masking, it
can not tolerate multiple upsets striking sensitive nodes in master or slave latches simultaneously.


































































 SEUs Injection on Vulnerable Nodesn4
n1n2 n3n4
Figure 6.7: Simulation waveforms for the proposed SEU-resilient latch when a transient fault
strikes a sensitive node.
6.3.3 DNU-Resilient Non-Volatile Flip-Flop Circuit
Herein, a high-performance and DNU-Resilient NVFF (DNUR-NVFF) circuit is proposed, which
realizes radiation-tolerance by triplicating/duplicating the susceptible nodes, and using an output
feedback loop to construct protected internal interlocked nodes. In addition, to protect the output
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node, duplicated interceptive feedback loops are activated during the latching phase. Without loss
of generality, the latching phase is assumed to occur during the rising edge of CLK. In this regard,
the output changes according to the majority logic values of internal nodes.










































































































































Figure 6.8: Circuit diagram of the proposed high-performance shadow-based DNU-resilient NV
flip-flop.
Figure 6.8 depicts the structure of the proposed DNUR-NVFF. Similar to the SEU-resilient NV-
FF design, each latch consists of a dual redundant interlocked loop, a regular latch, and clock-
gating output comparators. Moreover, TG4 is added to transfer data to the output (Q) during the
transparent mode of operation. This reduces the propagation delay time (CLK-to-Q) and achieves
high speed operation. Herein, a C-element circuit is employed in the logic datapath of the latches
to protect the sensitive nodes while reducing the area overhead and power consumption of the
redundant logic. The functionality of the proposed DNU-resilient latch circuit is described below.
Next, the focus is on the behavior of the slave latch since a similar circuit is also utilized as master
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latch.
During the transfer mode, when the clock signal (CLK) is high, the input data bit is transferred
to the output (Q) through TG11, and simultaneously stored to the regular latch (configured by
INV6 and INV7) through TG9. Likewise, it is locked into the upper interlocked feedback loop
(constructed by MP0-MP1 and MN0-MN1) and lower loop (configured by MP2-MP3 and MN2-
MN3) through TG8 and TG10, respectively. Thus, the datapath delay (CLK-to-Q) is equal to
the propagation delay of TG11, thereby realizing a significantly high speed operation. In the
latching phase, the CLK signal is low and the behavior of the DNUR latch is similar to that of
the proposed SEU-resilient latch, except that the output of the lower loop (n15) is now driven
by a C-element (composed by the MP2-MP3 and MN2-MN3), which prevents transient faults
striking n18 node from being propagated to node n15. In addition, during the latching phase the
feedback from the upper and lower loop is compared to ensure the integrity of data bit at the
internal nodes. Thereafter, the logic state of n13, n14, and n15 nodes are compared via a clock-
gating C-element circuit (constructed by MP4-MP7 and MN4-MN7) to produce the masked output
of the latch. Transient faults striking nodes n16 and n18 temporarily alter their logic state, however
the correct logic state will be recovered via a C-element circuit and the output data bit will remain
unchanged. Hence, the integrity of nodes n10, n12, n16, and n18 is ensured via the upper and
lower comparison (C-element) circuit, while nodes n13, n14, and n15 are protected via the output
comparator. Therefore, radiation-induced upsets striking single or double sensitive node(s) will be
masked through the internal and output comparators. Here, the SE signal is performing the same
as in the SEU-resilient NV-FF design.
To investigate the radiation-tolerance of the proposed DNUR-NVFF design, SPICE circuit simu-
lations were performed in presence of DNUs, as shown in Fig. 6.9. To model the effect of DNUs,
radiation-induced current pulses are simultaneously applied to the susceptible nodes of the design.
The injected upsets temporarily alter the logic state of the struck nodes, however the impacted
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nodes n3, n4, n5, and n6 are quickly recovered through the interlocked feedback loops, and the
final output (Q) is not affected. Moreover, transient faults striking the output of TG11 will not
impact the output of the latch since it is in transparent mode and its data is not valid in this mode.
Hence, the proposed DNUR-NVFF design is able to produce the correct output, Q, in presence of
DNUs striking master latch, slave latch, and/or the NV latching circuit, while realizing reduced
area overhead, delay, and power consumption, as discussed in the next section.








































































Figure 6.9: Simulation waveforms for the proposed DNU-resilient latch design when transient
faults hit double vulnerable nodes.
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6.4 Results and Discussion
To evaluate the performance of the aforementioned SEU and DNU resilient NV-FF designs, the
proposed circuits are implemented by SPICE circuit simulator using 45nm CMOS technology [131]
and the SHE-MTJ model introduced in section 6 with 1.1V nominal voltage at room temperature.
To provide a fair comparison, the designs previously presented in [58, 68, 77, 157] have also been
implemented using the same 45nm CMOS library.
6.4.1 Performance Analysis of Proposed Latching Circuits
Table 6.2 provides a comparison between the proposed SEU and DNU tolerant latching circuits
and the soft-error resilient designs recently introduced in [58, 68, 77, 157]. The last four columns
of the table list the relative overheads in terms of area (∆Area), power consumption (∆Power),
datapath delay (∆Delay), and PDP (∆PDP) compared to the conventional TMR-based latch [158]
as baseline.
Simulation results show that the proposed SEU-resilient latch realizes 70.45% and 92.81% re-
duction in power consumption and delay (CLK-to-Q) compared to the baseline design, respec-
tively. Moreover, the presented SEU-resilient design achieves 97.87% decrease in terms of PDP,
which is the largest PDP improvement compared to the previous energy-efficient SEU-tolerant
latches [77, 157]. Additionally, the proposed SEU-resilient latch circuit uses only 20 MOS tran-
sistors, which makes it the second most area-efficient SEU-tolerant design after [77] with 18 tran-
sistors. On the other hand, the last three rows of Table 6.2 provide a comparison between the
proposed DNU-resilient latch circuit and prior work recently presented in [58] and [68]. The re-
sults obtained indicate that the proposed DNU-resilient latch reduces area and power consumption
by 29.63% and 27.49%, respectively, while increasing the speed by 90.63% compared to the base-
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line design. Moreover, as listed in the last column of the table, the DNU-resilient latch circuit
realizes 93.21% PDP improvement compared to the baseline design, making it the most energy-
efficient design among the DNU-resilient latching circuits investigated herein. Thus, the compar-
ison results verified the advantages of the proposed SEU and DNU resilient latch circuit in terms
of PDP, which is mainly achieved by significantly reducing the propagation delay while main-
taining power-consumption and area overhead values comparable to previous high performance
radiation-hardened latch designs.





















Baseline [158] 54 64.72 64.2 4155.02 X × - - - -
[157] 26 60.27 35.54 2141.99 X × -51.85 -6.87 -44.64 -48.44
[77] 18 27.06 17.45 472.19 X Considerably -66.66 -58.19 -72.82 -88.63
Proposed 20 4.65 18.97 88.21 X Considerably -62.96 -92.81 -70.45 -97.87SEUR-Latch
[58] 36 34.63 43.48 1505.71 X X -33.33 -46.49 -32.27 -63.76
[68] 63 6.54 57.31 374.8 X X +16.66 -89.89 -10.73 -90.97
Proposed 38 6.06 46.55 282.09 X X -29.63 -90.63 -27.49 -93.21DNUR-Latch
6.4.2 Performance Analysis of SEUR and DNUR NV-FF Designs
Thus far, the proposed radiation-hardened SEU and DNU resilient NV-FFs use the NV unit as a
shadow latch [159] that is only active during the back-up and wake-up operations. This provides
non-volatility to the FF designs without incurring energy overheads during the normal operation.
Here, the performance of NV-FF designs that utilize the developed SEU-Resilient (SEUR) and
DNU-Resilient (DNUR) latching circuits as the master latch and the developed NV-latch as slave
latch as active components, i.e., incorporating for per cycle data backup, is also examined. Ta-
ble 6.3 lists the structure of the NV-FF circuits investigated herein, as well as their vulnerable
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nodes and sensitive node pairs. The SFC metric defined in Section 6.2 is used to evaluate the
radiation-tolerance of the proposed NV-FFs, as listed in the last column of Table 6.3. The results
indicate that the proposed SEU-resilient NV-FF circuits (SEUR-ShL and SEUR-Non-ShL) cannot
tolerate ∼ 10% of the DNUs, due to the existence of the unprotected sensitive node pairs, listed
in the eighth column of the Table 6.3. Meanwhile, the DNU-resilient NV-FFs (DNUR-ShL and
DNUR-Non-ShL) can tolerate 100% of single and double node upsets. However, this improvement
in radiation tolerance is achieved at the cost of higher energy-consumption and area overhead as
expressed in the Table 6.4. Moreover, it can be observed in Table 6.3 that the utilization of NV-
latching circuitry as slave latch, i.e., active component for per cycle backup, or else the shadow
latch does not have a significant impact on the SFC value.
Table 6.3: Radiation-tolerance analysis of the proposed NV-FF Designs. {ML=Master-Latch,
SL=Slave-Latch, ShL=Shadow-Latch}







SEUR-ShL SEUR SEUR NV 29 12: (n1-n8)(s0-s3) 66 6: (n1-n3, n4)(n5-n7, n8) 100/90.9
SEUR-Non-ShL NV SEUR - 17 8: (n1-n4)(s0-s3) 28 3: (n1-n3, n4) 100/89.3
DNUR-ShL DNUR DNUR NV 49 22: (n1-n18)(s0-s3) 231 0 100/100
DNUR-Non-ShL NV DNUR - 26 13: (n1-n9)(s0-s3) 78 0 100/100
Table 6.4 lists the delay and power consumption of the NV-FFs investigated herein in different
modes of operation. During the normal operation, i.e., latch/transfer mode, the delay and power
consumption of the NV-FFs which use a shadow latch in their structure (SEUR-ShL and DNUR-
ShL) designs are comparable to that of the conventional CMOS-based flip-flop, since the logic
components utilized during normal operation are comparable to a CMOS flip-flop. In particular,
the SEU-Resilient Shadow-Latch (SEUR-ShL) design uses one extra TG, and three additional TGs
are utilized in the DNU-Resilient Shadow-Latch (DNUR-ShL) NV-FF circuit to isolate the CMOS-
based datapath from that of NV logic circuits. During the back-up operation the logic state in the
CMOS-based latch should be stored to the MTJ devices in NV shadow-latch circuit. Switching
the state of the MTJs requires ∼ 98 fJ energy consumption and incurs ∼ 1.8 ns delay. During the
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wake-up operation, the state of the MTJ is sensed by the developed DNU-resilient sense amplifier
and its logic value is restored to the CMOS-based latch. Based on the results provided in Table 6.4,
the energy consumption for the wake-up operation is approximately equal to 0.048 fJ and 0.074
fJ for the SEUR-ShL and DNUR-ShL NV-FF circuits, respectively. It is worth noting that, the
back-up and wake-up operations in designs with Shadow-Latch (ShL) only occur when the FF is
being power-gated.










Device Count MOS 63 35 105 53
MTJ 2 2 2 2
Normal Mode
Power (µW) 24.56 135.52 52.42 162.31
Delay (ns) 0.064 2.74 0.067 2.75
Energy (fJ) 1.57 371.32 3.51 446.35
Back-up Mode
Power (µW) 54.77 NA 54.51 NA
Delay (ns) 1.79 NA 1.8 NA
Energy (fJ) 98.03 NA 98.12 NA
Wake-up Mode
Power (µW) 1.1 NA 1.58 NA
Delay (ns) 0.044 NA 0.047 NA
Energy (fJ) 0.048 NA 0.074 NA
In contrast, SEUR-Non-ShL and DNUR-Non-ShL designs do not have a shadow latch in their
structure and the developed DNU-resilient NV-latching circuit is used as a master latch. Thus,
the data should be written in and read out from the MTJ device in each cycle, which will signif-
icantly increase the power consumption and delay of the NV-FF’s normal operation. The results
listed in Table 6.4 show more than two orders of magnitude reduction in the energy consumption
per cycle of the designs that use NV-element within a shadow latch instead of master latch, i.e.
NV-FF SEUR-ShL and DNUR-ShL designs. This indicates that these designs incur roughly delay
of 1.8 ns only before entering the standby mode. During the normal operation/mode, they incur
negligible delay (64 and 67 ps, respectively). On the other hand, SEUR-Non-ShL and DNUR-
Non-ShL designs backup the data bit in every clock cycle, and thus, they incur significant delay
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(2.7 ns), which represents output delay of normal operations. Hence, although using a shadow
latch incurs area overhead and adds back-up and wake-up operations to the NV-FF, it provides sig-
nificant energy consumption advantages that makes the proposed SEU and DNU resilient NV-FFs
suitable candidates to be used within energy-harvesting-powered systems, as well as intermittent
and normally-off computing architectures.
6.5 Summary
In this chapter, energy-efficient and radiation-tolerant NV-FF circuits are developed using SHE-
MTJ devices. First, a NV-latching circuit is designed that can tolerate multiple upset nodes us-
ing feedback transistors to discharge the radiation-induced charges injected to its sensitive nodes.
Then, SEU and DNU resilient CMOS-based latching circuits are developed, which utilize intercep-
tive feedback loops with the clock-gating Muller C-element at output stage to mask soft errors in-
duced by the particles striking the sensitive nodes of the circuit. The developed radiation-hardened
CMOS-based latching circuits realize more than 90% PDP improvement compared to conventional
soft error resilient latching circuits.
Next, the designed latching circuits were leveraged to develop SEU and DNU resilient NV-FF cir-
cuits. In particular, the NV latching circuit is leveraged as a shadow latch to backup the data for the
standby operation, while the CMOS-based latches are used as master and slave latches. The com-
bination of the proposed DNU-resilient NV shadow latch and SEU-resilient CMOS-based master
and slave latches achieved a radiation-hardened NV-FF, which could tolerate 100% of SEUs and
more than 90% of DNUs. To realize 100% DNU-resiliency, the developed DNU-resilient latch
circuit is leveraged as slave and master latches along with the DNU-tolerant NV shadow latch.
Achievement of 100% DNU-tolerance is realized at the cost of higher area overhead and energy
consumption compared to the proposed SEU-resilient NV-FF. In summary, the results obtained
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quantify the clear trade-off between radiation immunity, area-overhead, and energy consumption.
Consequently, the NV-FF designs developed herein can ensure correct operation in harsh environ-
ments in terms of radiation, while also supporting low-energy intermittent computing for IoT and
space-based applications.
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This final chapter presents a summary of achievements of this dissertation and integration into
state-of-the-art techniques that explore novel and bold ideas. In addition, the drawback(s) and
inherent limitations of proposed techniques are discussed. Likewise, recommendations to improve
circuit performance in terms of energy-efficiency and resilience of fault masking coverage are
elaborated here. In the following sections, the technical summary of the proposed SE-mitigation
approaches is presented and the possible future work is also discussed.
7.1 Technical Summary
The recent trends for the aggressive scaling of nanoscale CMOS device technologies have posed
new challenges which significantly contribute to impact a system’s performance and reliability.
First, there exists an increased impact of Process Variation (PV) on device performance, while the
second reliability challenge is an increased susceptibility of nanoscale device technology to soft
errors. In particular, radiation-induced soft errors have become a key issue as they cause malfunc-
tions in large-scale circuits and systems even for terrestrial applications. Similarly, the continuous
shrinking of supply voltage reduces the required energy to induce transient and upset glitches, i.e.,
Single-Event Transient (SET) and Single-Event Upset (SEU), at the susceptible nodes of a logic
circuit. In addition, operation at higher clock rate has also increased the probability of SETs to
be captured by a latch/flip-flop. These reliability impacting factors have become major concern
of recent device technology. Investigating these challenges underlying the design and evaluation
of robust and energy-efficient modern computing systems for deeply-scaled technologies is the
prime trends, prospects, and contributions of this dissertation. More importantly, how to improve
robustness of circuits and systems towards soft errors while maintaining constricted energy bud-
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get, how to reduce the static power dissipation, and how to tolerate the effects of process Variation
(PV) are the major questions and aims that drive the research progress. Thus, addressing these
challenges efficiently via careful designs, i.e., cost-effective, robust, and energy-efficient, were the
major contributions of this dissertation. Since technology size scaling of CMOS devices has in-
duced emerging issues that impact reliability of nanoscale logic circuits, it has been essential to
address these reliability challenges at the design phase to improve the performance and resilience
for the widespread use of VLSI systems towards these challenges.
In the first portion of this dissertation, a hybrid technique named Temporal Self-Voting Logic
(TSVL), capturing benefits of both spatial and temporal redundancy approaches, has been intro-
duced as an efficient approach that reduces the performance penalties of the spatial redundancy,
i.e., conventional TMR, and improves the performance of temporal redundancy. The proposed
technique is utilized to mask soft errors effects in logic paths, occurring due to a transient or an
upset error. The developed TSVL latch employs a hybrid of spatial and temporal redundancy to
reduce area overhead and power consumption of protection while ensuring the data integrity and
improving systems’ reliability. It utilizes a single datapath for combinational logic and duplicates
the latches/flip-flops instead of duplicated/triplicated logic paths in the prior work. However, even
though the design of TSVL technique reduces the area and power of the protection logic, it de-
grades the speed performance and increases complexity of the design.
On the other hand, near-threshold computing has been proposed as an effective strategy to reduce
leakage power of deeply-scaled CMOS circuits. However, near-threshold strategies exacerbate the
impact of delay variations on device performance and increase the susceptibility to soft errors due
to narrow voltage margins, which makes it difficult to ensure correct performance of large-scale
VLSI designs. Therefore, investigating the effects of PV on the SE-mitigation techniques at NTV
region is the second portion of this dissertation. In particular, we provide detailed tradeoffs between
energy consumption and resilience of fault masking coverage for redundancy-based SE-mitigation
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approaches by introducing a new metric referred to as Fault Coverage Energy Ratio (FCER). Ad-
ditionally, an important insight of this work is to identify redundancy-based hardening techniques
that can deliver increased benefits for the leveraged tradeoffs within iso-energy constraints. Thus,
the primary insight from this work is identification of redundancy-based hardening techniques that
can deliver increased benefits in terms of the FCER for the leveraged tradeoffs within iso-energy
constraints at NTV. In this study, we established the relationship between reliability-aware and
energy-aware operation to improve reliability of low power computing systems in NTV region via
the developed FCER metric, by slightly sacrificing fault resilience, i.e., tolerates few unmasked
soft errors, while meeting the constrained budget of energy consumption. For instance, image pro-
cessing applications are a promising field to employ our developed fault-tolerant approaches and
FCER metric to immune mission-critical systems towards transient faults while delivering energy-
efficiency and preserving high soft fault masking with an acceptable performance degradation.
Finally, we demonstrated how the developed FCER metric provides a concise and effective opti-
mization parameter for design of fault-tolerant circuits and systems, and its applicability to guide
circuit synthesis to meet performance and robustness goals.
Other methods for increasing logic path reliability and realizing novel computing paradigms in-
clude asynchronous logic approaches [160–162], including spintronic-based [163] and QCA meth-
ods [164]. Thus, natural language systems constitute a growing area of future applications that can
benefit from emerging computing approaches [165–167]. Recently, emerging spin-based devices
are introduced as potential alternative and an intriguing candidate to alleviate leakage currents and
scalability challenges of CMOS technology. Spintronic devices can provide the valuable attributes
of non-volatility, near-zero leakage power, vertical device integration, and radiation hardness as
a promising complement to CMOS technology. However, the immunity of read/write circuits to-
wards radiation-induced soft errors needs to be adequately addressed. Therefore, in the last portion
on this dissertation, radiation-immune hybrid CMOS/spintronic flip-flops/registers are designed
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and evaluated for non-volatile applications. First, a spintronic NVFF circuit was developed using
STT as a switching mechanism to write the data bit. Even though the proposed latching circuity
achieved superior soft error resilience, i.e., significantly reduces the potential Single-Event Double
Node Upset (SEDNU) rate, it still incurs high energy consumption due to the high current ampli-
tude required for the switching. Thus, to reduce the protection overhead of extra logic and lower
the switching energy, an energy-efficient SEU and DNU resilient latching circuits are introduced
to be employed within logic datapaths to ensure data integrity. Here, instead of using the STT as
switching mechanism, the SHE is employed to deliver less writing energy consumption while pro-
viding separate paths for read and write operations [11, 151]. Furthermore, the developed NVFF
circuits are designed to work in four modes, including the following: Latch, Backup, Standby,
and Wakeup mode. During normal operation (latching mode), the proposed SE-tolerant latching
circuits will perform the same as CMOS-based FFs, while during the backup mode the data bit in
the slave latch is stored in the NV Shadow-Latch (ShL). In the standby mode, the logic state is
maintained in the NV elements, i.e., MTJs, and the circuit is power-gated with near-zero leakage
power. Finally, during the wakeup mode, the stored logic state is sensed and recovered for normal
latch operation. In this way, the design will incur comparable power consumption and delay com-
pared to CMOS-based FFS, while alleviating the leakage power to be near-zero during the standby
mode. Thus, the developed NVFFs can potentially assist in making the emerging spin-based latch-
ing circuits more feasible and resilient and also continuing the scalability process of CMOS VLSI




The possible future work that can be investigated based on the work presented in this dissertation
are highlighted below:
• One possible trends and agenda to extend this scholarly research is to deeply and seamlessly
investigate the effect of soft-error in modern processor cores for nanoscale device technol-
ogy. Evaluating resiliency of soft fault masking coverage for a single core processor towards
Single-Event induced Multiple Upsets (SEMU) simultaneously can assist in designing re-
liable and efficient large-scale VLSI chips and also minimizing area overhead and power
consumption of protection logic.
• Developing a deep learning classification method to accurately and efficiently estimate the
vulnerable nodes, gates, and/or circuits towards transient faults of large-scale digital sys-
tems. This implies that the developed algorithm searches to identify the most vulnerable
nodes in the design to accurately determine where to optimally allocate the spatial/temporal
redundancy to improve the overall robustness of the targeted system. Identifying the most
vulnerable nodes in a circuit, i.e., modular criticality, in a VLSI digital circuit turns to signif-
icantly improve robustness of large-scale CMOS designs, and thereby efficiently guiding the
designer to realize minimized/limited performance penalties of area and energy overheads.
• Employing the Magnetic Electronic devices and materials instead of the heavy metal to re-
duce the write energy of NV latching circuits.
As Moore’s Law continuing the scaling of CMOS device, additional challenges and reliability con-
cerns will continue to arise regarding the unpredictable behavior of emerging large-scale circuits
and systems, which makes it difficult to predict the performance of a VLSI design. In addition,
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higher hardware complexity may experience new design challenges, and thus, reliability of VLSI
systems will need further investigations. These will be a major concern of upcoming challenges
to be identified, modeled, and addressed efficiently. Therefore, to deal with these issues, it will
be essential to continue studying these research topics via thorough investigations to guide future
research of emerging computing architectures at the ExaByte and ZettaByte scales.
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